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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the transformation of Turkey from an empire to a nation state and 
the chaos in post-WWI Anatolia, drastically affected, first the relationship between the 
Circassians and the Ottoman State and subsequently that with the Turkish Republic. 
Although the Circassians relied on the patronage of the Ottoman State, after the Great 
War political authority was represented by two governments: the Ottoman Porte in 
Istanbul as a de jure government, and the Ankara government as the de facto one, and the 
loyalty of the Circassian people was contrary to traditional accounts divided between the 
two. In general, the ordinary Circassian people supported the loyalists in Istanbul, while 
the majority of the military elite and the CUP members among the Circassians backed the 
nationalists in Ankara.  
This thesis magnifies the presence of the Circassians in this crucial period (1918-1938), 
illustrating how the post-WWI era and the transformative period from empire to a nation-
state became a painful rather than a peaceful experience for those in the country from 
different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Furthermore, it examines the role of the 
Circassians during this period, focusing on the important western and central Anatolian 
conflicts they participated in between 1918 and 1938. In geographical terms, the thesis 
most prominently examines Yozgat, Ankara, Düzce, Adapazarı, İzmit, Gönen, and 
Manyas as these areas are where incidents broke out. The Anzavur, the Düzce-Adapazarı, 
the Yozgat, the Çerkes Ethem incidents, the attempt to prepare for Circassian autonomy 
under Greek occupation, the Gönen-Manyas deportations, and the Circassian opposition 
to the Kemalist regime, are the central topics that the thesis illuminates in detail.  
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Introduction  
 The Circassians1 are the second largest non-Turkish ethnic group residing in the modern 
Republic of Turkey, after the Kurds. Their population numbers about 3 million.2 The 
Circassians held a unique place in Ottoman-Turkish history, as during the Russian 
expansion into the North Caucasus in the 19th century, 90% of indigenous Circassians, 
approximately a million people, were exiled to the Ottoman Empire.3 Following their 
exile, which is symbolically dated the 21 May 1864, the Circassian elites became 
integrated into the Ottoman military and bureaucracy, achieving significant positions. 
Ordinary Circassians were either infantrymen in the Ottoman military and the Hamidian 
Cavalry,4 or farmers in the regions settled by the Ottomans following their exile.  
 With the re-institution of the Ottoman 1876 constitution in 1908, the Circassian elites 
benefited from a new liberal atmosphere prevailing in the empire. They established a 
Circassian school and published a periodical focused on their history, culture, language 
and the problems faced by them at that time within the empire. Subsequently, on 1 May 
1910, they were granted permission by the Ottoman government to teach their own 
language to pupils attending their schools.5 However, this liberal climate did not endure. 
For nearly eleven years without cessation the Empire was at war on different fronts; from 
                                                          
1 A discussion still continues among the North Caucasian groups of Turkey about the term ‘Circassian’. 
Historically, the British used “Circassian” only for Adige people. On the other hand, the documents show 
that the Ottomans used Circassian, or ‘Çerkes’ in Turkish, to describe all of the North West Caucasian 
groups, namely the Adige, Ubikh, Abkhaz and Abaza. I use the same terminology in the Ottoman context. 
In contemporary Turkish context, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Circassian is used 
mostly for the Adige and Ubikh people. Although Circassians and Abkhaz and Abazas are culturally 
closer to each other than other North Caucasians peoples, Abkhaz and Abaza are becoming more of an 
independent identity, distinct from the Circassian identity, especially after their war with Georgia and 
following independence in 1993.  
2 http://www.cerkesarastirmalari.org/org/cerkesler.    
3 See Walter Richmond, The Circassian Genocide (New Jersey; Rutgers University Press, 2013). Justin 
McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821 - 1922 (Princeton: Darwin 
Press, 1995). Kemal H. Karpat, “The Status of The Muslim under European Rule: The Eviction and 
Settlement of the Çerkes,” in Studies on Ottoman social and political history: selected articles and essays 
by Kemal Karpat, (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
4 The Hamidian Cavalry was established in 1896, during the reign of Abdülhamid II. The aim was to 
strengthen state authority over the people of Eastern Anatolia and to suppress uprisings in the region.  
5 Nuri Güçtekin, “Çerkes Teavün Mektebi (1910-1914),” Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları 12, no. 23 
(2013): 1–21. 
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1911 it fought against the occupation of Tripolitania by Italy, then in 1912-1913 it was 
involved in the Balkan Wars, then the Great War between 1914-1918, up until 1919-1922, 
when the Turkish War of Independence took place.6 There was also a coup d’état in 1913 
by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP),7 following which they gained control of 
the empire incrementally until the end of the Great War.8  
 In the days following the end of the First World War (WWI) in October 1918, the 
Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Allies and the Ottomans. At this time, high-
ranking members of the CUP escaped the country to avoid facing charges for war crimes. 
After the war, the Allies allowed Greek troops to occupy Izmir in the West of Turkey in 
May 1919. The Ottoman Army was weak at that time, as its soldiers had become 
increasingly ravaged after suffering war throughout the entirety of the preceding last 
decade. The Ottoman military had suffered large-scale losses, casualties, and deserters 
during the so-called Great War. It was also enduring serious economic hardships and food 
shortages. At a time when morale and motivation were exceedingly low, the various 
paramilitary groups that emerged were initially perceived as saviours and protectors 
against the Greek occupation. They were considered useful as a means to defer further 
Greek offensive until the army would be ready to engage the Greek troops again.  
 Thus, war weariness was one of the greatest threats to both the nationalists9 and the Greek 
forces. The Anatolian people suffered scarcity and economic difficulties because of the 
                                                          
6 The term ‘Turkish War of Independence’ is used by academics and historians in the Turkish context for 
the wars between Turkish troops and the Allies, Greeks and Armenians during the 1919 - 1922 period. I 
will use the ‘Turkish – Greek War of 1919-1922’ to refer to the western front of the Turkish War of 
Independence.  
7 The CUP was established as a secret society in 1889 and later turned into a political party (1906). It 
governed the empire after the military coup of 1913 until 1918.  
8 CUP members and its ideology remained influential until the 1950s, though they were gradually 
replaced by the Kemalists and Kemalism, particularly after the assassination attempt (the so-called ‘Izmir 
Conspiracy’) against Mustafa Kemal in 1926. The first three presidents of the country – Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and Celal Bayar – were all one-time members of the CUP.  
9 Nationalists or later on ‘Kemalists’ are those who supported the movement against the Greek occupation 
and which were based in Anatolia. However, Kemalism in that period as a term did not have any 
secularist and authoritarian meanings; these features were taken after 1927. 
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war; furthermore, as some army officers wrote in their memoirs, people in Anatolia hated 
soldiers and the practice of military conscription in the post-WWI era.10  
On the other side, the Greeks were also war weary. Military service had been made 
compulsory in 1911, and they had engaged in several wars over the last ten years, 
including the Balkan Wars, WWI, and the Turkish-Greek War of 1919-1922. Some 
soldiers recruited into the army in 1911 had still not been discharged, and an attitude of 
anti-militarism was pervasive among the soldiers in the Greek army.11 Moreover, the 
Turkish-Greek War had triggered a domestic struggle between the Greek forces and the 
country’s politicians. The war loyalists who wished to remain neutral disagreed on the 
subject of the occupation of Anatolia, the supporters of Venizelos, the Venizelists, backed 
the occupation.12 Due to the difficulties associated with wartime conditions, the extended 
duration of a state of war and conditions at the front, the Anatolian campaign was one of 
misadventure for the Greek army, as reluctance and anger spread among Greek Army 
soldiers.13  
 One of the aims of this study is to examine the process of Circassian mobilisation during 
the Turkish-Greek War of 1919-1922. During that period, both the de jure government of 
the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul, and the de facto government in Ankara, used paramilitary 
groups against one another in their attempts to gain control over the country. This struggle 
between the two governments, and the use of paramilitary groups was akin to a civil war, 
particularly in the affected Adapazarı-Düzce and South Marmara regions,14 which 
experienced widespread chaos. This state of civil war and the associated chaos have 
                                                          
10 Rahmi Apak, İstiklal Savaşında Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1942) 88-89. 
Miralay Mehmet Arif Bey, Anadolu İnkılabı (Mücahedat-I Milliye Hatıratı 1335-1339), ed. Bülent 
Demirbaş (İstanbul: Arba, 1987), 12  
11 Ibid. 12, 13.  
12 Foti Benlisoy, Kahramanlar Kurbanlar Direnişçiler Trakya ve Anadolu’daki Yunan Ordusunda 
Propaganda, Grev ve İsyan (1919 – 1922) (İstanbul: İstos Yayınevi, 2014).10.  
13 Ibid. 10.  
14 South Marmara is in the south of the Marmara Sea and includes the provinces of Kale-i Sultani, 
Hüdavendigar, and Karesi. Today the term refers to Bursa, Balıkesir and Çanakkale.  
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generally been disregarded by scholars, particularly those responsible for producing the 
official (Kemalist) historiography of Turkey. According to Kemalist historiography, 
which was created and developed by the regime in the late 1920s and 1930s based on 
Atatürk’s famous Nutuk speech15, there was no attempt to differentiate approaches to 
engagement in rebellions initiated against the ‘national struggle’ and ‘collaborators’ 
working with foreign forces. This chaos and the internal struggles that occurred during 
the Turkish War of Independence undermines the very notion of a republic created by the 
Kemalist regime, which emphasised the ‘nationalist ’ and ‘total war’ features of the war 
against the Greek troops, during the republican period.  
 High-ranking CUP members, Ottoman bureaucrats, and military men who used 
paramilitary groups to form lines of resistance against the Greek troops beginning to 
occupy Western Anatolia in May 1919 were already planning their moves before the end 
of the Great War.16 They had been concealing arms for later use against the Alliance in 
case of the possible occupation of Anatolia after the Mudros Armistice (October, 1918). 
South Marmara was a key area processing arms, and its depots were responsible for 
organising the resistance movement and armed struggle against the possible occupation 
of the Anatolian portion of the empire by the Alliance. It was also a region in which 
people were already well armed, due to various intra-regional conflicts originating from 
the 1910s.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), Nutuk (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981). Suna Kili, 
Kemalism (Istanbul: School of Business Administration and Economics, Robert College, 1969). Munis 
Tekinalp, Kemalizm (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Gazete ve Matbaası, 1936). Doğu Ergil, Milli Mücadelenin 
Sosyal Tarihi (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1981). Anıl Çeçen, 100 Soruda Kemalizm (İstanbul: Kilit 
Yayıncılık, 2009).  
16 Erik Jan Zürcher the Unionist factor; the role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish 
national movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 106-117.  
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1 - Paramilitarism and Circassians  
The paramilitary unit, as a form of resistance against occupation, was a key feature 
of the early resistance movement in Anatolia. As has been mentioned previously, the 
Anatolian people were already sickened by war having suffered lasting periods of conflict 
over the previous ten years. Although a group of high-ranking military men, prominent 
CUP members and local paramilitary leaders aimed to protect Anatolia, the people of the 
region were not voluntarily willing to support the resistance movement against Greek 
occupation. The only concern of the majority of the people was survival, rather than 
coming together around the resistance movement to fight against occupying forces. 
People were tired, and suffering from war, lack of food, disease and infirmity, as a result 
of casualties. They were unwilling to fight anymore. The populations of Anatolia viewed 
the high-ranking military men and officers as responsible for the catastrophic situation 
they encountered.17 Under such conditions, the role played by the paramilitary groups and 
brigades was crucial. The paramilitaries were more acceptable to people than the regular 
army. Moreover, the soldiers preferred to fight as members of the irregular forces, since 
they did not have to wear military uniform, the hierarchy was not so important as in the 
regular army, and the salary was much higher.18  
The paramilitary groups in South Marmara mainly comprised of Circassians. One 
important question, which has hitherto not been adequately dealt with is this: Why did a 
large number of Circassians join paramilitary groups? Without understanding the 
Circassian presence in the Ottoman Empire, it is impossible to deduce the paramilitary 
activism of Circassians after the World War. It should be emphasised here that the 
Circassians had become war-like before being exiled to the Ottoman Empire, in response 
to their long struggle against the Russians from the mid-18th up until the late 19th century. 
                                                          
17 Rahmi Apak, İstiklal Savaşında Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1942), 88-89. 
18 Ibid. 88-89.  
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Without a formal state structure, particularly those who used to live in the Northwest 
Caucasus, the Circassians tribes, fought a long guerrilla war against the Russians in the 
North Caucasus. In the post-exile period, their skills led them to be recruited into the 
army, to fill a gap in the Ottoman military’s needs. They were also used by the Ottomans 
to counter the rebellions in the Balkans and Anatolia, and during the reign of Abdülhamit 
II, they formed part of the Hamidian cavalry.  
Arguably, the Circassians were systematically organised to participate in the 
armed activities of the state, such as the military and Ottoman Special Organisation: 
‘Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’, which was established by Enver Paşa in November 1913 to battle 
insurgents in the Balkans.19 It was initially hoped that the organisation would remain 
under Enver’s control, although on the surface there was little to suggest that the 
insurgents were working for the Ottoman Empire. The Caucasus Revolutionary 
Committee, which was associated with the Special Organisation to perform counter 
activities in Iran and Russia, particularly in the Caucasus, so as to free the region from 
Russian control, had recruited dozens of Circassians from Anatolia to implement its 
policies.20 Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that their changing cultural features enabled 
them to adjust to the regular and irregular armed activities of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Turkish Republic. This situation echoes what they had encountered in previous decades, 
prior to being exiled to the Ottoman Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries. Their long 
struggle against Russian occupation, colonisation, and atrocities in the North Caucasus, 
the difficult conditions of their exile from the North Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire, 
their struggles to integrate into their new settlements and with their new neighbours 
toughened their daily conditions.  
                                                          
19 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires : The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian 
Empires, 1908-1918 / (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011), 121.  
20 Ibid. 121. 
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These ruthless conditions led a war-like’ Circassian ‘culture to emerge. In the 
period post-WWI, dozens of those who fought in the Ottoman army under the Special 
Organisation returned home. Many of these fighters, such as Anzavur Ahmed, Maan Ali, 
Çerkes Davut, and Çerkes Bekir, were alaylı, who had not studied in military schools and 
so who did not have well organised connections with the executive of the CUP, as their 
relationship had been broken with it in the post-WWI period.21 Whatever they observed 
during WWI, made them anti-CUP and therefore the national movement in Ankara. These 
individuals became the leading figures of the anti-nationalist movement in 1919 and 
1920.22 However, huge numbers of Circassians also fought in the national movement for 
the Ankara government’s army, and worked in the bureaucracy, becoming MPs in the 
assembly.23  
After the Circassian ‘golden age’ in the Ottoman Empire, under the CUP, from 
1908 to 1913 there followed a period of political turmoil and war, and finally the creation 
of the Turkish nation state. The Circassians then saw their rights becoming increasingly 
restricted, similar to other religious and ethnic groups in the country, such as Muslims, 
Christians, Jews, and Kurds in the early republican period. Their position in Turkey 
contrasted unfavourably with that of the Circassian minorities in surrounding states: for 
example, in Jordan they had more privileges than some of the other groups, due to their 
role in the founding of it and special responsibilities as guards of the King; and Israel, 
where the state had given them full support to protect their identity.24 Meanwhile, in 
                                                          
21 Ryan Scott Gingeras, “Imperial Killing Fields: Revolution, Ethnicity and Islam in Western Anatolia, 
1913--1938” (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2006). 182-183.  
22 There are number of Circassians in the Special Organisation during the WWI, however, after the war, 
significant number of them took the Ottoman government’s side against the nationalists. Gönenli Çerkes 
Bekir Sıtkı Bey, Anzavur Ahmed, Düzceli Çerkes Maan Ali Bey, Gendarme lieutenant Çerkes Mustafa 
Bey, Çerkes Ethem, Reşid and Tevfik Beys, Istanbullu Çerkes lieutenant Çerkes Sadeddin Bey, Gönenli 
Çerkes Ahmed Bey, Gönenli Çakır Efe, Major Tophaneli Çerkes Hüseyin Bey, Kadıköylü Çerkes Agah 
Bey, Gönenli Ahmed Bey, see Semih Nafiz Tansu, Cumhuriyet, 31 July 1956. 2.  
23 Sefer Berzeg, Türkiye Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Çerkes Göçmenleri (II) (İstanbul: Nart Yayıncılık, 1990); 
Muhittin Ünal, Kurtuluş Savaşında Çerkeslerin Rolü (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1996). 
24 Arsen Avagyan, Türk Dış Siyasetinde Kuzey Kafkasya Siyasi Muhacereti (1920-1971) (İstanbul: Belge 
Yayınları, 2013), 9.  
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Turkey, the assimilationist policies of the early republican period meant that the 
Circassians faced the threat of losing their ethnic identities. Unlike the Kurdish identity, 
which is not only a cultural identity but a political one also, the Circassian identity in 
Turkey today is far from being a political identity. Although some protests and 
demonstrations have recently been organised to address the issue of mother-tongue 
language rights, for the protection of Circassian identity, and to form a party for the 2015 
general elections, the majority of Circassian groups’ protests and demonstrations are still 
targeted at Russia. It should also be emphasised that Circassian activism cannot 
successfully reach the wider audience of Circassians in Turkey. At present, disunity 
within activist groups and organisations, and internal struggles between these groups and 
organisations are the main reasons for this limited mobilisation of Circassian society in 
Turkey.  
Moreover, some organisations, such as The Federation of the Caucasian 
Association (KAFFED) were unhappy with even limited mobilisation against Russia; 
KAFFED is the largest umbrella organisation representing the Circassians in both Turkey 
and Russia, limiting problems arising with Russia. Therefore, it is argued here, that as a 
leading group among Circassian organisations, it seeks to deplete people’s energy by 
organising protests far away from city centres, to emphasise the historical meaning of 
peripheral cities and places in Turkey that are relevant to the Circassian exile. For 
example, it organised a ‘commemoration day’ in 2014, 2015 and 2016 for the Circassian 
exile, on 21st of May 1864, in the small town of İzmit, Samsun and Kartal/Istanbul, since 
this was where the first Circassians came after the exile and where many lost their lives 
from lack of food and diseases. There are no attempts to organise commemorations in the 
centre of the larger municipalities, such as Istanbul and Ankara.  
It is also important to underline that the ambivalent policy of the Turkish state 
towards the Circassians is another factor preventing a better understanding of their 
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situation in Turkey in the early republican period and its aftermath. On the one hand, the 
state prohibited the expression of Circassian identity in public spaces, and banned the 
language. However, on the other hand, Circassian refugees arriving from Turkey in the 
1920s after the Bolshevik Russian expansion into the North Caucasus, along with their 
political associations with North Caucasian Emigrants in Europe, were both utilised by 
several departments of state from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as associated with the 
intelligence services, in order to strengthen Turkey’s position against Soviet Russia.25 As 
part of this policy, a number of Circassians and North Caucasian Emigrants were 
employed in Turkish intelligence, and by military and police departments, particularly 
during the Democratic Party’s reign in the 1950s.  
In view of the above, it can be stated that because of the rapprochement between 
the Turkish state and North Caucasian Emigrants, and the recruitment of them into the 
intelligence, military and police forces, the Circassians gained some freedoms. They were 
the first group, along with the Azeris, permitted by the state to open a cultural association 
in the republican period (in 1946).26 After elimination of the threat posed in the early 
republican period by groups of Circassians, both inside and outside Turkey, and following 
reconciliation, the Circassians had relatively better conditions compared than other non-
Turkish groups. The Circassians no longer seemed to pose a threat to the state as much as 
they had in the early republican period. The Cold War period partnership against Soviet 
Russia also positively predisposed the state to change its policies toward the Circassians. 
Moreover, as an external community who had settled in Anatolia only 100 years before, 
they were not expected to be likely to demand an independent political structure in 
Anatolia.27  
                                                          
25 Ibid. 16-17.  
26 Ibid. 18. 
27 Ibid. 10.  
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This study will explore the social characteristics of the Circassian community to 
understand their reactions to incidents that took place during the period 1918-1938. The 
class structure was a characteristic feature of this community, and it affected Circassian 
participation in the Ottoman army. The Circassians can generally be divided into two 
different classes, warq (aristocracy) and tfokotl (peasantry).28 The existence of slavery 
and the class structure continued, even after the Circassians converted to Islam and were 
exiled to the Ottoman Empire. The system of slavery among the Circassian community 
was employed by the Ottomans when incorporating them as soldiers into the Ottoman 
military. Due to the increase in the slave trade in the 19th century from the North Caucasus 
to the empire, the Circassians were considered key human resources, able to fill the 
empire’s needs. This meant they were able to move to the higher echelons of the Ottoman 
military and bureaucracy, until recruitment practices altered to incorporate professional 
training during the late 19th century.29 During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, a new 
law was issued by the Porte aiming to abolish slavery and recruit manumitted slaves into 
the military. According to this new legislation, the state would pay the price of the slave 
to the owner, and then the slave would be recruited into the army assuming the owner 
accepted. 30 This policy increased the number of Circassian foot soldiers in the Ottoman 
military. There were also Circassians from upper-class Circassian families who joined the 
Ottoman army and royal military school, becoming a new elite Circassian class in the 
Ottoman Empire, while representing other ‘lower class’ Circassians, using them to 
solidify their own position at the centre of the empire. This situation provided an opening 
for the Circassians in their new country. The Circassian elites became part of the power 
                                                          
28 Walter Richmond, The Northwest Caucasus; Past, present, future (London: Routledge, 2008), 21. Also, 
see the impact of the class structure in the diaspora, Eiji Miyazawa, Memory Politics; Circassians of 
Uzunyayla, Turkey (Unpublished PhD Thesis, SOAS University of London, ND.)  
29 Ryan Gingeras, “The Sons of Two Fatherlands: Turkey, the Soviet Union and the North Caucasian 
Diaspora, 1918-1923,” European Journal of Turkish Studies [Online], 2011, 3,4. 
30 Ehud R. Toledano, “Ottoman Concepts of Slavery in the Period of Reform (1830s-1880s),” in Martin A 
Klein, Breaking the Chains: Slavery, Bondage and Emancipation in Modern Africa and Asia (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 44.  
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centre, and other, lower class Circassians, became either villagers or foot soldiers. 
Nonetheless, scholars have argued that slavery affected some enslaved families even 
during the war of independence period (1919-1922), during which time enslaved families 
fought the nationalists, in response to their owners’ opposition to the nationalists.31 
Undoubtedly, the elites benefited from this situation until the end of that patron-client 
system at the beginning of the 1920s.  
Notably, however the Circassians already had a long history of interaction with 
the Ottoman Empire. Long before they moved to the empire en masse, their women 
served as slaves in the Ottoman harem. Girls were kidnapped, sold or sent by slave traders 
or their families who aimed to make them part of the Ottoman aristocracy, something 
which rings true, particularly for the Abkhazian and Ubikh tribes. This occasion provided 
opportunities for some Circassians to become part of the Ottoman Empire via the harem.  
This thesis will also focus on class structure and slavery among the Circassians, 
and the harem as an institution used by both the Porte and Circassian elites. The Porte 
used slavery both to meet its need for white women slaves for the harem and to move 
Circassian men into the military. The Abkhazians and Ubikhs, in particular, used the 
harem and military to obtain positions inside the empire, as they had a more distinct 
hierarchical social structure than the other Circassian tribes. The existence of Circassian 
women in the harem provided an important means for the Circassians to enter the 
Ottoman bureaucracy and the military. Circassian slave girls became concubines and 
wives of high-ranking bureaucrats and military men, even the Sultan. The latter role was 
an important one for a slave girl and her family. She could become the mother of a prince, 
or a şehzade, which would then have a positive impact on her relatives’ careers in the 
                                                          
31 Gingeras, “Imperial Killing Fields: Revolution, Ethnicity and Islam in Western Anatolia, 1913--1938.” 
42.  
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Ottoman military and bureaucracy.32 This was the case for Anzavur Ahmed,33 whose sister 
was one of the wives of Abdülhamid II; he was raised to the rank of Paşa. 
 
2- The Aims and the Central Questions of the Thesis  
Although there was general chaos throughout Anatolia after 1918, it should be 
underlined that this thesis limits its scope to central and western Anatolia. On the eastern 
front, nationalist forces struggled against the Armenian army. Whereas, in southern 
Anatolia, the French army, with the help of local Armenian bands, also aimed to effect 
an occupation. Moreover, throughout Anatolia, local conflicts between bands, local 
forces, the police and the gendarme were widespread. To study all these regions and 
conflicts is beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses principally on key important 
western and central Anatolian conflicts involving Circassians. Specifically, the Yozgat, 
Ankara, Düzce, Adapazarı, İzmit, Gönen, Manyas are included, as these places were 
where incidents broke out. The Anzavur, the Adapazarı-Düzce, the Yozgat, the Çerkes 
Ethem incidents, the attempt to prepare for Circassian autonomy under Greek occupation, 
the Gönen-Manyas deportations, and the Circassian opposition to the Kemalist regime, 
are the topics highlighted and studied in this thesis.  
During the republican period, the state and its institutions failed to allow 
academics and researchers to study the bloody Turkish War of Independence, or the early 
republican period in any detail with objectivity. Until the early 2000s, the controversial 
topics of this transformative period, from empire to nation state, were off-limits to 
independent researchers inside Turkey. The authoritarian approach of the state to this 
topic created a barrier to researchers. Those who tried to circumvent it were punished by 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 48. 
33 Anzavur Ahmed (1885-1921) was a Circassian, and a member of Ottoman Special organisation, 
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, during the Great War, he was suggested by (Met, Janutuko) Yusuf İzzet Paşa and 
Çerkes Üzeyir Bey to the Special Organisation. See Semih Nafiz Tansu, Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 31 July 
1956. 2 Later on he was made a Paşa by Damat Ferid government in March 1920.  
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the state. For example, economist Fikret Başkaya, who wrote a well-known and critical 
book on Kemalism and the early republican period,34 sentenced to 20 months in prison, 
according to counter-terrorism law in 1993. This was because the book criticised 
Kemalism from a leftist perspective, arguing that the Kemalist movement was no more 
than a Bonapartist and pragmatic movement. Incongruously, a journalist, Hakan 
Albayrak, was also sentenced for claiming in his column that the Islamic funeral prayer 
was not practised when Atatürk died, even though eight days later he corrected his earlier 
comment and said that the Islamic funeral prayer was practised. He was sentenced to 15 
months under the law ‘Crimes against Atatürk’ in 2004.35 In the last decade, however, a 
great number of books have been published relating to this period, describing the 
experiences of the different religious and ethnic groups of Turkey; the majority being 
‘popular’ history books. Indeed, this is another problem; i.e. the lack of academic 
investigation regarding topics considered divisive inside Turkey. While there are a 
number of books that have been published describing the most significant non-Turkish 
elements inside the country, namely the Kurds, there are a dearth of academic studies 
relating to the Circassians of Turkey.  
 This thesis aims to bring about a new perspective on the existing historiography. 
Although over recent decades there have been some worthy novel discussions relating to 
Kemalist historiography in both TV shows and popular history magazines, there has been 
limited historiography originating from the academic domain. This thesis aims to create 
new ground in this area, focusing in detail on the political and historical context for the 
emergence of the activities of Çerkes Ethem36 and Anzavur Ahmed, the incidents of the 
                                                          
34 Fikret Başkaya, Paradigmanın Iflası : Resmi Ideolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş : Batılılaşma, Kalkınma, 
çağdaşlaşma / ; (İstanbul : Özgür Üniversite, 2012).  
35`Atatürk’ün cenaze namazı, gazeteciye 15 ay hapis cezasına mal oldu` 21.04.2004. 
http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/04/21/446534.asp accessed 21.08.2015.  
36 He was a former agent in the Ottoman Special Organisation, one of the leading paramilitary leaders in 
South Marmara in the days following the Great War, of Circassian descent, born in Emreköy/Balıkesir 
(1886–1950).  
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Gönen and Manyas exiles, and the Circassian opposition to the Kemalist regime and its 
repressive policies over the Circassians during the single party periods. With few 
exceptions, none of these topics could hitherto be, or have been studied, with objectivity 
by either the Turkish academy or internationally.37 With some exceptions, existing works 
were heavily influenced by the Turkish ‘one nation’ ideology, based on Kemalism. Thus, 
either they ignore the presence of the aforementioned issues, or accept them only to then 
bring them to view at a shallow level, with discussions regarding who was ‘progressive’ 
or ‘backward’ in the conflict. The thesis will magnify the presence of the Circassians in 
this specific period of Ottoman history, 1918-1938, showing how after Wolrd War I, the 
era that witnessed the transformation from empire to nation-state was a painful experience 
for people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. 
 In the broader context, the thesis will utilise concepts relating to theories of civil war and 
political loyalty, asking the following questions: Where do the Ottoman/Turkish or 
loyalist/nationalist38 struggles and civil war fit into a worldwide context? What were the 
dynamics at play, in terms of the shifting loyalties among Circassian elites and ordinary 
people, for both the state and their ethnic identity during this period? 
 Civil war has been defined as armed conflict leading to at least one thousand deaths.39 It 
is typically a struggle between different groups or authority-wielders within the 
                                                          
37 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor : The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 / (Leiden : Brill, 1984). Ryan Gingeras, “Notorious Subjects, 
Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the Turkish National Movement in Northwestern 
Anatolia, 1919-23,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40, no. 1 (February 2008): 89–108. 
Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores : Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923 /, 
Oxford Studies in Modern European History. (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009). Ryan 
Gingeras, “Last Rites for a ‘Pure Outlaw’: Clandestine Service, Historiography and the Origins of the 
Turkish ‘Deep State,” Past and Present, no. 206 (February 2010): 121–44. Gingeras, “The Sons of Two 
Fatherlands: Turkey, the Soviet Union and the North Caucasian Diaspora, 1918-1923.” Zeynel Abidin 
Besleney, The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey : A Political History /, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern 
Politics ; (London : Routledge, 2014).  
38 ‘Loyalist’ is defined as those who were on the side of the Sultan/Caliph and the Istanbul government, 
‘Nationalist’ or ‘Kemalist’ are ones who supported the movement based in Anatolia and who fought 
against the Greek occupation. However, Kemalism in that period as a term did not have any secularist 
and/or authoritarian meanings; such features emerged after 1927.  
39 Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of 
the Theoretical Literature” in World Politics, Volume 52.4, (July 2000), downloaded from 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/summary/v052/52.4sambanis.html on 09 August 2013, 444.  
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boundaries of a state.40 It is possible to state that civil war can be divided in two categories: 
‘old’ and ‘new’ civil wars. In old civil wars, there were mutual political aspirations for 
participants whose aims were delineated clearly from the outset.41 Violence was not 
venerated; it was merely accepted as a necessary stepping-stone to attain the political aims 
of the group.42 In contemporary civil wars, on the other hand, a clearly delineated aim 
emerges among interested groups. The struggle for leadership and the lack of hierarchy 
within groups has also been a problem in contemporary civil wars.43 These factors all 
contribute to uncertainty in the struggle between different groups and authorities.  
Former civil wars and violence in period 1918-1923 were widespread in Europe. 
The suggestion that Turkey underwent a civil war, despite its rejection by mainstream 
Turkish historians, is not a concept unique to Ottoman-Turkish history in the post-WWI 
era. Civil war and domestic violence were prevalent across the European continent from 
Russia to Britain, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire during 1918-1923. At the beginning of 
the Great War, the conflict was between states and their armies, as had traditionally 
occurred. However, after the war, violence was directed principally against civilians and 
interstate actors by their own governments.44 The widespread use of violence turned this 
war into a ‘European civil war’,45 as the worsening conditions brought about by warfare, 
conflicts between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries spread across the 
continent.46 In Russia, for example, there was the conflict between the Red, White, and 
Green armies at the end of the Great War. In Italy, the territorial and economic profits 
gained during WWI were insufficient to satisfy the nationalist fervour of some Italians. 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 444.  
41 Ibid. 444.  
42 Ibid. 444. 
43 Ibid. 444.  
44 James Mcmillan, “War in Political Violence” in Political Violence in Twentieth – Century Europe ed. 
Donald Bloxham, Robert Gerwarth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 58. 
45 Enzo Traverso, A feu et à sang: De la guerre civile européenne 1914-1945 (Paris: Stock, 2007), 129 
quoted in James Mcmillan, “War in Political Violence” , 58.  
46 Enzo Traverso, A feu et à sang, 71 quoted in James Mcmillan, “War in Political Violence”, 64.  
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Their disappointment resulted in violence, and would eventually bring Mussolini to 
power.47 In Britain, soldiers joined in riots, which erupted in January and August of 1919 
in major cities.48 There was also a struggle between the Irish nationalists and the British 
army in Northern Ireland at this time.49  
 One can observe similarities between the two great multinational empires; the Russian 
and the Ottoman Empires. Generally speaking, the Ottomans and Russians comprised the 
two main rival groups competing for power inside the empire during this period. Both 
empires experienced civil wars, fought by those who supported the existing regimes: the 
White army in Russia against the Bolsheviks, and the loyalists in Turkey against the 
nationalists.50 The creation of a narrative (historiography) was also important for both the 
empires of the successor states of. It can be said that all the leaders: Lenin, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, and Stalin, worked on the production of a ‘national history’ for their countries, 
viewing themselves as ‘revolutionary leaders’. The writing of the nation’s history was 
considered a necessity by the leaders and politicians of the authoritarian states.51 The civil 
wars (or ‘rebellions’ as they are termed in official Turkish historiography) were framed 
by the leaders in the official school history text books and their own memoirs as 
demonstrating the ‘backwardness’ of the old regimes and their supporters.52 In the post 
war period, when the Bolsheviks and Kemalists seized the power necessary to realise their 
agenda, the state was seen as the chief instrument of social and economic transformation, 
                                                          
47 James Mcmillan, “War in Political Violence”, 65. 
48 Ibid. 65.  
49 Ibid. 65.  
50 J.F.N Bradley, Civil War in Russia 1917-1920 (London: BT Batsford, 1975). In the Ottoman context it 
cannot be said that at the beginning the nationalists were initially against the Sultan; they were in fact 
against the supporters of the Sultan. The Sultan in many ways was seen as above this conflict.  
51 Büşra Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 108. 
52 For the Soviet side of this historiography see M. Gorky, V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, S. Kirov, A. 
Zhdanov, J, Stalin, The History of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R. Volume 1, (London: Lawrance & 
Wishart, 1936). For the Kemalist side, see Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), Nutuk (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu Basımevi, 1981). Tarih IV. Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri 1931 – 1941 (İstanbul: Kaynak 
Yayınları, 2004 ).  
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and both were based on single party regimes and statist economic policies.53 Although 
this study focuses mainly on the transformation of Turkey from an empire to a nation 
state, using the Circassians as the case study, it also examines their political and 
paramilitary activism, and the importance of their presence as an influential factor 
effecting both sides in the civil war, fought between the Istanbul and Ankara 
governments. 
 The second central question of the thesis concerns how Circassian political loyalty 
changed during this transformative period. Although the Circassians relied on the 
Ottoman Sultan for their patronage, considering that after the Great War political 
authority was represented by two governments, the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul as a de jure 
government, and the Ankara government as a de facto one, the loyalty of the Circassian 
people was, contrary to traditional accounts, split between the two governments. The 
ordinary Circassian people, generally speaking, supported the loyalists, while the 
majority of the military elites and the CUP members backed the nationalists. It is also 
possible to assert that for some of the Circassian elites, the loyalty of their ethnic 
Circassian identity later became more vital and pronounced. As will be shown in this 
thesis, they tried to set up an autonomous Circassian state under Greek occupation as a 
buffer zone between the Greeks and Turks in 1921. Until that time, Circassian identity 
and its loyalties to the Ottoman State were not in conflict. The concept of Ottoman 
identity, which was in fact a multinational identity, allowed the Circassians to identify 
themselves clearly. However, after the Greek occupation, some of the Circassian elites 
thought that the Ottoman State’s days were limited, and that the time had arrived for them 
to establish an autonomous structure under Greek occupation. This was partly because 
they feared that if they returned to central Anatolia, the nationalists of Ankara would not 
                                                          
53 Charles King, Midnight at the Pera Palace : The Birth of Modern Istanbul /, First edition. (New York : 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2014), 224, 225.  
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give them sufficient space within the new state and would execute them for their 
opposition to Ankara.54 They decided to take a step based on the Wilsonian principles55 
popular at the time, and set up an autonomous Circassian state structure. However, this 
decision was not supported by vast majority of the Circassians. 
 
3- Literature Review  
The liberal atmosphere of the post-constitutional revolution that affected the 
Ottoman Empire in 1908 did not last long. The independence of Bulgaria, the annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria, the occupation of Tripoli by Italy and the war between 
Italy and the Ottoman Empire, not to mention the Balkan Wars, fundamentally changed 
the atmosphere in the empire between 1908 and 1913. The liberal ideas of the 1908 
revolution were sidestepped by the CUP, which toughened its rules concerning opposition 
and the subjects of the empire, by restricting them to maintain the territorial integrity of 
the empire.56 However, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had been predicted by its 
rivals before WWI.57 Germany and Russia had plans for its dismantling, which would 
have seen them to share its territory.58 However, they preferred to postpone this 
dismantlement as long as possible, until they would be ready to take its place.  
 From 1908 onwards, groups with different ethnic and national identities came to 
the stage in the Ottoman Empire with the rise of nationalism and the relatively limited 
success of the idea of ‘Ottomanism’ as a collective identity, encompassing all nationality 
groups in the empire. With the exception of the various Anatolian groups, the members 
                                                          
54 Group of Circassian attempted to set up an autonomous state under the Greek rule in 1922. See chapter 
5.  
55 This is known as the `Fourteen Points` declared by the President of United States, Woodrow Wilson, in 
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Books, 2015), 23,24. 
57 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 : The Ottoman Empire and the First World War /, 
Cambridge Military Histories (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008), 66-68.  
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of different nationality groupings produced their own independent states in the following 
decades, in the Balkans and the Middle East; namely, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Albania, 
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Gulf countries. The majority of non-
Muslim Anatolian groups, such as the Armenians and Rums, were either exiled forcibly 
from Anatolia or exchanged for the Muslim population of the Balkans. A number of 
works already exist concerning Ottoman nationalities and the activities of these groups 
with regard to the process of creating their own nation states.  
However, there are a limited number of studies concerning their non-Turkish 
Muslim counterparts. The Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, the Laz, and the Circassians of 
Anatolia were all subject to the assimilationist policies of the new republican regime 
espousing Kemalism. The absence of academic works on the activities of these groups 
means it is challenging to understand the intricacies of the period in depth. It is not 
possible to argue that there are adequate works on these groups, particularly the 
Circassians. Although their case was unique in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, they 
shared some similarities with the civil war in Russia and the other non-Turkish groups of 
the Ottoman Empire.  
 It is further, useful to understand the Turkish civil war in a broader historical 
context, by comparing it with another civil war, in this case the one taking place in Russia. 
Similar to the Kemalists in Turkey, the Bolsheviks believed that their revolution in 
October 1917 signified a radical break with the past necessitating the establishment of a 
new order in the country. There were some striking similarities between the Russian and 
Ottoman civil wars, and interestingly, both victors in the civil wars, namely the 
Bolsheviks and Kemalists, used similar terminologies to depict them. Concepts implying 
‘progress’ and ‘reaction’ led to those supporting them being termed progressive, and 
those against them labelled backward, reactionary, or loyal to previous regimes. This 
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terminology framed the boundaries of the political language in domestic politics for many 
decades to come in Turkey.59 
Kurds provide an example of a non-Turkish group that encountered similar 
experiences to the Circassians in the late Ottoman and early republican period. From the 
19th century up to the contemporary era, two periods have held a significant place in the 
history of the Kurdish people in terms of their relationships with the Ottoman political 
authorities, and their political mobilisation. The first period is the Hamidian period (1876-
1909), during which, Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) tried to centralise the state as 
much as he possibly could, as part of his response to modernisation. However, to carry 
out these policies he played different ethnic and religious groups against one another to 
gain firmer control over the empire. Janet Klein explores how Kurdish tribal groups, and 
Circassian groups from the same unit, were used by the Hamidian government and its 
successor Young Turk government during the period 1890 to 1914. The Hamidian cavalry 
was also used to control East of Anatolia for the government.60 
 It is also important to mention the emergence of Kurdish nationalism and nationalist 
movements. In particular, the post-Young Turk revolution phase now holds the same 
significance in the history of Kurdish nationalism as it does in relation to the issue of 
Circassian political mobilisation. The impact of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 on 
Kurdish Nationalism, the post-World War relationship between the Kurds and the 
Ottoman State, as well as that with the British forces, was also studied in Robert Olson’s 
book. 61 He depicted the emergence of Kurdish nationalism, noting its historical roots 
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dating from the days of provincial leaders in the Ottoman Empire to the Sheikhs of 19th 
and 20th century and the nationalist-secularist intellectuals of the post-Young Turk 
revolution era. Olson also explored Kurdish activism in South East Anatolia during the 
post Great War period, until the early republican period.  
One of the most significant books of the period relating to the activities of the 
Circassians, and the post-Balkan War in Anatolia during the period covered here, is Ryan 
Gingeras’ Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 
1912-1923.62 This book was one of the first to follow an alternative approach to the 
internal struggles in Anatolia during the Turkish-Greek War of 1919-1922 in detail. 
Gingeras consulted a number of memoirs written by witnesses during this period and 
commentated on some of the key protagonists who played a prominent role in the period, 
as well as relying on archival sources. The majority of these memoirs were published in 
the 1950s when the multi-party system re-emerged in the country. As mentioned in the 
book, the community or class structure of the Circassians should be studied to understand 
their participation in the ‘loyalist’ and ‘nationalist’ sides of the conflict. Particularly in 
terms of their position as a group among the upper-classes who backed the nationalists in 
Ankara by joining the resistance movement against the Greeks, either as military men or 
bureaucrats, and in the assembly as MPs; as large numbers of Circassians also supported 
the loyalists. One of the missing parts of the story in the historiography of this period 
relates to the internal conflicts that transpired locally in parts of western Anatolia, a place 
that Gingeras also focuses on in his book.  
Arsen Avangyan’s book also provides a useful introduction; it is based on Russian 
archival material, as well as secondary Russian and Turkish sources.63 However, 
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Avangyan did not adequately emphasise the internal struggles that took place among 
Circassians or their relationship with authorities, when showing the main differences 
between the CUP and Kemalist eras. Moreover, the book does not mention the impact the 
‘Kemalist-Nation Building’ project had on the Circassians. At times, the author also 
exaggerates the Circassian presence in the Ottoman-Turkish political and military 
structures. A further important work that enhances our understanding of the Circassian 
presence in the Ottoman-Turkish historical and political structure is Zeynel Besleney’s 
recent book, The Circassian Diaspora in Turkey: A Political History.64 The book focuses 
on the political activities and activism of the Circassians as a diaspora community, from 
the beginning of the multiparty period (1950), concentrating particularly on the early 
2000s to the early 2010s.65  
In the single party period, even the existence of a Circassian identity was ignored 
by the state.66 Indeed, one of the reasons why the Circassians were oppressed in the early 
republican era was because they were seen as the remnants of the ancient regime by the 
Republican elites. As Ahmet Kuru has extensively studied, the ancient regime represented 
the Ottoman Empire and its values in the republican context of Turkey.67 Circassians, as 
the single biggest opponents to the Ankara government in the early 1920s, were 
associated with the Ottoman past of Turkey, and one group of them represented the CUP’s 
opposition to the Kemalists in the early republican era. At this time, as Charles King 
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argues, even God had been nationalised;68 the intention was then to assimilate the 
Circassians into the new nation to prevent them from expressing their identity, which 
meant a ban on using their mother-tongue language in public. Until the Democrat Party 
came to power in 1950, after which the Circassians and state reconciled, the Turkish state 
viewed them with suspicion. 
As Ali Birinci demonstrates in his book,69 one should look to the pre-WWI period 
of the Ottoman Empire to understand the nationalist-anti nationalist division of the post-
1919 period comprehensively. It is argued here that the division was mainly a product of 
the CUP-Liberal Entente70 dispute that took place from 1911 to 1914. Some key figures 
from the Liberal Entente were later added to the ‘Yüzellilikler’71 list by the Kemalists, 
such as Gümülcineli İsmail Bey, Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı), Tokat MP Mustafa Sabri 
Efendi, and Konyalı Zeynel Abidin Efendi. The Liberal Entente party believed during the 
pre-WWI period that the Ottoman State should not go against the British, believing that 
Britain was becoming a new political centre in Europe. Furthermore, they believed that 
Britain would be an important ally for the empire, rather than the Germans.72 It is 
important to mention here that outside Istanbul, the Liberal Entente gained the support of 
the ulema, and focused on the local shop owners Esnaf and villagers, who were broadly 
disregarded by the CUP, a party reliant on the support of the military, state officials and 
landowners.73  
There were also many people within the party that were excluded from the military 
and administration of the empire during the CUP rule.74 The CUP believed the only way 
to keep the empire together was to strengthen the central authority of the state; and yet, 
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70 Liberal Entente was established in 1912 as a political party.  
71 Those who declared as `Traitor` or personae non gratae by the Turkish Republic in 1924.  
72 Birinci, Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası, 66-68.  
73 Ibid. 97, 98, 238-240.  
74 Ibid. 97, 98.  
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members of Liberal Entente argued that only decentralisation could unite the empire.75 
After the Bab-ı Ali raid, carried out against prominent CUP figures of the Liberal Entente 
wing (i.e. Kamil Paşa, Cemaleddin Efendi, Sadık Bey, Rıza Nur, Ali Kemal, and Mustafa 
Sabri) and hundreds of opponents of the CUP, they were forced to leave the empire as the 
CUP attempted to force political exile on all its opponents.76 Although there is no any 
direct connection between the pre-WWI Liberal Entente and post-WWI Liberal Entente, 
those who suffered under the CUP rule until the end of WWI came to Istanbul after the 
CUP leaders had left the city to take their revenge on the CUP. 
One also has to mention Ahmet Efe’s two books on the period that this present 
study is interested in. The first book relates to Çerkes Ethem and his activities.77 It is one 
of the more detailed books by Çerkes Ethem and often presents issues in a nuanced way. 
However, the approach taken by the author is very problematic, and his research is 
overshadowed by his propensity to promote conspiracy theories. Ahmet Efe offers a very 
sceptical approach, prone to generalisation without sufficient emphasis on demonstrating 
proof. For example, Efe argues that because Ethem kidnapped the some of the governor 
of İzmir in 1919, the British gained the opportunity it needed to implement article 7 of 
the Mudros Armistice, which gave the Allies the right to occupy any place in Anatolia 
that caused them security problems. However, in the book, Efe does not give any proof 
that the Allies in fact used the kidnapping as a pretext to occupy Anatolia.78 Furthermore, 
one of his conspiracy theories is certainly a masterful work of fiction. According to Efe, 
Sheik Shamil was a very close friend of the Queen of England and, therefore, during the 
Circassian exile in mid-19th century, the exiles were directed by the British to the 
Marmara region, because the British had planned to set up a buffer zone here 60 years 
previously to maintain the security of the region. Efe’s failure to review the Ottoman 
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78 Ibid. 32, 33. 
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Archive, coupled with his lack of knowledge about the settlement of the Circassians into 
the empire by the Ottoman government in the 19th century, led to his lack of knowledge 
on the topic. His second book79 is similar to his first in terms of its excessive details and 
level of research. In its approach to the period, it seems that Ahmet Efe wrote the book in 
response to Philip Stoddard’s PhD thesis80 and Cemal Kutay’s books and writings about 
Kuşçubaşı Eşref Bey, rather than aiming to produce an original and evidenced argument.  
The existing historiography of this period in Turkey’s history is very problematic 
for a number of reasons. The Turkish War of Independence is still treated as a movement 
supported by most people, except those who were ‘backward’ or ‘collaborators’ with the 
‘Greek occupiers’. However, recent studies show that local dynamics varied massively 
from district to district, and among different ethnic groups. For South Marmara, the 
relationship between the state and the residents of the region was already strained 
following the Great War, particularly due to the disastrous results of the war on the 
Anatolian people, which included epidemics and food shortages.81 The existing situation 
weakened the state’s authority in this region and led to an increase in intra-regional 
struggles between the Turks, Circassians, Albanians and some Greeks, a significant 
number of whom were exiled or deported during the war. In particular, the origins of the 
Circassian-Albanian conflicts during the 1900s were among the most serious for the 
region. Moreover, until the Battle of Sakarya in 1921, the resistance movement was not 
expected to succeed against the Greek army, as it was supported by the Allies. The region 
was ruled by the Greek authorities for more than two years, which shows that further 
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scholarly research is still necessary to understand local anti-resistance movement 
activities and the population’s relationship with the Greek authorities fully.  
 
4- Chapters of the Thesis 
The first chapter of the thesis is the introduction.  
The second chapter examines Circassian participation in the civil war period from 
1919-1920; i.e. the so-called period of ‘National Struggle’. Although this was largely a 
war between Greek and Turkish troops, there were several battles fought between the 
followers of the Nationalists and the Loyalists. Both sides used paramilitaries as a tool to 
achieve control over the country. Çerkes Ethem and Anzavur Ahmed were two important 
leaders at this time. Çerkes Ethem, the majority of whose soldiers were Circassians, was 
influential in suppressing the movements against the nationalists of Ankara, from South 
Marmara to Central Anatolia. Meanwhile, another Circassian, Anzavur Ahmed, also had 
a significant impact on the Circassians, as a leading figure responsible for mobilising the 
Muslims of the South Marmara against the Kuva-yi Milliye,82 while emphasising Islamic 
solidarity among the people of the empire. This chapter further argues that because the 
people of the region felt a large degree of war weariness, Ahmed Anzavur gained their 
support following a successful propaganda drive. He mobilised the Circassians of the 
region using his internal ethnic network, and its religious population, using their 
emotional attachment to the Ottoman Sultan and the Caliphate.  
The third chapter focuses on the Adapazarı-Düzce incidents, the Yozgat incident, 
and in response to these two incidents the pro-nationalist activities of Çerkes Ethem and 
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his growing impact on the political problems facing the Ankara government. The Düzce–
Hendek region proved to be a major battlefield between the Circassians who supported 
the Istanbul government, and those who supported the Ankara government.83 The loyalist 
Circassians of the Adapazarı-Düzce region rose against Ankara, attempting to seize 
control over the region. Due to Ankara’s lack of an effective military force, Çerkes Ethem 
was called upon to suppress the incident. In doing so, he caused an internal Circassian 
conflict in Düzce that resulted in about 50 people involved in the incidents being hanged. 
At the same time, Ankara was threatened by another disorder in Yozgat, led by a local 
landowner from the Çapanoğlu family. Ethem was invited once more by Ankara to 
repress disorder in Yozgat. This chapter argues that Ethem increased his military and 
political power in Anatolia and Ankara, particularly in the assembly, through his 
suppression of these three incidents (Anzavur, Adapazarı-Düzce and Yozgat) which in 
effect saved the national movement destruction by Istanbul backed incidents in Anatolia.  
The fourth chapter focuses on the exclusion of Ethem from the nationalist cause 
in relation to the Enver Paşa -Mustafa Kemal conflicts, and the impact of the so-called 
Green Army Society on this. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the increasing 
political and military power of Ethem concerned Mustafa Kemal and İsmet (İnönü), 
mainly because they wanted Ethem to act as a military man only. However, political 
opposition against Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, and outside it, from those such as Enver 
Paşa was worrying; indeed, Enver did eventually attempt to use Ethem against Mustafa 
Kemal. The supporters of the Green Army had in fact asked Ethem to join the movement, 
as he already had military power, and it was hoped that this would give the movement 
increased political influence. From this perspective, Ethem seemed to be more of a threat 
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to Mustafa Kemal, rather than a manageable military man under his control. Ethem and 
his brothers’ frequent, yet at other times, lenient policies to anti-nationalist groups were 
also used by Ankara as proof they were harming the nationalist cause. Thus, when 
Mustafa Kemal decided to change the military order and commanders at the western front 
in October 1920, a feud broke out between Çerkes Ethem, his brothers Tevfik, Reşit and 
İsmet, Refet and Mustafa Kemal.  
The fifth chapter details the activities of one-time governor of İzmit, Çule İbrahim 
Hakkı, the Circassian Congress and the Gönen-Manyas deportations. After his 
relationship with the Istanbul government deteriorated irreparably, İbrahim Hakkı 
approached the issue of Greek occupation forces in Western Anatolia. He changed his 
political stance from that of loyal Ottoman Statesman to a believer in Circassian 
autonomy under the Greek occupation forces in western Anatolia. However, his 
ambitions were not realised, because notable Circassians and the general mass of the 
Circassian people did not favour autonomy. This chapter also sheds light on Circassian 
armed opposition to the Kemalists in western Anatolia during the period 1922-1923, 
when forces tried to wage a counter-revolution against the Ankara government. It will 
also focus on the Ankara government’s response to this opposition, namely the forceful 
exiling of 14 Circassian villages from the region, as a form of collective punishment.  
The sixth chapter explores the anti-nationalist activities of Circassians from 1924 
onwards, and the drawing up by the Ankara Assembly of a list of personae non gratae 
‘Yüzellilikler’ in April 1924. Those who were against the nationalists from the beginning, 
and those who were excluded by the Ankara government engaged in anti-nationalist 
activities. Although in the past certain groups may have had disagreements, they now had 
a common enemy: the Kemalists. Çerkes Ethem, Tevfik, Reşit, Kuşçubaşı Eşref, Çerkes 
Sami, Çule İbrahim Hakkı, and Maan Mustafa, a group of Circassian and Abkhazians 
from the western Anatolia region and some other Muslims from Anatolia were the driving 
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opposition force. This opposition first began in the Greek occupied zone of western 
Anatolia, but then spread beyond Turkey, as members of this group were declared 
personae non gratae. This chapter will also focus on how the list of personae non gratae 
was determined by the Grand Assembly of Turkey, and the motivation behind the 
decisions made by the assembly, since about 86 of the 150 persons on the list were 
Circassians. This chapter will also discuss the impact of Kemalist nationalisation and 
modernisation projects on the Circassians as a distinct non-Turkish Muslim group in the 
country. The years following the War of Independence saw the Kemalist elite attempt to 
revive the nation building project proposed by the CUP, while also increasing the 
authoritarian policies that remained from the previous era. The experience of the first few 
years was sufficient to persuade the Kemalist elite that the country was unprepared for a 
pluralistic political system, although it may well be possible to argue that the Kemalist 
elite had never aimed to implement a pluralistic system in the first place. The prohibition 
of non-Turkish languages as part of the infamous ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns, 
and the exclusion of those with Circassian identity from the public places will also be the 
focus of this chapter.84  
Chapter seven will be the conclusion.  
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5- Archives  
The author consulted and compiled primary source materials from several archives for 
this study:  
 The military archive ATASE (Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivleri) 
in Ankara, which in the last a few years has increased the numbers of documents 
it makes available to researchers. This archive has a large collection of 
correspondence and telegrams passed between the military units, paramilitary 
groups and local governors during the period 1919-1922.  
 The British Public Record Office (PRO), which holds military, intelligence 
reports, and correspondence between the Istanbul Embassy and the Foreign 
Office, since Istanbul was under the British occupation for about three years.  
 The Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) in 
Istanbul and the Prime Ministry Republican Archives, BCA (Başbakanlık 
Cumhuriyet Arşivleri) in Ankara. These two archives have a large numbers of 
documents from the Ministry of Interior, the local governors and courts.  
 The Ankara University, Turkish Revolution History Archives, TİTE (Ankara 
Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Arşivi), which stores military, 
intelligence reports, correspondence between government units about the period 
and the Circassians and their political-paramilitary activism, such as Çerkes 
Ethem and Ahmed Anzavur.  
 The Grand National Assembly Archive (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Arşivi) in 
Ankara. A web page is now available for online research.85  
 Atatürk Library’s newspaper archive. 
 The online archive of Cumhuriyet.  
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 The Atatürk Kitaplığı in Istanbul provided access to newspapers pertaining to the 
period, as the author was able to access this freely. However, although access is 
unrestricted, a lengthy bureaucratic process was involved in obtaining some data, 
such as ATASE. One slight problem that arose here was that for certain collections 
it is only permissible to keep a limited number of documents at any one time (e.g. 
100-150 in some cases (ATASE and TİTE)). 
 An attempt was also made to consult the Turkish National Police Archive, 
(Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Arşivi) in Ankara. However, the files on the list of 150 
‘Yüzellilikler’ had been recently transferred to the Prime Ministry Republican Archive in 
Ankara. Although before the transfer, with the permission of the general directorate of 
police, researchers could gain access to the files in the archive, after the documents were 
transferred to the Republican archive, access was prohibited by its administrators. It has, 
however, been possible to include data from books and PhD theses that relied on these 
records before the transfer in this work.86  
The information contained in this thesis was also gleaned from personal writings, 
correspondence and telegrams sent and kept by key military personalities of the period, 
Bekir Sami (Günsav). These documents will afford greater detail and more information 
than many of the currently published memoirs of the military and political elites of this 
period. To understand the grassroots context during this period newspapers are a key 
source.  
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Chapter Two  
‘Rebellion’ or ‘Civil War’: Circassian Paramilitary Activism during the Turkish-
Greek War of 1919-1920  
 
Introduction 
The domestic problems and conflict affecting the Ottoman State during the period 
of the Turkish–Greek War (1919-1922) has generally been bypassed by mainstream 
Turkish historians. Although local opposition(s) to the nationalist resistance87 was 
nuanced inside Anatolia, varying from province to province, and district to district, all 
regions have generally been viewed indiscriminately by historians as ‘rebellions.’88 
Mainstream Turkish historians and leading officials of the period have been reluctant to 
address the issues of domestic conflict and violence in their books and memoirs. Where 
they do mention conflicts, they underline the ‘ignorance’ and ‘backwardness’ of ‘the 
rebels’, and their ‘collaboration’ with Greek and British occupiers or the Istanbul 
government, without fully analysing the reasons behind these mass movements. To define 
the period as a time of ‘civil war’ is more suitable than referring to it in terms of 
‘rebellion’, because the anti-nationalist movement received mass support, and the 
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national movement had no absolute and legitimate authority during the period, only 
taking power as the de facto government in Ankara/Anatolia. 
WWI led to the almost total destruction of the Ottoman Empire.89 Post-war 
conditions weakened the empire, not only in terms of manpower, population and 
productivity, but also economically. Inflation rates were high, scarcity of food rife, and 
chaos widespread in Anatolia. Large numbers of people in the capital, the provinces and 
the districts opposed the CUP, holding it responsible for the disastrous events in Anatolia. 
The existence of the CUP in Anatolia was increasingly a challenge for many people.90 
 During the Great War, unrest, robbery, burglary and kidnappings were widespread in the 
South Marmara region.91 The lack of state authority led to an increase in the number of 
bandits committing crimes in the region. There were large numbers of Circassians among 
the bandits. Due to their dense population in the South Marmara region, they were 
characterised by a ‘war-like culture’, inherited from decades of war and exile before they 
settled in the region. This, along with clashes with other groups in the region, made them 
a highly influential force in South Marmara.92 Before WWI, conflict was already brewing 
between the Circassians and Albanians. Throughout WWI, the tension was exacerbated 
among Circassians, the Albanians, and the Turks of South Marmara. The reasons for these 
tensions were mainly competition for advantage over other groups, or for positions as 
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91 Özcan Mert, “Anzavur’un İlk Ayaklanmasına Ait Belgeler”, Belleten, 56, no 217 (1992), 850-851. 
92 Mert, “Anzavur’un İlk Ayaklanmasına”, 850-852. Also see Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı, Balıkkesir ve 
Alaşehir Kongreleri ve Hacim Muhittin Çarıklı’nın Kuva-yi Milliye Hatıraları (1919-1920) (Ankara: 
Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1967), 77.  
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local administrators, which provided a great opportunity to gain access to state facilities 
to overcome the harsh conditions of war.  
 In the days following the Great War, the Kuva-yi Milliye and its loyalist opponents 
emerged as newly armed groups, adding to the number of armed groups already operating 
in South Marmara. The bandits and armed groups in the region were incorporated into 
these two new groups from their initially small and fragmented units. Although ethnic 
differences were important to the formation of these two different groups, their main 
distinctive features could be categorised as either nationalist or loyalist. This chapter 
provides background to the Turkish War of Independence, and then explores the 
nationalists’ efforts to create a line of resistance against Greek occupation in the South 
Marmara region using paramilitary groups. Finally, it will examine the origins of the anti-
nationalist movement and the mobilisation of Circassians and other Muslim peoples in 
the region.  
 
1) Turkish War of Independence: Historiography and Problems with Sources  
 The Turkish War of Independence remains a controversial period in Turkish 
historiography. Undoubtedly, the history of the period is mainly a product of Nutuk – the 
‘Great Speech’ of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Erik J. Zürcher claims that fifty thousand 
copies of Nutuk were published in the days following the CHP Congress in 1927 at which 
Atatürk gave the speech.93 These fifty thousand copies were intended for the 1.4 million 
literate people of Turkey. From the mid-1930s until the 1950s, the Turkish War of 
Independence period was taught in public schools and universities as İnkılap Tarihi or 
‘History of the Revolution’. The course was taught by politicians,94 some of whom were 
                                                          
93 Erik J. Zürcher, The Young Turk legacy and the national awakening: from the Ottoman Empire to 
Atatürk's Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 
94 The course was started in 1935, and was taught by Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, 
Recep Peker and Hikmet Bayur in İstanbul and Ankara Universities. Recep Peker, at the same time, was 
the general secretary of the CHP. See Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Bir Lise Öğrencisinin Milli Mücadele 
Anıları (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınevi, 1971), 67.  
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hard-line Kemalists, such as Recep Peker and Mahmut Esad Bozkurt, and it was used as 
a tool to disseminate official state ideology. The main sources of the lecture were 
Atatürk’s Nutuk, which was also a useful source for creating a ‘national history’ of the 
‘nation’. Indeed, the textbooks were prepared by people close to government circles.95 
Textbooks were influenced by romanticism, French positivism and German historicism, 
which gave the Kemalist political leaders what they needed to create a national history 
for the newborn nation, full or heroism and pragmatism as a basis for a strong state.96  
It can also be said that publications emanating from the Turkish General Staff also 
had a huge impact on the creation of a historiography for the Turkish War of 
Independence, because until the 1980s, publications by General Staff on the period were 
the main sources available, due to restrictions placed on accessing archives in the country. 
They published a significant number of books and journals, which included important 
documents about the war. 97 However, it is not possible to know which documents were 
chosen for publication by General Staff. The archives were disregarded and not 
effectively organised in Turkey until the 1990s. Still, in the absence of archival 
documents, other publications, such as memoirs, began to expand in the early 1950s to 
become a significant source for the Turkish–Greek War historiography. Nevertheless, 
from the 1950s onwards, the main source for the period was Atatürk’s Nutuk, due to 
restrictions on publications and in the press. There are several problems with relying on 
the Nutuk, mainly because it gives one-sided explanation of the incidents without much 
                                                          
95 Outlines of the Turkish History ‘Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları,(Kollektif eser Türk Tarihi 
Tetkik Heyeti). Mf. Vekâleti yayınları. Devlet matbaası. İstanbul 1930, the book was prepared by a group 
which, barring two of them, were MPs from the Republican Party. Büşra Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003). 119-120.  
96 Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih, 26.  
97 Genel Kurmay Harp Tarihi Dairesi, Türk istiklal harbi: iç ayaklanmalar: 1919-1921 (Ankara: 
Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1964). Genel Kurmay Harp Tarihi Dairesi, Genel Kurmay Harp 
Tarihi Vesikaları Dergisi (Ankara: Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1964-1977). Genel Kurmay Harp 
Tarihi Dairesi, Türk İstiklal Harbi: İstiklal harbinde ayaklanmalar (1919-1921) (Ankara: Genelkurmay 
Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1974). 
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objectivity. Numerous historians use Nutuk as a principal source, without ever 
questioning its veracity as a ‘historical memoir’ or document. 
The lack of social history and informative works related to WWI and the Turkish 
War of Independence period are other reasons explaining the existence of ‘official’ 
Turkish historiography.98 The historiography of the era was shaped by the authorities 
(politicians of the Republican Party), who sought to give political legitimacy to their 
policies.99 One of the main resources of the period, besides archival documents, includes 
memoirs written by high-ranking military figures who fought during the War of 
Independence, and state officials from the early republican period. Certainly, however, 
memoirs are not always reliable sources. In Turkish historiography it can be said that they 
are generally more problematic than usual, because of the emphasis given to the ‘the 
single man’ Mustafa Kemal by early republican elites and successor generations. For 
instances, Hıfzı Veldet100 mentions in his memoirs that when the British forces occupied 
the Assembly in Istanbul in March 1920, they (Hıfzı Veldet and his schoolmates) were 
both worried, and surprised.  
                                                          
98 Even though in the last decade an increasing number of discussions and criticisms on TV programmes 
has occurred, as well as writings in popular history books about the Turkish War of Independence and 
World War I, there is not much academic study on the topics at hand, except for a few notable exceptions. 
See: Erik J. Zürcher, The Unionist Factor; The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
Turkish National Movement 1905-1926 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984). Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores : 
Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923 /, Oxford Studies in Modern 
European History. (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2009). Gingeras, “Notorious Subjects, 
Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the Turkish National Movement in North western 
Anatolia, 1919-23. Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans : The Great War in the Middle East / (New 
York : Basic Books, 2015). Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires : The Clash and Collapse of the 
Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918 / (Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 
2011). Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 : The Ottoman Empire and the First World 
War /, Cambridge Military Histories (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
99 Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih, 67.  
100 Ord. Prof. Hıfzı Veldet (1904-1992) was an officer in Ankara in the Assembly from 1920 to 1928 until 
he was sent to Switzerland with a scholarship from the state to study education in law. He edited and 
published a modern Turkish version of the Atatürk’s Nutuk. However, this edition is problematic in terms 
of accuracy. Hakan Erdem reviewed this edition in his book, Tarih-Lenk. Erdem shows that Hıfzı Veldet 
cut one fifth of the Nutuk in his edition because of what he saw as its ‘unimportance’ in terms of ‘Kemalist 
Thought’. Erdem says that the Hıfzı Veldet’s edition includes significant numbers of anachronism and 
changes from the original Nutuk. See Gazi M. Kemal Atatürk, Söylev, ed. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu 
(İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982). See also Hakan Erdem, Tarih-Lenk; Kusursuz Yazarlar, Kağıttan 
Metinler (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010), 50-59.  
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On one day March 1920, a friend of ours, Memduh (Payzın), came to us crying and said 
‘[the] English [have] occupied Istanbul [and] martyred our soldiers when they were 
sleeping…’ Everyone was thinking about Istanbul and their family and relatives, and 
consoling each other. We swore to take revenge from the English and fight the Greeks while 
we were crying. After that surprise when we were conscious, we thought ‘Mustafa Kemal 
Paşa surely could take requisite measures, we believed him to be like a prophet.’101 
Hıfzı Veldet’s attitude towards Mustafa Kemal reflects the typically unrealistic and 
fictional approach of the early republican elites to the period in general, and Mustafa 
Kemal in particular. In March 1920, Mustafa Kemal was a former Ottoman army general 
and the only head of the national representative committee, the Heyet-i Temsiliye.102 
However, the approach taken by Hıfzı Veldet places Mustafa Kemal centre stage, as the 
sole figure already responsible for predetermining his policy responses to future incidents. 
Here I argue that the nationalist resistance to Greek forces was not organised by 
the people themselves in Anatolia. The resistance was not a result of the process of a 
series of congresses carried out by local people to protest against, and then mobilise in 
opposition to the Greek occupation in western Anatolia or in eastern Anatolia. In fact, the 
potential for armed resistance was already apparent to the CUP, as they calculated the 
potential risks from an Allied occupation of Anatolia during the WWI. The Karakol 
Society, established by the CUP on 13 November 1918, was one of example of this. The 
aim of the society was to keep the empire united under the CUP’s control. Every single 
person involved in establishing the society was a member of the CUP.103 The resistance 
movements in Anatolia were a top-down project carried out through the medium of 
                                                          
101 1920 yılı Mart ayı içinde bir gün arkadaşlarımızdan Memduh (Payzın) koşa koşa ve ağlıyarak geldi, 
‘İstanbul’u İngilizler işgal etmişler, askerlerimizi uykuda bastırarak şehit etmişler’ dedi… Herkes 
İstanbul’u ve İstanbul’daki yakınlarını düşünüyor, herkes bir şey söylüyor, birbirini teselliye çalışıyordu. 
İngilizlerden intikam almak, Yunanlılarla savaşmak için nemli gözlerle and içmiştik. İlk telaş ve şaşkınlık 
geçtikten sonra: ‘Mustafa Kemal Paşa her halde bir tedbir almıştır’ sonucuna vardık ve durulduk. Ona bir 
peygambere inanır gibi inanıyorduk.’ Hıfzı Veldet, Bir Lise Öğrencisinin, 37. 
102 When Mustafa Kemal resigned from his duty, he was scared of being arrested as a rebel general by 
Kazım Karabekir, see Taha Akyol, Ama Hangi Atatürk (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), 49-53.  
103 Adnan Sofuoğlu, Milli Mücadele Döneminde Kocaeli (Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 
2006), 32-34. 
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resistance associations, called ‘Defence of Right Societies’ (Müdafa-i Hukuk 
Cemiyetleri). The associations in western and eastern Anatolia were set up by members 
of special organisations, Karakol, members of CUP, and local notables.104 
Although the Kemalists were once members of the CUP, Kemalist historians have 
consciously denied the role of the CUP in the nationalist resistance.105 The CUP was the 
most powerful political party at the time, despite the majority holding it responsible for 
the current situation. It could still mobilise a broad range of people from different 
backgrounds within society; from members of armed militias or groups, to bureaucrats 
and high-ranking military personnel. The role of the CUP has been ignored in mainstream 
historiography, because its last days were filled with wars, conflicts, and exiles, and its 
members were engaged in a power struggle with their old allies: the Kemalists.106 Such a 
background was not a convenient backdrop for the ‘new’ republic of Turkey. Moreover, 
the Kemalists were already in conflict with the remaining CUP members from the 1920s, 
up until the alleged assassination attempt of Mustafa Kemal in 1926.107 Therefore, 
mainstream historians did not pay sufficient attention to the role played by the CUP 
during the pre-republic period.  
  
2) Organising Paramilitary Resistance against the Greek Occupation  
Before Greek forces occupied Izmir, paramilitary groups and arms had already 
been prepared by a group of Ottoman officials, to provide resistance against potential 
occupation of the region by Alliance members.108 During WWI, the CUP hid a number 
of arms in West Anatolia. In contrast to the official historiography, a national struggle of 
                                                          
104 Emel Akal, Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm: Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında (İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 14.  
105 A critic for this approach, Erik J. Zürcher demostrates in his book that National Struggle was a CUP 
project, Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor : The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
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106 That is, Mustafa Kemal and those around him. 
107 Akal, Mustafa Kemal, İttihat Terakki ve Bolşevizm Milli Mücadelenin Başlangıcında. 33.  
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resistance began before Mustafa Kemal went to Samsun on 19 May 1919. Some 
commanding officers and state officials, who were former members of CUP, or who had 
been close to the CUP, were already seeking how to go to Anatolia, due to the prevailing 
threat of the possible establishment of an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia or the 
occupation of Anatolia by Alliance members. Kazım Karabekir, Mersinli Cemal Paşa, 
Nurettin Paşa, Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez), Kazım Özalp, and Rauf Orbay were some of the 
most prominent figures. Rauf Orbay also helped to coordinate resistance between 
different groups in Anatolia against the Greek occupation.109 Another important 
individual in this group was Kazım Karabekir, who had arrived in Anatolia before 
Mustafa Kemal. On March 13 1919, Kazım Karabekir was appointed commanding officer 
of the Fifteenth Army; later renamed the Ninth Army, in Erzurum.110 
It can be said that the War Office and the General Staff of the Ottoman Empire 
supported the resistance movement from the outset. During this period, key efforts were 
led by Cevat Paşa (Çobanlı) (December 19, 1918-April 2, 1919), Mersinli Cemal Paşa 
(October 10, 1919-January 25, 1920), and Kavaklı Ahmet Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak) (February 
3, 1919-March 16, 1920). Indeed, the Anatolian movement gained large-scale support 
from the War Office and General Staff.111 Bekir Sami Bey112 was appointed to bring 
together Ottoman soldiers who had dispersed when the Greeks occupied İzmir, and to 
take specific measures to organise combat units.113 Kazım (Özalp) Bey114 was also 
                                                          
109 Ibid. 101, Rauf Orbay (1881-1964) was of Circassian descent. He was a former minister of Navy, and a 
leading figure in the Circassian cell in Istanbul. The cell organised the participation of Circassians in the 
national struggle. See Muhittin Ünal, Miralay Bekir Sami Günsav’ın Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları (İstanbul: 
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36-37.  
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114 Kazım Özalp (1882-1968), an Albanian descent. He was the commander of several corps during the 
Turkish-Geek War, and he was promoted as general after Sakarya battle in 1921.  
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nominated by the General Staff as the commander of the 61st division. He was also 
encouraged by the War Office to provide resistance against Greek troops, while avoiding 
massacres directed against the non-Muslims in the region.115 In South Marmara, Rauf 
Bey (Orbay) also met Çerkes Ethem116, with the aim of creating a line of resistance 
composed of paramilitary groups made up of Circassians, who were already armed as 
they had been fighting with the Albanians in the region. 
It can be said that there was no coordination between the different local resistance 
groups to counter the occupation of Anatolia. It is also important to emphasise that the 
main aim of local resistance movements was to battle against Greek and Armenians 
soldiers and bandits.117 Although French and Italian soldiers occupied a number of areas, 
no major battles occurred between these forces and Ottoman soldiers.118 It must also be 
mentioned that the national movement did not always view France and Italy as enemies. 
Kazım Özalp states in his memoirs that, ‘the French and Italian military officials M. 
Deuran and Mr. Parciel behaved in a friendly way and helped us’ (Kuva-yi Milliye). Other 
foreign military officials came to Balıkesir seeking information about the activities, 
numbers of soldiers and the establishment of a nationalist resistance: ‘I did not have any 
doubts about bringing them to the fronts and showing them our national forces’ 
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and Islamic characteristics of Anatolia.’ The reasons for using this terminology might be to avoid creating 
a new problem for the Ottoman state because according to the 12th principle of Wilson, autonomous 
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actions’.119 Even British forces preferred not to come into conflict with the Kuva-yi 
Milliye. They tried to achieve their political objectives in Anatolia without fighting.120 
Both the Ottoman government and the de facto government of Ankara or (the 
Kuva-yi Milliye) also avoided conflict with the British.121 In addition, a group of Ottoman 
politicians and governors believed the continuing existence of the Ottoman State was 
dependent on British support. These politicians and governors believed that if they 
created problems for the British forces in Anatolia, they would risk losing the entire state, 
because they were too weak to resist Britain.122 For example, Ali Kemal, the Minister of 
Interior, supported an agreement with the British, choosing not to fight against the Allies 
and the Greeks – even if they occupied the land brutally. Otherwise, he claimed that it 
would not be possible ‘to save the fatherland.’ He was antagonistic towards the Kuva-yi 
Milliye, and its policies. One of his telegrams to the local pro- Kuva-yi Milliye governors 
reveals his aim was to inhibit the progress of the nationalists; ‘Your way is a dead end, 
you will lead to massacres of the Muslim elements of the state. We cannot do anything 
while having war (against them)’.123 In contrast, he also explained the committee of 
Balıkesir’s resistance movement; stating that they (the Ottoman government) had to order 
them not to resist, since they (the Ottoman government) were under pressure from their 
occupiers. However, he also advised the national resistance committee that they should 
rise against the Ottoman government, because resistance was their right.124 The Ottoman 
                                                          
119 Ibid. 68 ‘Fransız subaylardan M. Deuran ve İtalyan tabasında Mr. Parciel, o sırada milli kuvvetlerin 
faaliyetleriyle çok alakadar oldular ve bizlere yakınlık göstererek yardım ettiler.Bundan başka bazı 
ecnebi subaylar ve memurlar Kuva-yi Milliyenin kuruluş şekli, mevcudu ve faaliyeti hakkında bilgiler 
almak üzere Balıkesir’e geldiler.Bunlardan bazılarını cephenin belirli noktalarına göndermekte ve milli 
kuvvetlerimizin harekatını göstermekte bir zarar görmüyordum. Aksine fayda görüyordum.’  
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were no serious exchanges of fire between British and Kuva-yi Milliye troops. See TTK Bekir Sami dos.25, 
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122 See Ali Kemal`s telegram to the governor of the Karesi. Özalp, Milli Mücadele, 33.  
123 Özalp, Milli Mücadele, 33. 
124 Rahmi Apak, İstiklal Savaşında Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1942), 52. 
Ali Kemal: ; ‘Biz size, sizi ayaklandırmaktan menedecek emirler veririz, çünkü tazyik altındayız. Siz bize 
dahi isyan ediniz. Milli müdafaa, bir milletin en kudsi hakkıdır.’  
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State was already suffering from a lack of manpower and as a consequence of financial 
and military losses, incurred during WWI. It could not survive a British attack. The British 
officials similarly warned their officials about their military activities in South Marmara 
against the Greek troops, demanding that the Ottomans halt their attacks in the region, 
warning that otherwise, the Greek troops, backed by the British, might improve their 
situation with the result that they would be able to occupy as far as central Anatolia.125 
The British presence created a dilemma for the Istanbul government. Although 
the Ottoman rulers were striving to keep the empire united under its control without 
losses, to succeed in its aim, compromises had to be given to the British in terms of 
sovereignty. British presence for 30-35 years was considered a preferable option to 
dismemberment of the state.126 With this policy, the palace would enhance its power, 
which was very low under the CUP’s rule. The members of the Liberal Entente held a 
similar position relative to the palace. They sought ways to improve their relations with 
the British, working towards signing a peace agreement to avoid further trouble for the 
empire and its subjects.127  
In the days following the Greek occupation, local organisations were established 
under the title: ‘the Resistance against the Occupation and Annexation of Greek Forces’, 
in South Western Anatolia. The local resistance was organised by military men, local 
governors and nobles in South Marmara.128 The first congress of local resistance groups 
was held between 27 June and 12 July 1919. The aim of these local congresses was to 
organise local lines of resistances against the occupiers and to protect people’s 
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possessions. There were no direct connections between local congresses in different 
regions, due to a lack of collective intent and leadership.  
In the districts and towns, the notables were the most important assistants of 
military commanders. In the days following the Great War, local notables were hesitant 
about and resistant to becoming involved, as they were sickened by war like many others 
in the empire. Moreover, some of the local notables did not necessarily agree with the 
intention to conduct paramilitary attacks against Greek forces. This changed, however, 
when Greek forces occupied Western Anatolia, introducing no fewer than one hundred 
thousand Greeks to settle in the region. It was here that local notables began to fear for 
the loss of their possessions.129 They began to support the local resistance movement and 
paramilitary groups in order to safeguard their possessions and privileged positions, 
which were threatened by the Greek occupation.130 In addition to their economic power 
and the great amount of land they owned, the notables had large numbers of workers who 
were employed on their lands.131 
 The newspapers in Istanbul begin to criticise the high ranking military commanders for 
the decisions they had taken during WWI. The pressure felt from the press, coupled with 
the existence of Allied soldiers in the capital discouraged the military, and those related 
to the CUP and its war policies in Istanbul. Moreover, the Greek occupation of Western 
Anatolia and the presence of Allied forces in Istanbul forced high-ranking military men 
to leave the city for Anatolia. Although Mustafa Kemal tried to take his place in the 
Istanbul government as Minister of War, he was unsuccessful and ultimately left Istanbul, 
settling for the role of an inspector in Samsun. Notwithstanding the nationalist fervour 
that persuaded high-ranking bureaucrats and military men to resist the occupation by 
going to Anatolia, it was not until the official occupation of Istanbul by British forces that 
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large numbers of these officials chose to leave Istanbul.132 After the occupation, they felt 
they had no place left for them in Istanbul; they had few options open to them; either they 
would be arrested by British forces and sent to Malta as political detainees, or they could 
leave Istanbul for Ankara.133 It seems that the occupation of Istanbul hugely influenced 
their decision to go to Ankara. 
 
3) The Rise of the Anti-nationalist Movement in South Marmara 
The population of the South Marmara region consisted mostly of refugees who 
had travelled to the region in the mid-1860s. One of the largest groups in the region was 
the Circassians, many of whom had settled in the region by the Ottoman Porte in the 
second half of the 19th century after the Circassian exile. During the days following the 
‘93 Harbi’, or the Ottoman–Russian War of 1877-1878, an increasing number of refugees 
flooded into the region. These included Turks, Albanians, Circassians, and Bosnians. 
From the 1850s to the 1920s, the influx of refugees completely altered the social and 
economic characteristics of the South Marmara. Meanwhile, the non-Muslim residents of 
South Marmara were either exiled or left the region voluntarily, between 1910 and the 
early 1920s. Their migration, or exile, also led to further major change in the region. The 
Turks, Circassians, Albanians and Bosnians had already previously fought one another, 
and from early 1910, the relationship between the different groups had been exacerbated 
due to weak state authority, and the arrival of many more migrants in the region fleeing 
from the effects of the Balkan Wars.  
In the months following the end of WWI, Anzavur Ahmed, a member of the 
Ottoman Special Organisation, was appointed governor of several districts in the South 
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Marmara region.134 Although at the close of WWI, Anzavur was working with the 
nationalists to control the Circassian bandits who were creating chaos and endangering 
the region, later he moved to the anti-nationalist cause, because his demands were not 
being satisfied by the nationalists.135 During the Greek occupation, Anzavur Ahmed had 
mobilised many people with the support of some high-ranking Ottoman politicians 
working against the Kuva-yi Milliye. He used discourse laden with Islamic references, 
emphasising the importance of the Caliphate and the Ottoman Sultanate, while 
simultaneously attacking the declarations of the Kuva-yi Milliye in Anatolia by accusing 
it of being a continuation of the CUP. Anzavur Ahmed clearly used key nationalist 
figures’ links with the CUP in his speeches, in order to mobilise the masses against them. 
He referred to the wartime and pre-wartime policies of the CUP, drawing analogies with 
Kuva-yi Milliye in a bid to disgrace the latter in front of the people. He declared that his 
aim was to save the country from the CUP and its policies, and end the Greek occupation 
with a loyal army.136 Conversely, Hacim Muhittin (1881 – 1965) a leading figure for 
Kuva-yi Milliye in Balıkesir, states that the aim of Ahmed Anzavur was actually to arrest 
him and other Kuva-yi Milliye members (during horse races in Balıkesir/Savaştepe) to 
send them to Istanbul. He also believed that Anzavur’s movement would ultimately lead 
to a Turkish-Circassian conflict in the region, and that, British forces would then take 
advantage of the situation to gain control of the region.137  
Certainly, in 1919, a short while before Anzavur arrived; chaos persisted in the 
region, particularly in Karacabey, as struggles between the Circassians and Albanians 
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worsened.138 Armed clashes were taking between groups and many of these continued for 
days on end, with people engaged in the widespread plundering of one another’s villages 
and farms.139 A significant number of people were killed on both sides. The conflict 
between the Albanians and Circassians spread to other districts in the region, such as 
Kirmastı.140 Overall insecurity provided a significant opportunity for Anzavur’s 
opposition141 to mobilise the masses to counter the nationalists. In addition to the security 
problems affecting the region, members of the Kuva-yi Milliye forced people to pay taxes 
beyond what they could reasonably afford; they also confiscated their horses, and seized 
property belonging to villagers and residents in the region.142  
Clashes between the Circassians and Albanians were an acute problem in Kirmastı 
and Karacabey. However, Bekir Sami believes that the underlying dispute between the 
Circassians and Albanians in Kirmasti and Karacabey was not ‘ethnic’ in nature.143 
However, even if the reasons for the conflict between the Circassians and Albanians were 
due to ethnic differences, this could not provide a basis for generalisation to events in the 
entire South Marmara region. The basis of the conflict for the groups was about gaining 
local authority over the groups in the region, while trying to restrict other groups’ living 
space. An understanding of the participants in the Anzavur incident consisted of several 
groups; this provides evidence of the veracity of Bekir Sami’s argument. Many of those 
who took part in the Anzavur incident were Circassians, Pomaks, Albanians and Turks. 
They participated because Anzavur Ahmed’s rhetoric focused on Islam and the 
Sultan/Caliph, although he used these as symbols rather than attaching any deeper 
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meaning to them as will become clearer later.144 It is apparent, however, that although 
problems existed between the different ethnic groups, an emphasis on Islam, loyalty to 
the Sultan, and an anti-CUP stance convinced them to work together against the Kuva-yi 
Milliye. 
Anzavur was also backed by several groups in the capital. He used the presence 
of the British in the region to push his anti-nationalist agenda. Britain also aimed to use 
Ahmed Anzavur to save the Dardanelles and the Straits for themselves. The threat from 
the nationalists around the Dardanelles forced the British to support Anzavur’s movement 
in the form of military equipment.145 The Ottoman government, the Damad Ferit cabinet 
itself, also promised military assistance to Anzavur Ahmed to oppose the Kuva-yi 
Milliye.146 He was further supported by other groups, some of whom were agents or 
volunteers of the Special Organisation of the Ottoman State, who had been pardoned by 
the state for past crimes committed whilst in criminal gangs.147 He also began to recruit 
armed persons to counter the Kuva-yi Milliye.148 Anzavur Ahmed used Islamic rhetoric, 
while also claiming that the Kuva-yi Milliye was a continuation of the CUP; a group, 
which he claimed was comprised of freemasons.149 He also presented himself to the 
Sultan as the one able to liberate Aydın province from Greek occupation and protect the 
country from further losses in provinces that might potentially become part of an 
independent Armenia.150  
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 As can apparent in a report sent to the War Office, the reasons for the widespread unrest 
in the Bursa province of South Marmara and its surroundings during the post Great War 
period could be expressed as follows: 
 The gendarmes are not forceful and reliable; 
 The residents of the region are from very diverse ethnic and religious 
backgrounds, like ‘the tower of Babel’; 
 Due to the continuation of many new waves of migration, many people are 
homeless and suffering from famine; 
 Worse still is the ‘bandit activism’ of some groups, which opens a door to foreign 
intervention in the region; and 
 Those who have been appointed as members of the military tribunal have not 
come to the region to begin their duties... 151 
 
 On 12 November 1919, Anzavur Ahmed captured the Susurluk district of 
Balıkesir.152 One of his aims in doing so was to end the Kuva-yi Milliye, and to arrest its 
members.153 He gave a speech, which emphasised his plans to abolish military service; 
so that he could protect the Caliphate; and he requested that soldiers either leave the 
district or join him.154 The Kuva-yi Milliye’s response to Anzavur Ahmed’s movement 
was clear. At the beginning, the Kuva-yi Milliye avoided conflict with Anzavur Ahmed, 
because he had already received the backing of many people in a short period. Some 
military commanders were sent by the Kuva-yi Milliye to induce Anzavur Ahmed to join 
their national movement. However, they were unsuccessful.155 It is important to explore 
what the Kuva-yi Milliye meant to Ahmed Anzavur as an ordinary Ottoman legionary 
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(alaylı) soldier and a former member of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa. In a telegram to the 
Ministry of Interior, Anzavur Ahmed stated that, because of the CUP’s policies over the 
last ten years, people were witnessing an ongoing and terrible situation in the empire, 
while the Kuva-yi Milliye, which was organised by the very same people, was now 
provoking ordinary people to seek revenge against the Greeks and the Alliance. They 
were nothing more than bandits who had come together and organised the Kuva-yi 
Milliye. The group also ruled the state without consideration for the legitimate Ottoman 
government. They collected money from the poor, while living lavishly themselves.156 
 On 14 November 1919, he sent a letter to Colonel Kazım Özalp to demand Özalp’s 
neutrality in his fight against the CUP and the Greek troops.157 A day later, Anzavur 
Ahmed and his troops encountered the Kuva-yi Milliye. He was then defeated, and left 
the region.158 On 22 November, Anzavur Ahmed captured Gönen and arrested a number 
of officials, including the first lieutenant and governor of the district Ziya (Şahan) Efendi, 
as well as Kuva-yi Milliye member, Esat Bey.159 The mostly Circassian populated villages 
around Gönen and Manyas areas either willingly or forcibly participated in Anzavur’s 
movement; these villages included: Muratlar, Keçeler, Bayramiç, Üçpınar, Karalar, 
Çerkes Keçidere, Karaağaçalan, Aynalıdere, Hacı Menteş, Sızı Hasan Bey, Çerkes Çalı 
Oba, and Asmalıdere (Turks were resident in the village).160 Çerkes Ethem participated 
in the battle against Anzavur Ahmed.161 On 26 November they came to Gönen, and 
Anzavur Ahmed was again defeated.162 Gönen and its villages were held by Kuva-yi 
Milliye on 2 December; up until this time, Anzavur Ahmed had lost 120 of his men in 
conflict.163 
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On 6 December 1919, nearly 80 armed people under the leadership of the gangs 
Suphi and Kara Hasan of Kuva-yi Milliye were sent to arrest Anzavur Ahmed; they ended 
up looting the farm of the wife of a prominent Circassian gang leader named Şah İsmail, 
and some other Circassian villages.164 Another group of armed people also joined the 
Suphi and Kara Hasan action against the Circassians. The situation in the region 
transformed into an ethnic conflict between the Circassians and Turks. The local 
governors tried to minimise these conflicts and sent an advisory council to the 
Circassians, in which two Circassians took part (Big) Ahmet Fevzi Paşa and Hurşit 
Paşa.165 The advisory council spoke to local people in order to calm the situation, and this 
prompted the discharge of the rebels arrested in the region by the local governors.166 On 
balance, it can be stated that during the Anzavur incident, the approach of the Istanbul 
government was self-contradicting. Initially, there was no determined policy towards the 
Kuva-yi Milliye. There was no doubt that different political groups existed in Istanbul, all 
vying for power.167 Even in the government, different policies were applied by different 
ministries. Two ministries in particular – Dahiliye Nezareti (Ministry of Interior) and 
Harbiye Nezareti (War Office, and their local branches) espoused very different policies. 
The military commander of local units, such as the War Office, demanded a harsh 
repression of ‘the rebels’ without any sympathy.168 Meanwhile, the local governors of the 
region, i.e. those from the Ministry of Interior, aspired to send an advisory council to 
Anzavur Ahmed in order to placate him.169  
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It can be said that from the very beginning a connection existed between the War 
Office in Istanbul and Kuva-yi Milliye. When Britain was asked by the Ministry of War 
to remove Cemal Paşa and Cevat Paşa from their offices, Mustafa Kemal, even though 
he had been removed from his duties, supported resistance against the British demands. 
The War Office was ostensibly part of the national movement. The nationalists and the 
War Office itself engaged in a partial collaboration, and despite the frequent cabinet 
reshuffles in Istanbul, this collaboration continued until the official occupation of Istanbul 
by British forces in March 1920. It is also noteworthy that the nationalists viewed 
themselves as the ‘saviours’ of the state. Indeed, it can be seen from archival documents 
that the nationalists were already considering themselves the legitimate governors of the 
state, long before they opened the assembly in Ankara on April 1920. In fact, their attitude 
led to confusion in the existing historiography, due to the often contradictory language 
used; language that presented them as both reliant on the Istanbul government and against 
it. Although they were officials and the military men of the Ottoman State, they accused 
the Istanbul of for not taking the necessary measures to stop the chaos in South Marmara. 
The people who vied against the nationalists were characterised as ‘opponents’ muhalif / 
karşıt by the former; however, it can be argued that those opponents were not against the 
legitimate government of the country, i.e. the one in Istanbul. They were, in fact, against 
the Kuva-yi Milliye, and later the Ankara government.  
Particularly with regard to Biga, it can be said that the town’s local officials did 
not support one side in the conflict between the Kuva-yi Milliye and Ahmed Anzavur. 
Although the Kuva-yi Milliye consisted of military men, bureaucrats and state officials, 
besides the guerrillas and irregulars, the local governors of Biga still did not support it.170 
It seems that in the town there were two distinct groups tussling for authority, while the 
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local officials of the town were changing sides according to who was winning. On 20 
February 1920, Anzavur Ahmed captured Biga and seized arms, which had been snatched 
earlier by the Kuva-yi Milliye from the Akbaş arsenal.171 Many Circassians arrived in 
Biga with Anzavur from their villages.172 Significant numbers of people from the districts 
of Gönen and Biga joined Anzavur’s movement towards Yenice, where arms were being 
stored by the Kuva-yi Milliye.173 Hamdi Bey,174 who was a nationalist and a former 
governor of Edremit district, aimed to prepare a regiment from Biga, and to tax the people 
of Biga for the expenses of the regiment.175 However, the potential taxation troubled 
people who had already undergone economic hardships; thus, it caused an increase in 
support for Anzavur Ahmed.176 Due to this support, the Kuva-yi Milliye failed to resist 
the anti-nationalists in the region. The arsenal was blown up by the Kuva-yi Milliye, 
because they did not have enough soldiers to protect the arms and felt threatened by the 
possibility of Anzavur gaining access to them.177 By April, Anzavur took control in 
Gönen,178 Bandırma179 Karacabey, and Kirmasti. The impact of his movement reached 
Adapazarı, where the people, a majority of whom were Circassian, then began to conspire 
against Kuva-yi Milliye.180 His movement thus became widespread throughout the region.  
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The actions taken by the Kuva-yi Milliye against Anzavur Ahmed were on 
occasion quite harsh. On 6 March 1920, a group of people from Kuva-yi Milliye burned 
down three Circassian villages and the houses of Circassians who had been allied with 
Anzavur Ahmed.181 Indeed, until April 1920, the Kuva-yi Milliye did not have much 
support in the region and the anti-nationalist movement was still strong. Therefore, to 
solidify their position in the region, the Kuva-yi Milliye commanders took additional 
steps, hardening their policy and rhetoric against the Circassians in order to ‘warn’ them 
of the consequences if they persisted. Bekir Sami emphasised that the Circassians should 
be loyal to the state; meaning the Kuva-yi Milliye, otherwise they would be annihilated. 
He emphasised this by going to Kirmastı and Karacabey and arguing that for any 
‘betrayal’, the Circassians would be annihilated. 182 When a concern was raised among 
Circassians about the Kuva-yi Milliye, Bekir Sami tried to convince them they were safe, 
by saying that half of the leadership in the Kuva-yi Milliye were Circassians. The aim of 
Kuva-yi Milliye was nothing more than to achieve an independent Turkey.183 However, 
Bekir Sami did not consider the ordinary people’s thoughts regarding the Kuva-yi Milliye. 
Ordinary Circassians felt themselves close to the Sultanate and Caliphate, contrary to the 
Circassian elite who were once members of the CUP and who had then taken a role in the 
Kuva-yi Milliye. Bekir Sami nonetheless emphasised the role of the elite Circassians in 
the Kuva-yi Milliye.  
Some military units were permitted to imprison, punish and even execute (without 
the necessary judicial process) those who opposed the Kuva-yi Milliye and supported 
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Anzavur Ahmed.184 The nationalists did in fact discuss the process of military tribunals. 
However, it emerged that military men did not aspire to conduct proper judicial processes; 
they saw this as wasting time.185 The commander of the 172nd Regiment, lieutenant 
colonel Kasap Osman (or Osman “the Butcher”), asked Bekir Sami for his opinion 
concerning whether he should execute prisoners by shooting, or judge them.186 Two days 
after asking for Bekir Sami’s opinion, Colonel Osman executed four individuals who had 
killed a Kuva-yi Milliye soldier in an exchange of fire, as an example to others.187 
The lack of proper equipment and organised army units in the region led to an 
understanding among the Kuva-yi Milliye commanders regarding the importance of the 
irregular and paramilitary groups in carrying out resistance against Greek troops and the 
Anzavur Ahmed incident. Assistance against Anzavur Ahmed from Çerkes Ethem, who 
had already established a hundred-kilometre-long line of resistance against the Greek 
forces,188 as well as Demirci Efe, was demanded.189 Çerkes Ethem came to the region 
with two thousand armed men, while Demirci Efe sent six hundred cavalrymen to join 
the Kuva-yi Milliye.190 A group of Anzavur’s armed men, under the command of Çerkes 
Ahmet Bey, a retired Ottoman army colonel, were followed to Biga wharf, where they 
were caught in the crossfire of the Kuva-yi Milliye before boarding a ship to escape from 
Biga.191 Anzavur was wounded and left the region for Istanbul. Those who supported 
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Anzavur were later dispersed by Ethem’s forces. Ahmed Anzavur did not represent an 
important threat to Ankara at this time.  
It is noteworthy that Kazım Özalp referred to Ahmed Anzavur’s armed men as 
“brigands”, even though they were under the command of a former Ottoman colonel who 
himself had been under the command of Kazım Özalp during WWI.192 However, Kazım 
Özalp did not offer to explain why a retired Ottoman Army colonel, Çerkes Ahmet Bey, 
had also joined Ahmed Anzavur. The answer to this might lie in Çerkes Ahmet’s own 
Circassian network, a dislike of CUP/ Kuva-yi Milliye, his feelings or ties to the Ottoman 
dynasty, or local disputes with other groups. Kazım Özalp did not give any reasons for 
the actions carried out by his former colonel. He only emphasised that they (himself and 
Kuva-yi Milliye) were working to ‘save’ the fatherland, while the anti-nationalist 
movement was comprised of bandits, religious fanatics, and bigots.193  
Ahmed Anzavur’s movement favoured a two-pronged tactic as part of a wider 
strategy of mobilising the different people of the region. The first was centred on ethnicity 
and the second on Islam. That is to say, although Anzavur Ahmed underlined “Islamic 
unity” and his rhetoric focused on the Muslims of the state; his main success came in 
mobilising large numbers of Circassians.194 Indeed, he focused on places populated by 
Circassians, such as Biga, Gönen, Kirmastı, Manyas, Düzce, Adapazarı and Hendek. It is 
also important to mention that not only ordinary Circassians, but also Circassian notables 
supported Ahmed Anzavur.195 These features of Anzavur’s movement threatened the 
Kuva-yi Milliye, because of the possibility they opened for a “Turkish-Circassian issue” 
to develop in the region.196 The Kuva-yi Milliye also needed the support of the armed 
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groups in the region for their war against the Greeks, and could not afford the “ethnic 
conflict” brewing among the subjects of the state.197  
As noted above, the second important component of Ahmed Anzavur’s 
mobilisation strategy was his appeal for Islamic unity and better relations with the 
Ottoman Porte.198 Such rhetoric influenced Muslim sentiment against the Kuva-yi Milliye. 
Anzavur also avoided the issues of taxation and compulsory military service, two 
unpopular policies employed by the Kuva-yi Milliye; this increased his support among 
ordinary people. In this regard, Anzavur Ahmed’s movement was more of a threat to the 
Kuva-yi Milliye than the Greek occupation. The internal struggle in the South Marmara 
between Anzavur Ahmed and the nationalists could lead to a reduction in support for the 
Kuva-yi Milliye.199 His criticism of Mustafa Kemal and his circle was especially harsh. 
He described Mustafa Kemal as a rebel. Anzavur Ahmed also promised that he would 
save the Anatolian people from Mustafa Kemal’s cruelty for the sake of the fatherland 
and the Sultan.200  
The Nationalists were fully cognisant of the Circassian support for Anzavur 
Ahmed. They aimed to divide the Circassians into two groups to strengthen the Kuva-yi 
Milliye in the region.201 Otherwise, they thought they would be unable pursue their 
                                                          
197 Çarıklı, Balıkkesir ve Alaşehir, 100. Whether or not there existed a ‘Turkish–Circassian issue’ was 
indeed a matter of discussion. On 6 January 1920 Mustafa Kemal asked Bekir Sami via telegram whether 
during the Anzavur incident there was contact between the Circassian bandit leaders, Çerkez Şevket, Şah 
İsmail, Çerkes Ethem, Yusuf İzzet Paşa and Ahmet Fevzi Paşa. According to Mustafa Kemal this contact 
among the Circassians and the support from the military officers could led to a conflict between Turks and 
Circassians. See TTK. Bekir Sami dosya 16, 598-599-600. 
198 The Damat Ferid Paşa government decided to make him a Paşa in 7th of April 1920. They were then 
planning to give to his soldiers official Ottoman military uniforms. PRO/FO 371/5047 – E 3673/3/44. 
April 23 1920. Ferid Paşa also tried to convince the British delegates to aid them in terms of military 
equipment since, he argued, that if Anzavur Ahmed had more arms and munitions, he could be more 
successful against the nationalists. See the same document. PRO/FO 371/5047 – E 3673/3/44. April 23 
1920. 
199 Kazım Özalp believed that Anzavur’s success was worse than Greek advance in Anatolia for them. 
Özalp, Milli Mücadele, 112.  
200 “Ahmed Anzavur Paşa”, İkdam Gazetesi, 26 April 1920. It worthy that both sides saw the other as 
rebels. Mustafa Kemal also referred to Anzavur as the who tried to create division among the national 
forces TİTE. K20G37B37001. 
201 Bekir Sami claims that the Kuva-yi Milliye could undermine the Anzavur uprising if they could divide 
the Circassians in two separate groups in the region. See TTK. Bekir Sami dosya 14, 329 and TTK. Bekir 
Sami dosya 15, 449-450-451-452. 
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activities in the region. It can also be said that there were differences between the Kuva-
yi Milliye and Anzavur Ahmed in terms of their attitude towards the residents of the 
region. For instance, the Kuva-yi Milliye threatened and cajoled the local population 
through force to acquire their support against the Greek occupation and Ahmed Anzavur. 
By contrast, Ahmed Anzavur sought the support of local people via non-coercive means. 
His written declarations against the nationalists were often enough to gain the backing of 
the masses in the field.  
 
Conclusion 
In the days and months following the Great War, violence and conflict became 
widespread throughout the South Marmara region, and bandits and gangs became features 
of daily life. The main characteristic features of these groups were their ethnicity, which 
separated them from ‘others’. However, the conflicts were generally local and limited to 
their districts. With the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia, two new main groups 
emerged in the region: the loyalists and the nationalists. Existing armed groups later 
joined one of the new groups, while continuing their bandit activities. It is noteworthy 
that the loyalist movement was united on an Islamic basis. The loyalists mobilised people 
by emphasising their ties with the Caliphate and the Sultanate. Circassian ethnicity also 
played an important role in the strengthening of the loyalist movement. Anzavur Ahmed 
used Circassian ethnicity to solidify his movement, which was based in towns populated 
by Circassians. Meanwhile, the national movement also tried to use Circassian ethnicity 
gain an advantage. At the beginning, this was used to develop a line of resistance against 
the Greek occupation, and relied on Circassian networks in South Marmara. However, 
with the emergence of the anti-nationalist movement, the nationalists encouraged Çerkes 
Ethem to battle against the anti-nationalists. The conflict between the loyalists and 
nationalists then became an intra-community struggle between Çerkes Ethem and 
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Anzavur Ahmed. The conflict also forced the nationalists to think more deeply about the 
existence of Circassians in the region. As will be explored later, the Gönen-Manyas 
deportations can be seen as a deliberate nationalist attempt to reduce the density of the 
Circassian population in the region.  
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Chapter Three: Civil War in the Empire: Adapazarı-Düzce and Yozgat Incidents 
(1920) 
Introduction  
In the history of the modern republic of Turkey, the Adapazarı–Hendek–Düzce 
region first came to the attention of the media in 1996. The Susurluk Incident (one of the 
biggest scandals highlighting the extent of the police-mafia-state nexus in Turkey) 
followed a seemingly routine car crash in the Southern Marmara town of Susurluk. The 
bodies in the car included those of Abdullah Çatlı, who was wanted by Interpol, police 
chief Hüseyin Kocadağ, and Sedat Bucak, an MP and a leader of a pro-state tribe from 
Southeast Turkey; all except Sedat Bucak were pronounced dead at the scene. A 
parliamentary committee was established in order to investigate this curious web of 
relations and networks. The committee conducted hearings with politicians, bureaucrats, 
and suspects in the case. Additionally, individuals thought to be related to these people 
and their networks were also called upon to testify before the committee. Mehmet Hadi 
Özcan,202 who was imprisoned as a leader of a local criminal group that was active in the 
İzmit-Adapazarı region, also appeared before the committee.  
Below are some excerpts from his testimony:  
Chair: Several extra-judicial executions have been carried out in this triangle, Kocaeli, 
Sakarya (Adapazarı), Sapanca, and Istanbul, and it so happens that the mafia groups are 
all based in this region. Why is this?  
Mehmet Hadi Özcan: Because of the weather, I suppose! I don’t know. (In obvious 
reference to a well-known Turkish expression that is generally used to make fun of 
questions that one is asked, or to water down the seriousness of the matter being 
discussed) 
Chair: We also like the weather, but…  
                                                          
202 He is a Circassian from Kırkpınar village of Sapanca/İzmit. Sadık Güleç, Ölüm üçgeni : Bir şehir, Bir 
Kabadayı, Bir Mafya Babası /, 1. baskı, Profil ; Strateji-Analiz ; (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul : Profil Yayıncılık, 
2013).  
60 
 
Mehmet Hadi Özcan: Indeed, it is all happening here, and they are all from around here.  
Chair: But I do not think that it is simply because of the weather.203 
Evidently, the weather is not the cause. In fact, this was not the first time that the 
region had been the focus of attention. Almost 75 years earlier, in 1920, an incident that 
took place in the region threatened the very survival of Kuva-yi Milliye in Ankara. This 
incident was led by a Circassian-dominated group who, despite their close relationships 
with the Ottoman government, were initially independent of it. The Ottoman government 
later used this situation to weaken the Ankara-based nationalists. The nationalists first 
sent an advisory delegation to calm down those who had taken up arms, but the Ankara 
government chose to use military force to suppress them when several members of the 
delegation were killed en route to a meeting with the anti-nationalist. Although a certain 
level of calm was initially achieved in the region, anti-Kuva-yi Milliye sentiments 
prevailed in the region, and opposition to the Ankara government continued. This 
opposition movement continued until the 1940s, and became a trans-border movement 
when its leading members were stripped of their citizenship and banished from the newly-
established Turkish republic. This incident will be investigated in further detail in Chapter 
6.  
 Although the Adapazarı–Düzce incidents appeared to be a limited opposition 
movement compared to other incidents of the era, both in terms of its geographical 
penetration and the after-effects of the incidents in the following decades, it retains a 
unique place in the historiography of modern Turkey. Indeed, the incidents broke out in 
a region that was situated very close to the headquarters of the national movement, thus 
                                                          
203BAŞKAN - Birtakım infazlar, babalar şunlar bunlar hep bu mıntıkada; İzmit, Sakarya, Sapanca, 
İstanbul üçgeninde oluyor, niye burada oluyor. 
MEHMET HADİ ÖZCAN - Havasındandır, bilmiyorum. 
BAŞKAN - Havası güzeldir; biz de beğendik havasını da... 
MEHMET HADİ ÖZCAN - Hakikaten burada oluyor ama, ben bakıyorum öyle, hep buradan çıkıyor. 
BAŞKAN - Hep havasından değil gibi geliyor bana?  
01.03.1997 Hadi Özcan’s statement to the Susurluk Investigation Committee, 
http://www.kocaelimeydan.com/gundem/bir-mafya-babasinin-itiraflari-h11394.html accessed 
21/08/2015.  
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forcing the Ankara government to prepare for relocating parliament to the town of 
Sivas.204 The leaders of the incidents were either killed by the nationalists, or they moved 
abroad and continued their opposition to the nationalist cause (later known as the 
Kemalist cause) over the following years. This chapter argues that the suppression of the 
anti-nationalist movements of Adapazarı–Düzce and Yozgat strengthened Çerkes 
Ethem’s position in the nationalist cause. Moreover, it claims that, in order to unite the 
people against the Greek occupation and the anti-nationalists, Ethem took extremely 
harsh measures against the anti-nationalists, without differentiating between Turks, 
Circassians, Muslims or non-Muslims. It could be said that, without Ethem’s military 
forces and actions, it would not have been possible for the Ankara government to gain 
acceptance as the de facto government from the people of Anatolia. This chapter will 
demonstrate why the Adapazarı–Düzce incidents occupy a significant place in the history 
of Turkey, particularly during the transformation from empire to nation state. Firstly, this 
chapter will examine the Circassian opposition to the Ankara-based nationalists in the 
Adapazarı–Düzce region. Secondly, it will focus on how one key paramilitary leader of 
the period, Çerkes Ethem, became one of the most powerful people in the country after 
suppressing another incident in Yozgat.  
  
1 – The Adapazarı–Düzce Incidents  
The Adapazarı–Düzce region was extremely important for both the Istanbul and 
Ankara governments, as gaining the support of the local people could change the balance 
of power for either side in the conflict. During the period after WWI, there were many 
armed people and armed groups in this area. Geographically, the region was sandwiched 
between the territories controlled by the opposing governments in Istanbul and Ankara. 
                                                          
204 Anti-Kuva-yi Milliye movement reached to the Yabanaban town of Ankara which was only 30 km far 
Ankara. Halide Edib Adıvar, Türkün Ateşle-Imtihanı : (Istiklâl Savaşı Hâtıraları) / (Istanbul : Çan yayını, 
1962). 144, 137,138.  
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Therefore, this was, strategically speaking, a very significant location. For the Ankara 
government, the region was a transit zone for sending Ottoman military arms from the 
arsenals in Istanbul to Anatolia. The main railway lines from Istanbul to west and central 
Anatolia passed through this region and, during the civil war, maintaining control over 
the railway line and the region was vital. Moreover, the Ankara government was greatly 
concerned about armed mobilisation in the region, which, although both geographically 
and politically closer to the Ottoman Porte, was only one day’s journey from Ankara. The 
conflict, which initially surfaced in the Adapazarı–Düzce region, moved closer to Ankara 
with each passing day, where the government did not have a sufficiently well-prepared 
army. 
 The Adapazarı–Düzce region was also vital for Ankara-based nationalists in 
Istanbul, who passed through the region on their way to Ankara. The Karakol205, which 
organised the nationalists’ escape from Istanbul, was a powerful organisation in the 
region, but was being threatened by Rum, Armenian bandits, and Palace-supported anti-
nationalist Circassians. The local Laz, an ethnic group that originates from the Black Sea 
coast, were mobilised by Karakol against anti-nationalist groups in the region. Local 
small-boat captains, Ramiz and Rauf of Hopa, as well as Dr Refik of Trabzon, Meto 
Hüseyin, and Mehmet Bey, were recruited to the nationalist cause by Karakol, and 
Yenibahçeli Şükrü was appointed as the general commander of the region.206 Although 
Ali Fuat Paşa (Cebesoy)207 believed that the significance of the incident was exaggerated 
by the Ankara government due to the reports that it received from local unit commanders, 
the incident was, nevertheless, the single biggest threat facing Ankara at that time. The 
                                                          
205 Pro-nationalist, a resistance group which was led by two prominent CUP figures, Kara Kemal and 
Vasif Bey.  
206 Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Millî Mücadele Hâtıraları /, 2. baskı., Temel Yayınları Sertifika No ; (İstanbul : 
Temel, 2010), 440.  
207 Ali Fuat Paşa (Cebesoy) 1882-1968. General, diplomat, and politician. He was the commander of 
Western Front in the early days of the Turkish War of Independence, and then he was appointed as the 
Ambassador for Turkey in Moscow.  
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Ankara government began to panic and, in an attempt to quell the incident, the 
government diverted army units from the western and southern fronts to the region, even 
though those troops did not have sufficient preparation and training for confronting the 
local anti-nationalists.  
 A group of Circassian notables attempted to gain the control of the region. Their 
aim was to maintain their control of the region by holding on to the prominence that they 
enjoyed in the post-World War I period, and they sought the support of Istanbul 
government. Some members of the Ottoman Palace, such as Baş Mabeyinci Yaver Paşa, 
contacted Circassian notables in the hope of convincing them to rise up against the Ankara 
government208 with the help of well-armed local Circassian villagers in İzmit, Sapanca, 
Hendek and Düzce. One of the reasons the Porte had gained support so fast, was the great 
respect and affinity the locals felt towards the Ottoman Sultan and the Caliph, as well as 
the presence in the Ottoman government, bureaucracy, army, and security structures, of 
a significant number of Circassians from the region, who commanded respect among the 
local Circassians and had relatives amongst them. Furthermore, the presence of 
Circassian women in the Ottoman Harem also played a part here.209 Not only did the 
leaders of the incident gain the support of the local people, they were also able to influence 
the army units that were stationed in the region. 210  
The people of the region had no sympathies for the CUP rule and considered the 
nationalists of Ankara to be a continuation of the CUP, which was thought by many to be 
responsible for the disastrous outcomes in WWI. The fact that the region had been 
engaged in several long-lasting wars, from the Balkan wars of 1912-13 to October 1918, 
when their involvement in WWI ended, was another reason for the incident. Specifically, 
                                                          
208 Cebesoy, Millî Mücadele Hâtıraları, 427.  
209 There were girls from the Adapazarı-Düzce region in the Ottoman Harem; for an example see the 
report of a lady from Maan (the family of Kayalar village) see BOA.DH.MKT 2270/81 document 1. 4 
May 1320 (1904). 
210 Cebesoy, Millî Mücadele Hâtıraları , 427-428.  
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war-weariness was a problem in the region, which had been in a constant state of war 
since the early 1910s. Although the country was under occupation, many ordinary people 
were against military mobilisation. 211 The local notables, on the other hand, took a less 
strict stance towards either the Istanbul government or the nationalists in Anatolia. For 
the most part, they depended on their own personal networks and on the dynamics of local 
politics. For instance, Sait Bey worked for the Kuva-yi Milliye in the Adapazarı region, 
but his local rival, Çerkes Hikmet, also sought a position in the local Kuva-yi Milliye 
branch; he was prevented by his rivals from joining the branch, which was also controlled 
by members of the CUP that Çerkes Hikmet opposed. Consequently, Çerkes Hikmet 
began recruiting people who supported the Istanbul government, rather than Kuva-yi 
Milliye.212 
The Adapazarı–Düzce region first attracted the attention of Mustafa Kemal on 20 
October 1919. In a telegram sent by the commander of the First Division, Mustafa Asım, 
to Mustafa Kemal, the former explained that a group of Circassian and Abkhazians led 
by Bekir, Beslan, and Talustan Beys, had tried to recruit people in the town of Akyazı by 
declaring that they would not accept Mustafa Kemal as a replacement for the Sultan, and 
had tried to set up a local government.213 Two pro-Ankara Circassians were sent by 
Mustafa Asım to gather information about the incident.214 A few days later, with the 
support of local Circassians and military units stationed in the area, the group was routed 
out of the town.215 
                                                          
211 Hüsrev Gerede, Hüsrev Geredeʼnin Anıları : Kurtuluş Savaşı, Atatürk ve Devrimler (19 Mayıs 1919-
10 Kasım 1938) /; (İstanbul : Literatür, 2003), 202-203.  
212  Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, (Istanbul : Devlet Matbaası, 1934). Volume 3, document 174, 206.  
213 Atatürk, Nutuk. Volume 3, document 162, 196-197. Mustafa Kemal believes that these Circassians 
were backed by the British. Adnan Sofuoğlu, Milli Mücadele Döneminde Kocaeli (Ankara: AKDTYK 
Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006)., 64-66.  
214 Atatürk, Nutuk. Document 162, 196. One of these Circassians was Safer Bey, who would change sides 
and take a position in the local government of Adapazarı.  
215 Ibid, volume 3, document 162, 198-199.  
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Public order had already broken down in Adapazarı and the surrounding areas 
after WWI. Some Circassians and Abkhazians were actively engaging in banditry in the 
region.216 In the early days of the national movement, a struggle between the Ankara and 
Istanbul governments had already begun in Adapazarı–Düzce over authority and control 
of the region. Çerkes Bekir of Adapazarı went to the region to recruit people to the Special 
Organisation, which was controlled by the national movement at that time. 217 However, 
Bekir’s propaganda for the nationalist cause was unsuccessful. The elders of the 
Circassian community in Düzce did not accept Bekir’s offer of working for the Kuva-yi 
Milliye.218 Approximately ten days later, he came to Adapazarı to recruit people; as in 
Düzce, his attempt ended in failure.219 On 24 February 1920, Kuşçubaşı Eşref Bey,220 
who used the title ‘Commander of the Mujahedeen of Turkey’ (Türkiye Umum 
Mücahidin Kumandanı) and had been appointed to the position of commander of the 
Kuva-yi Milliye forces in İzmit, Adapazarı, and Bolu, came to Kandıra, a town in 
Adapazarı, with the objective of preventing any anti-Kuva-yi Milliye uprisings in the 
region.221 Eşref arrived in Adapazarı on 3 April 1920 accompanied by dozens of mounted 
infantry soldiers.222  
However, he also failed in his attempt to gain the support of the locals for the 
nationalist cause. One possible explanation for this failure is that the local Circassian 
notables did not think that his family’s rank in the Circassian hierarchy was high enough, 
                                                          
216 BOA.DH.ŞFR. 104/136, 1 Teşrinisani 1335 (1 November 1919). Çerkes Said Bey was the leader of 
bandits in Adapazarı at the time.  
217 BOA.DH.KMS. 53-3/36 document 1, 14 September 1335 (1919).  
218 BOA.DH.KMS. 53-3/36 document 2, 16 September 1335 (1919).  
219 BOA.DH.KMS. 53-3/36 document 2, 16 September 1335 (1919).  
220 Kuşçubaşı Eşref Sencer,1873-1964. Circassian descent. He was agent in the Ottoman Special 
Organisation ‘Teşkilatı Mahsusa’. In the early days of the Turkish War of Independence he worked for 
the nationalists, and then moved to the opposite side.  
221 BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ 33/ 76, 2 March 1920. BOA.DH.KMS 53-4/ 47 document 3. 17 April 1336 
(1920). Rüknü Özkök, Milli Mücadele Başlarken Düzce – Bolu İsyanları (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayın Ltd. 
Şti. Yayınları Tarih Kitapları Dizisi, 1971).244. 
222 PRO/FO 371/5047 E3731/3/44, 23 April-24 April 1920, a telegram from Admiral Webb in İstanbul, 
document no 133. According to same document that Eşref Bey was released from Malta in February 
1920.  
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even though Eşref was a well-known agent in the Special Organisation and his family had 
links to the Ottoman Palace because of his father’s role there.223 One could be from the 
palace, but not a Circassian noble. As a result, Eşref was unable to gain control in the 
region. Çerkes Kanbulat Sait of Adapazarı was wary of Eşref’s activities and mobilised a 
group to oust Eşref. Although this movement was initially directed against Eşref’s 
activities, it later turned into an anti-Kuva-yi Milliye uprising. Eşref had to escape from 
Adapazarı with only thirty armed men. Those who failed to escape were imprisoned and 
beaten by the anti-nationalists, the majority of whom were Circassians.224 Kanbulat and 
his helpers first moved to Adapazarı, but later headed towards Hendek. In the town of 
Çatalköprü, they destroyed the bridges that connected Adapazarı with Hendek.225  
On April 13, anti-Kuva-yi Milliye Circassians and Abkhazians held a meeting in 
the Ömer Efendi village of Düzce and started another incident.226 The telegraph lines 
were broken, military buildings were attacked, and a captain and an officer were killed.227 
Military ammunitions were taken over by the anti-nationalists; prisoners were released 
from the military prison and the town jail, and the anti-nationalists recruited people into 
their own gendarme force. They seized official positions in Düzce and appointed Berzeg 
Safer Bey as governor and Maan Ali228 as commander of the gendarme force, made Vahap 
responsible for subsistence and reinforcement (iaşe ve ikmal), and named Koç Bey as 
mayor of the town.229 On April 18, the leaders of the incident met in Paşa Karyesi and 
                                                          
223 Adnan Sofuoğlu, Milli Mücadele Döneminde Kocaeli (Ankara: AKDTYK Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 
2006) 60,61.  
224 PRO/FO 371, 5167, E5039/262/44. 23 April 1920-20May 1920 a report from Admiral Webb in 23 
April 1920 page 106.  
225 Özkök, Milli Mücadele Başlarken Düzce – Bolu İsyanları. 244.  
226 ATASE.İSH. 274/ 23, 13 April 1336 (1920), ATASE.İSH. 527/43, 25 April 1336 (1920). M. Zekai 
Konrapa, Bolu Tarihi (Bolu: Bolu Vilayet Matbaası, 1964), 724. Sina Akşin claims that about four 
thousand people came together in Ömer Efendi, see Sina Akşin, İç Savaş ve Sevr’de Ölüm (İstanbul: 
Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2010), 65-66.  
227 Captain Avni Efendi and officer Rahiskar Efendi were killed. BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ. 51, document 2, 
24 April 1336 (1920). Özkök, Milli Mücadele Başlarken Düzce – Bolu İsyanları.247,248.  
228 He was member of Ottoman Special Organisation during WWI as Major. He was in Iraq front, and 
served under the Osmancık volunteer regiment. See Semih Nafiz Tansu, Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 31 July 
1956. 2 
229 Akşin, İç Savaş ve Sevr’de Ölüm. 65-66. 
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made a declaration, in which they openly stated that they were not hostile towards the 
Istanbul government.230 A group of the anti-nationalists, which comprised people from 
the twenty-seven different villages of the Düzce–Bolu region,231 attacked military units 
in Bolu and Düzce and seized their arms.232 Since the local governor of Bolu also backed 
the anti-nationalist movement, he was able to convince them to go back to their villages. 
The Ankara government sent a group of MPs to negotiate with the local leaders and put 
an end to the anti- Kuva-yi Milliye movement; this group included Hüsrev, Fuat, Şükrü, 
and Hüseyin Beys, and was accompanied by a cavalry detachment. 233 On 20 April, 
another group of anti-nationalists came to Bolu from Gerede to occupy the local 
governor’s building and to complain about the Ankara government and local bureaucrats 
who were loyal to Ankara. As a result of this occupation, the anti-nationalists declared 
that they would not recognise any government apart from that of the Sultan, and that they 
would not join any government army except that demanded by Istanbul. Communication 
channels would only remain open with Istanbul, and not with Ankara. In addition, the 
clerks of the Telegraph Office of Bolu would be replaced, and only the government in 
Istanbul would be allowed to collect taxes from the region.234 
 The Ankara government sent its military detachments from Adapazarı to Düzce 
to suppress the incident, which was close to reaching the outskirts of Ankara, but they 
were defeated by the anti-nationalists, of whom there were more than two thousand (the 
majority of whom were Circassian).235 In Düzce, Hendek, and Adapazarı, all senior 
nationalist military officers were arrested; more than eight hundred foot soldiers were 
                                                          
230 BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ. 40/51, document 2, 24 April 1336 (1920). 
231 Konrapa, Bolu Tarih, 724.  
232 30 guns and 10.000 shotshells were seized from one military unit. BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ. 40/51, 
document 3, 24 April 1336 (1920). 
233 The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session 2, 24 April 1920, 8. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001002.pdf. accessed 
14/11/2014.  
234 BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ. 40/51, document 3, 24 April 1336 (1920). 
235 BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ. 39/37, document 3. 24 April 1336 (1920), BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ 39-41, 
document 3.  
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discharged, and their arms and ammunitions were confiscated by the anti-nationalists,236 
who were led by Berzeg Sefer Bey.237 Lieutenant Colonel Mahmut, who was also 
Circassian, was sent by Mustafa Kemal to convince the Circassians to end their anti-
nationalist activities in the region. He left the Yağbasan village of Hendek on 21 April,238 
and was on his way to Düzce when he was confronted by a group of armed men, most of 
whom were Abkhazians. They were accompanied by other Abkhazian troops under 
Mahmut Bey’s command. Initially, the meeting was friendly and Mahmud Bey’s troops 
and the anti-nationalist Abkhazians began marching together towards Düzce. However, 
at some point on the 23 April 1920, an Abkhazian from the anti-nationalist group shot 
Mahmut Bey239 and killed a further three people who were sent by Ankara as an ‘advice 
council’, with the task of reaching an agreement between the Ankara government and the 
anti-nationalists in village of Budaklar of Hendek.240 Following these incidents, no Kuva-
yi Milliye sympathisers remained in the region.241 The region was now entirely under the 
control of the anti-nationalists, who put forward the demands of the Istanbul government 
via the commander of the gendarme force of Bolu, Osman Nuri, on 24 April 1920.242 
They stated that the Sultan and his government (i.e. the Istanbul government) were the 
only legitimate authorities in the empire, only the Ministry of War should have the 
authority to recruit people into the army, telegram communication should be opened with 
the Istanbul government and cut with Ankara, and tax should only be collected by the 
Ministry of Finance.243  
                                                          
236 BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ. 39/41, document 3. 
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 Ankara subsequently sent a group of MPs and military men to the region. This 
group included Hüsrev (Gerede) Bey, whose memoirs are an important source for 
understanding the incident.244 When the group arrived in Gerede, they were surrounded 
by anti-nationalists and were taken as hostages.245 It is worth noting that Islamic rhetoric 
and rituals were practised by the anti-nationalists during the incident in order to encourage 
local people to rise up against the Ankara government. Although there were Turks among 
the anti-nationalists, the majority of the participants were Circassian.246 The leader of the 
anti-nationalists, Berzeg Sefer Bey, visited Hüsrev Bey in prison, where he explained to 
him that he was against Mustafa Kemal and his friends because he wanted to prevent 
them from establishing a military dictatorship in Turkey.247 
 On 2 May 1920, Bolu was taken by the Kuva-yi Milliye forces, which consisted 
of 500 cavalry and foot soldiers under the command of the Lieutenant Colonel Arif 
Bey.248 Two days after Arif Bey had taken control of the city; it was surrounded by forces 
belonging to the Istanbul government. As a result, one hundred soldiers were captured as 
prisoners of war by the anti-nationalists. Arif Bey was forced to leave the city, which fell 
into the hands of the Istanbul government on 13 May 1920.249 However, the nationalists 
did not cease their activities; they had different cells and networks in several other cities 
in Anatolia and used all possible means of collecting intelligence in the Adapazarı-Düzce 
region. For this purpose, Eşref’s brother Ahmed, a reserve officer, and his friend, 
Lieutenant Ahmed Adli Bey, travelled from Istanbul to İzmit, pretending to be merchants. 
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However, on completion of their journey through the region, they were arrested by the 
Istanbul government on May 1920.250  
By May 1920, the region had already become a centre of the anti-nationalist 
movement. This movement did not only involve Circassians of Düzce; anti-Kuva-yi 
Milliye uprisings also flared up in Adapazarı and İzmit. Most of these involved three main 
opposition groups that were operating in the region. The first group was from the Düzce-
Bolu region and consisted of Circassians and Abkhazians under the leadership of Berzeg 
Sefer. The second group was made up of the forces led by Ahmed Anzavur,251 who was 
also active outside South Marmara and had the potential to pose a serious threat to the 
Ankara government in Adapazarı. He demonstrated this by organising a raid on Boğazköy 
on 10 May 1919, in which he led around five hundred armed men, some of whom were 
from the villages of Hamidiye, Kemaliye, and Kumbaşı in Adapazarı. He occupied the 
region for six days, attacking the troops of Ali Fuat Paşa with two thousand soldiers from 
the Army of Caliphate on 15 May, and taking full control of the entire region on 24 
May.252 However, his victory was short lived, as he was defeated two days later by a joint 
Cebesoy–Ethem force on May 26, the latter of which had recently reached the town of 
Hendek.253 Finally, the third opposition group was from the town of İzmit, where Çule 
İbrahim Hakkı254 was the governor. 255  
As a response to the threat posed by the anti-nationalist Circassians, the Ankara 
government also attempted to use Circassians from other regions against them. With the 
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outbreak of the incident, the nationalists in Ankara considered arming Circassians from 
the towns of Haymana and Bala (near Ankara) and deploying them in Bolu, but later 
concluded that arming the Haymana and Bala Circassians would pose security risks in 
the future, as they might join their fellow Circassians in Düzce and Adapazarı. Thus, these 
plans never came to fruition.256 The Damad Ferid Paşa government in Istanbul also went 
to great lengths to persuade local Circassians in other parts of Anatolia to create 
difficulties for the Kuva-yi Milliye, which aimed to end the national movement before a 
possible civil war began. At times, the British also favoured the anti-nationalists. It is 
important to remember that that the British put pressure on the Ottoman government to 
sign the peace treaty with the Allies before the Ottoman delegation was sent to the 
conference in Sèvres, France. In a meeting between Damad Ferid Paşa, a British military 
representative, and General Milne on 20 April 1920, it was stated that support in the form 
of ammunition and guns would be provided to Ahmed Anzavur’s forces, and also to those 
of İbrahim in Yalova.257 İbrahim, who was probably the commander of the gendarme 
force in Yalova, had approximately 1,500 soldiers. The plan was to combine these forces 
in order to create a bigger anti-Kuva-yi Milliye force in South Marmara.258 During that 
meeting, it was also decided that Ahmed Anzavur would take Bursa from the nationalists 
before moving to Yalova in the north in order to join İbrahim and his forces. The aim of 
this plan was to enable them to solidify their presence in İzmit and re-occupy Eskişehir.259 
For that purpose, and to strengthen Anzavur`s position, Damad Ferid gave him the title 
of Paşa in April 1920.260 Damad Ferid needed the support of the Circassians of İzmit, 
Adapazarı, Sinop, and central Anatolia in order to succeed in his anti-nationalist policies. 
He sent fixers from Istanbul to these regions to organise the local Circassians into an anti-
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nationalist cause.261 Some local Circassian notables from the Adapazarı–Düzce area were 
invited to Istanbul to make promises and guarantee that they would be loyal to the 
Ottoman government and the Palace.262 In addition, the British considered Anzavur to be 
a favourable person, as he enjoyed a great deal of support from local people and was not 
involved in any lootings or other such crimes.263 One of the primary concerns of the 
British was ensuring the security of the Bosphorus under their occupation. Therefore, 
İzmit, a city located at the gates of the Bosphorus, had a significant place in British 
policy.264 
A further British policy involved retaining control of Istanbul and the Çanakkale 
(Gallipoli) straits. Strategically speaking, the straits occupied a crucial position. If the 
British had the straits, they could control shipping traffic between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean. Moreover, this would ensure that the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, would 
remain safe under British occupation. Ankara believed that the British implemented this 
policy by backing the local Circassian notable Ahmed Anzavur, in order to create a buffer 
zone between their occupied territory and the Kuva-yi Milliye controlled area in the 
Marmara region.265 Ismet (İnönü) Bey also claimed that, from the Black Sea town of Şile 
to the gulf of Edremit in the Aegean Sea, the region would be secured by Ahmed Anzavur 
on behalf of the British forces. The aim of this collaboration was to prevent any armed 
conflict between the British forces and the Kuva-yi Milliye forces: Ahmed Anzavur would 
act as a barrier between them. The British aimed to turn the Marmara region into a buffer 
zone by saving it from nationalist forces. Furthermore, the Ankara government believed 
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that, when the incident began in the Adapazarı-Düzce region, this concern caused 
Anzavur to move to the region so that he could mobilise more people against Ankara.266 
However, British documents show that Ankara exaggerated both the involvement of the 
British in the civil war between the Istanbul and Ankara governments and its support for 
the anti-nationalists in the region and their leaders, such as Anzavur Ahmed. The British 
representative in Istanbul was not willing to become involved in the struggle between the 
two governments, even though it formally backed the Istanbul government. The British 
also complained about their allies in Anatolia, namely the Italian and French forces, since 
the Italians were not against the nationalists of Ankara, and the French made it difficult 
for the British to pursue their policy.267 It seems that, in such circumstances, Britain 
backed the Damad Ferid government in order to advance its own interests. It avoided 
having direct connections with the armed anti-nationalists in Anatolia, such as Ahmed 
Anzavur, because of the rumours surrounding its policies and the increasing level of anti-
British sentiments in Anatolia.268 
For Ankara, and particularly for Mustafa Kemal, the main enemy was not the 
British or Greek forces, but rather the Damad Ferid Paşa, his circle, and the domestic 
problems that Ankara believed to be the main threats to the continuity of the Kuva-yi 
Milliye movement.269 The priority of the Ankara government was quelling the uprisings, 
rather than fighting the occupation forces; if it failed to retain control over Anatolia in 
this chaotic situation, it would be easy for the occupation forces to execute their plans. 
Nevertheless, the leaders of the anti-nationalist movement, such as Mustafa Kemal, 
avoided making negative remarks about the Sultan in public, even though the Ankara 
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government was engaged in a civil war with the Istanbul government and the anti-
nationalists. In the minds of the people, the Sultan was not responsible for the disastrous 
situation in the empire. Although the nationalist forces were fighting the anti-nationalists, 
the Ankara government followed a policy of arguing that the Ottoman Sultan/Caliph was 
not free from British pressure in occupied Istanbul. According to Mustafa Kemal, the 
Sultan and the Istanbul government were two different entities, as he once claimed in the 
assembly. The Istanbul government, which was reformed on the orders of the Sultan many 
times during the occupation (due to British pressure), and particularly the Ferid Paşa 
cabinet, was held captive by the British. Mustafa Kemal noted that there was no need to 
send a delegation from the Ankara assembly to Istanbul to gain the support of the Sultan 
for the national movement, since the British occupation of Istanbul prevented the Sultan 
from openly declaring his support for the Kuva-yi Milliye movement. The assembly was 
already looking for a way to meet with the Sultan, and in order to do so, a secret contact 
would have to be found.270 He further argued that, even if he learnt that the Sultan was 
against the national movement, he would not believe it, and would ascribe any such 
declaration to British pressure on the Sultan.  
 
2 - Çerkes Ethem in the Adapazarı-Düzce Region  
As a paramilitary leader, Çerkes Ethem, would become one of the most dominant 
forces of the era. He was initially close to the national movement in Anatolia, and had 
enjoyed a good relationship with the bureaucratic elites of that movement ever since his 
military service during WWI, when he fought against the Russian and British forces in 
Iran and Afghanistan with the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa,271 under the command of his older 
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brother, Reşit Bey.272 Following the Mudros Armistice, Çerkes Ethem was in the town of 
Bandırma in South Marmara, where he was convinced by Rauf Bey (Orbay) to join the 
nationalist cause. He quickly organised his own paramilitary forces and set up the first 
lines of resistance against the Greek occupation. In addition, he developed his own 
strategies for collecting money from people in order to fund his paramilitary groups. 
Although he did use some resources that had been allocated to associations resisting 
against the Greek occupation to provide for the needs of his soldiers,273 he generally 
sustained his military units using money that had been forcibly gathered from notables in 
the region. His policies were not welcomed by the notables, who did not agree to pay 
voluntarily. In the territories that he controlled, Ethem enacted a number of relatively 
severe policies. He would stage sudden attacks on towns experiencing disorder, or those 
considered anti-Kuva-yi Milliye. After an armed clash, he usually took control and created 
military tribunals to carry out the trials of miscreants. The decisions of these tribunals 
tended to be very harsh: this was the single biggest complaint that locals and his own 
forces made about Ethem. The ongoing war and armed conflicts raging in the region 
meant that the tribunals had been given the authority to execute death sentences without 
following the proper legal process.  
Ethem Bey’s paramilitary group consisted of a large number of Circassians. He 
and his brothers refused to join the standing army, the establishment of which was being 
proposed by people in Ankara who had a background in the regular Ottoman Army. 
Indeed, his men had not been ‘proper soldiers’ in the first place, and they simply wanted 
to continue with their haphazard paramilitary activities.274 Taxes were an important 
financial resource that Ethem collected from notables in the region, although his methods 
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of doing so were very unpopular: he would arrest those who refused to pay tax,275 and his 
militia would seize money, just like the common criminal bandits and paramilitary groups 
in the region. Ethem’s militia was a powerful one, and was based on a wide-ranging 
kinship network with other Circassians in the region, while his social status as the son of 
a wealthy landowner also helped him to gain the respect of fellow Circassians.  
 After suppressing the first Anzavur incident, Çerkes Ethem was asked by İsmet 
(İnönü) Bey to move to Adapazarı–Düzce region so that he could also to quell the 
‘uprising’ that was taking place there.276 On the way to the Adapazarı–Düzce region, 
Ethem decided to go to the town of Manyas, where Anzavur Ahmed’s supporters had 
gathered to escape from Ethem’s forces. After the first attack by Ethem’s forces on the 
town, approximately 600 of Anzavur’s men joined Ethem,277 while the remainder either 
fled to Istanbul or were killed in the skirmish. These additions to Ethem’s forces gave 
him a total of about 5,000 cavalry men, all of whom had fine military equipment. In 
addition, he now had approximately 500 foot soldiers.278 On 29 April 1920, Ethem and 
his forces arrived first in Geyve, and then in then Sapanca and Adapazarı, where some 
people were sentenced to death.279 He suppressed the disorder that was prevailing there 
and took control of the area. An imam, a military captain, and ten civilians were hanged 
following a decision taken by his military tribunal.280 By taking control, he prevented the 
anti-nationalist forces from raiding, and subsequently terminating, the assembly in 
Ankara. Those who were heading towards Ankara in order to attack the assembly 
dispersed because they lacked adequate support from other anti-nationalists.281 
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 Although Ethem was a man who was concerned mainly with war, he was in no 
doubt about the necessity of becoming involved in political matters from time to time. On 
23 May 1920, before putting an end to the incident, he prepared three letters for Sultan 
Vahidettin, Sadrazam Damad Ferid Paşa, and the supreme military command in Istanbul. 
These letters clearly show why Ethem became involved in the nationalist struggle. In his 
first letter, which was written for Vahidettin, he argues that Damad Ferid was not an 
appropriate choice for the role of Sadrazam. Ethem claims that the Caliphate and 
Sultanate did not derive any benefits from Damad Ferid’s method of administration, and 
that his policies led to people in Anatolia killing one another. 282 Ethem also emphasised 
that, while the Kuva-yi Milliye aimed to save the Sultan from occupation, Damad Ferid’s 
policies divided people into different groups. Finally, he asked Vahidettin to dismiss 
Damad Ferid from the Sadrazamship, and to appoint people who had merit and were 
capable of doing the job.283 Moreover, Ethem also prepared a letter for Damad Ferid 
himself, in which he told him that the Ottoman administration had never been ruled by 
anyone with such a low level of capability. He blamed Damad Ferid for the problems in 
the state and accused him of being a traitor, as his policies had led to people killing one 
another.284 In his final letter, which was addressed to the supreme military commander in 
Istanbul, he also emphasised his concerns about Damad Ferid and reiterated his belief that 
he did not deserve the position that he held. Furthermore, he argued that Damad Ferid 
would never be capable of representing the Ottoman nation.285 However, the delivery of 
these three letters to Istanbul was prevented by Ali Fuat Paşa, who wanted Ethem to avoid 
becoming involved in politics so that he could focus instead on fighting the Greeks and 
quelling any uprisings against Ankara. Nevertheless, these letters tell us that Ethem was 
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not an apolitical fighter who had no understanding of politics. The language used in the 
letters shows us that, if they were written by Ethem, he was an educated man. Even if the 
letters were not written by him, they still prove that he was surrounded by people who 
were very capable and astute, and who understood the political issues faced by the empire.
 One night, while Hüsrev (Gerede) Bey was in prison, Berzeg Sefer Bey sent 
Ahmet Ağa to negotiate with him, in order reach an agreement with Mustafa Kemal on 
his behalf. Hüsrev Bey was secretly released from the prison and was brought to the house 
of Abdülgani Bey, one of the leading figures of the incident. He met with Berzeg Sefer 
Bey and Koç Bey, the commander of the gendarme force in Düzce. Sefer claimed that he 
was surprised by the news of the Sèvres Treaty286 and was filled with remorse about his 
initial hostility towards Ankara. Sefer asked Hüsrev Bey to negotiate with the Ankara 
government on his behalf and to ask for reconciliation.287 Although he was against the 
Kuva-yi Milliye, he was also against the partition of the Ottoman Empire that the Allies 
had stipulated in the terms of the Sèvres Peace Treaty, which would divide and colonise 
the Ottoman Empire under the rule of the Allies. While Hüsrev Bey travelled to Ankara 
via the other side of the front, Sefer Bey met with Refet (Bele) Bey on 24 May to negotiate 
the terms for ending his uprising.288 
 Although the leader of the incident in Düzce almost reached an agreement with 
Mustafa Kemal on ending it, Ethem moved towards Düzce via Geyve-Sapanca-
Adapazarı. Anti-nationalists demanded that Refet Paşa, and not Ethem Bey, come to 
Düzce to meet with them so that he could evaluate the situation for himself. The leaders 
of the incident were concerned about the possibility of Ethem taking hasty action towards 
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Düzce, so they also sent him a telegram warning him not to act, as they were close to 
reaching an agreement with the Ankara government.289 However, Ethem ignored this 
request to wait, and moved towards Düzce. On 26 May, he captured the city without 
clashing with the anti-nationalists, who were planning to welcome him as a guest.290 He 
sent a telegram to Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, which contained a list of anti-nationalists 
who would be hanged, and asked for Mustafa Kemal’s permission to carry out the 
executions.291 After a long discussion, Sefer Bey’s execution was not approved by 
Mustafa Kemal, since he had assisted with Hüsrev Bey’s release from prison.292 However, 
on 27 May 1920, about 50 people were hanged by Ethem’s forces, including Sefer, Koç, 
Abdülgani, Abdülvehap, Rüştü the murderer, Kamil, Mehmet, Ali Galip Beys, Gürcü 
Hoca, and the major staff officer Hayri.293 In addition to these local people, seven high-
ranking officers from the Kuva-yi İnzibatiye forces, who had come to the region to 
mobilise the people against the Kuva-yi Milliye, were also hanged on the 28 May. These 
officers were: Major Hayri, Lieutenant Ali Cerrah, İbrahim Ethem, Şerafettin, second 
lieutenant Suphi, İsmail Hakkı, Katip Hasan, deputy officer Mehmet, Ali Cenap, and 
Hurşit Beys.294 On the following day, the MPs Hacı Abdülvahap Bey, Müfti Çerkes 
Ahmet, İvranyalızade Hacı Emin, Hacı Hamdi, Komiteci Çubukluzade Sabri, and the 
lawyer Nuri Efendi of Mengen, were executed in front of the governor’s mansion.295 In 
Bolu, gendarme lieutenant Fuat, trainee Fethullah of Bagdad, reserve officer Hafız 
İbrahim, Hafız Hamdi, Hayri Efendis, Yunus, Mehmet, Hafız Hakkı, and Bayram were 
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hanged by the Kuva-yi Milliye forces in the second week of June 1920.296 In the following 
weeks, Hoca Sadık Efendi of Çarşamba, Kör Ali, Abaza Ethem, a Rum priest, Çolak 
Hamdi, Hafız Abdullah, and Arif were also executed.297 
The hanging of the Circassians in the Adapazarı–Düzce region by Ethem caused 
much debate among the Circassians of Turkey. As a paramilitary leader, he was 
responsible for executing a number of people before and after the Adapazarı–Düzce 
incidents. His forces usually hanged several people after taking control of towns, as was 
the case in Salihli, Gönen, Manyas, and Yozgat. However, the sanctions that he applied 
in those towns, were never as harsh as those that he chose to apply in Adapazarı–Düzce. 
According to Baki Çule, a native Circassian of Düzce,298 disagreements of a personal 
nature existed between Ethem and Sefer Bey long before the incident. He stated that 
Ethem and Sefer liked the same girl – this girl first became Ethem’s kaşen299 but later 
married Sefer.300 Consequently, Ethem violently punished Sefer Bey and his supporters, 
despite the fact that Sefer Bey had reached an agreement with the Ankara government. 
Ethem came to the region without considering the decision made by the Ankara 
government and established the military tribunal himself as a precursor to hanging people. 
Internal tribal struggles among Circassians, i.e. between the Şapsığ and Ubıkh sub-
groups, could also explain the disagreement between the two men. Indeed, there had been 
a long-standing struggle between Circassian tribes in the region, concerning who held 
sway over the other tribes and families. As a member of the Şapsığ, Ethem was welcomed 
by the mayor of the town Humetiko, Hüseyin Remzi Bey, who was also Şapsığ, and 
allowed Ethem to stay in his house while he was in Düzce. It could also be argued that 
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some local leaders used Ethem to eliminate their regional rivals, as this would enable 
them to achieve or maintain dominance. Sefer Bey, on the other hand, belonged to one of 
the leading families of the Ubıkh sub-group. With the exception of one person, everyone 
around Sefer Bey was also Ubıkh. This situation led to tribal divisions between 
Circassians and the Şapsığ; Çerkes Ethem did not interrupt executions of Ubıkhs. 
Although the nationalists only regained control of the Adapazarı–Düzce region 
for a very limited time, they still took severe measures. Those who supported the incidents 
were condemned to death by the Kuva-yi Milliye, whereas other anti-nationalists escaped 
death by moving to Istanbul. The Istanbul government was planning to turn this situation 
around by mobilising anti-nationalists to join the newly established pro-Istanbul Kuva-yi 
İnzibatiyye force.301 Approximately forty anti-nationalists had left the region and were 
seeking support from the Istanbul government.302 The Istanbul government passed a law 
stipulating that compensation must be paid to those who suffered because of the 
nationalist attack in the Adapazarı region and were forced to leave the region.303 It was 
not only people from the Adapazarı–Düzce region who moved to Istanbul after the 
capture of the former by Ethem’s forces, but also those from the towns of Alaşehir and 
Salihli.304  
To settle the chaos and prevent another incident, the nationalists tried to take 
further precautions in the region. Significant numbers of Circassians from the region 
joined Ethem’s forces.305 The commander of the Bolu region recruited approximately 
1,000 Abkhazians to the gendarme forces. He also demanded a cavalry regiment from 
Ankara, arguing that it would not otherwise be possible to keep order in the region, as the 
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loyalty of the population to the Sultanate meant that there was a risk of further uprising.306 
The Ankara government did not consider the Abkhazians of the region to be trustworthy, 
and the Ministry of War warned the Ministry of Interior in Ankara that those Abkhazians 
who fought in the nationalist cause were expected to turn against Ankara.307 The case of 
Abkhazians was also discussed in the assembly, where Hüsrev (Gerede), who had been 
captured during the Düzce incident, explained the origins of the problem in Düzce. The 
Circassians and Abkhazians were the leading figures of the incident and, in his opinion, 
the Circassians would regret what had happened, whereas the Abkhazians, especially 
those from the Nüfren region308 (Halil Bey Village), lived as bandits, and did not fully 
accept the state’s authority. They were particularly opposed to the constitutional 
monarchy, since their relationships with the Ottoman Palace – where their daughters lived 
in the Harem – had already broken down in the days following the declaration of the 
constitution in 1908. Furthermore, he suggested that the Ankara government should 
cleanse the region of armed bands, including armed Abkhazians.309  
  However, the measures taken in the region were not firmly established, and Düzce 
once again became a gathering place for anti-nationalists. The second incident began on 
19 July 1920, when a group of people rose under the leadership of Maan Ali and occupied 
Düzce. Within a short period, their numbers had grown to 1,000,310 but Colonel Nazım 
of the Ankara government was, nevertheless, able to suppress the incident.311 On 9 August 
1920, another attempt to seize control of the local governor’s offices took place in Bolu, 
this time by a group of about twenty Abkhazians. They based their actions on their belief 
                                                          
306 ATASE.İSH. 587/158, document no 158aa. 20 12 1336, 20 December 1920. 
307 ATASE.İSH. 587/158, 20 12 1336 , 20 December 1920. 
308 it is written as Neferin in the records mistakenly. 
309 Grand National Assembly, Open session 48, 14.81336 (1920), 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c003/tbmm01003048.pdf, accessed 
14/11/2014, 215-216.  
310 Yetim, “Milli Mücadele Döneminde İsyanların Gölgesinde Düzce ve Çevresinde Asayiş Sorunları.” 
25.  
311 Özkök, Milli Mücadele Başlarken Düzce – Bolu İsyanları. 269.  
83 
 
that the Circassian and Abkhazian men of the region would be killed by Kuva-yı Milliye 
and their daughters and wives would be made into concubines.312 This incident was also 
not successful for them, and was suppressed by the nationalists on 18 August.313 To 
strengthen its rule in the region, the Ankara government declared an amnesty on 30 
August 1920. However, some people were excluded from the amnesty. These included: 
Hacı Akmil and Maan Ali Bey of Düzce; Gürcü Süleyman Efendi of Hendek; Talo Sinan 
Bey, Çır Çır Bey, Kamil, Akçallı Hüseyin Çavuş and his brother Beslen of Akyazı; and 
Şirin Hazbuk Ahmet and Mustafa of Kayalar village. Furthermore, the governor of Bolu, 
a man named Osman, İzmit governor İbrahim Hakkı, along with Ahmed Anzavur and 
Captain Mehmet Hulusi, were all wanted dead or alive and their properties were 
confiscated.314 Nevertheless, the anti-nationalist movement continued and, in the summer 
of 1921, hundreds of deserters from the surrounding area came to Düzce. The deserters 
consisted not only of Circassians and Abkhazians, but also of other Muslims who had 
moved to Düzce.315 For this reason, Ankara paid close attention to the Düzce region. The 
names of those who had launched the incident and had not been punished by Ankara were 
published in a list, and the villages of Abaza Aktepe, Çerkes Elmacık, Çerkesköprübaşı, 
Çiftlik, Cedidiyye, Çıpyak, Arapçiftliği, Büyükaçma, Dereliköy, Süleyman Bey were 
named as having played a role in the incident.316 Even at the end of December 1921, 
complaints against Circassians in Düzce and Adapazarı were still being made. For 
example, 300 Circassian cavalry soldiers created disorder and disturbed the military 
divisions of the Ankara government in the region.317 
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 In the days following the Adapazarı–Düzce incidents of October 1920, another 
incident took place in the Central Black Sea region of Sinop. A group of Circassians, 
which included ex-military officer Çerkes Kazım and a few of his friends from the town 
of Alaçam and the village of Karlı, became involved in banditry and joined a local group 
called ‘Bayram Çetesi’. The local governor then attempted to cleanse (‘tathir’, 
‘temizlemek’) all Circassians from the region, regardless of whether or not they were 
bandits.318 However, this was not permitted by Canik Governorships’ Mutasarrıflık, who 
warned the local gendarme and armed forces that they should try to catch the members of 
armed bands, instead of removing all local Circassians from the region.319 At the end of 
the pursuit, Bayram and Çerkes Kazım were killed by gendarme forces (8 November 
1920), who regained control of the area.320  
  
3 - The Yozgat Incident  
Immediately after the Adapazarı–Düzce incidents, Ankara needed Ethem to 
suppress another anti-nationalist movement to the east of Ankara, in Yozgat. A local 
notable family, the Çapanoğlu family, rejected the nationalists’ demand that they send 
representatives to the assembly in Ankara on behalf of the people of Yozgat.321 To the 
Çapanoğlu brothers, the idea of sending representatives to the assembly was akin to 
rebelling against both the Sultanate and the Ottoman government. Thus, they informed 
the nationalists that no representatives from Yozgat would be sent to the assembly.322 At 
first, the general military staff issued an appeal to bring the Çapanoğlu brothers to Ankara. 
However, the Vice Governor of Ankara, Yahya Galip helped them to avoid coming to 
Ankara to stand trial because a member of the family, Celal (who was also the local 
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governor of Tokat), had assisted Yahya Galip when he was exile in Tokat during the time 
of the Abdülhamid II.323 
 Tensions between the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Liberal 
Entente further affected the emergence of the uprising. Edip Bey (1859 – 1925), an 
influential member of the Çapanoğlu family, was once a supporter of the CUP and an MP 
for the party.324 In the Ottoman Assembly of the post-1908 period, he had slowly become 
an opponent of the CUP because he did not agree with some of their policies, and his 
criticisms eventually led to his expulsion from the CUP. He was not even allowed to 
return to the governorship, and was forced to leave the capital and return to his hometown 
on 5 January 1911.325 Later on, he joined the Liberal Entente. The loyalist–nationalist 
differentiation in that region was not especially motivated by ideology or religion, but 
rather depended on individuals’ personal and past political experiences. Thus, Edip Bey 
was against the nationalists due to the lack of authority in the region, war-weariness, and 
the fact that he was an anti-CUP activist. The nationalists, for their part, seemed to view 
this as part of a CUP project.326 
 At first, there were two incidents in Yogzat. One of these was between the 
Yıldızeli and Akdağmadeni regions, and was led by ‘Postacı Nazım’ or Nazım the 
Postman, and the other was between the areas of Zile and Çekerek, and was led by 
Aynacıoğulları.327 These incidents were not initially related to each other, but later 
became widespread due to the persistent lack of authority in the region. In the early days, 
the Çapanoğlu family did not participate in the incident, but the developing situation later 
encouraged two Çapanoğlus, Celal and Salih Beys, to compete against the nationalists.328 
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One of these issues transpired when the mufti of Yozgat and the Çapanoğlu family 
disagreed about the collection of money for the nationalists. The mufti informed Ankara 
that the family was against collecting money for the nationalist cause, and Kılıç Ali Bey 
was sent by Ankara to Yozgat to seize control of the region and to organise fundraising 
for the Kuva-yi Milliye. He came to Yozgat on 1 June 1920, and kept the Çapanoğlu 
family under close surveillance. Members of the family, including Celal, Edip, Salih, and 
their brother in law, Mahmut (along with his sons Mekki, Şekib and Muhlis), were very 
disturbed by Kılıç Ali’s policies. In response, they left the city and began to collaborate 
with the anti-nationalists (8 June 1920).329 A week later, they returned to the city in order 
to begin the uprising (14 June). Their first move was to release prisoners from the town 
prison.330 
On this issue, it has been noted that Süleyman Sırrı once mentioned, in a secret 
session of the assembly, that Çapanoğlu Memet Ağa had been assigned by the Sultan to 
fight against the Ankara government; he had been given a force of 1,500 men for this 
purpose.331 Indeed, the incident spread very quickly. Once again, Ankara did not have 
enough military power to gain complete control of the situation. When the family 
achieved full control of Yozgat on 14 (or 13) June, Ethem – who had just suppressed the 
incident in Düzce – was called by İsmet (İnönü) to overthrow the Çapanoğlus.332 Ethem 
was welcomed by all the high-ranking politicians and military men at Ankara train station. 
A celebration in his honour was organised by Mustafa Kemal in the streets of Ankara, 
where he was declared the saviour of the people, or ‘Münci Millet’, in the assembly. In 
spite of this warm welcome, Ethem was not pleased to be in Ankara. He would rather 
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have been in Salihli, so that he could administer the front and prepare for a potential Greek 
attack. 333 In the special meeting between him, Mustafa Kemal, İsmet (İnönü) and Fevzi 
(Çakmak), Ethem criticised the Ankara government and its leaders for not being able to 
quell an incident that took place next to their city. Furthermore, he accused them of not 
working hard enough to form a military unit and of sending manifestos to Anatolia, 
Istanbul, and the Allied powers instead.334 During this meeting, the rhetoric that Ethem 
used against the leaders of the Ankara government was unexpected and harsh. Mustafa 
Kemal, on the other hand, complained about disagreements in the assembly, believing 
that these disagreements stemmed from the fact that many people from different 
backgrounds were present, most of whom were emotionally connected to the Caliphate. 
Hence, it was difficult to pass laws and take the necessary measures in the assembly to 
control the region.335 
On 20 June, Ethem moved from Ankara to Yozgat. On 23 June, he arrived in 
Yozgat and took control of the city on behalf of the nationalist forces on that same day.336 
After his attack on the Çapanoğlus, some of the leaders of that family left the battleground 
and escaped to the Aziziye (Pınarbaşı) region of Kayseri, a region that was mostly settled 
by Circassians. Other members of the family, namely Halid and Mehmed Celaleddin Bey, 
were also sheltered by Circassians.337 The governor and inspector of Yozgat were 
imprisoned. Ethem established a military court, which hanged twelve people, and hanged 
the Kadı of the town (the judge in the Islamic court).338 Çapanoğlu Mahmut Bey, 
Çapanoğlu Vasıf Bey, Ceritzade Hüsnü Efendi, Kadı Remzi Efendi, Tevfikzade Ahmed 
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Efendi, Hafız Şahab, his son Refet Efendi, and Veysel (from the Tatar İmam village), 
were all hanged due to their participation in the incident; the other four people who were 
hanged were from Ethem’s own forces, and were executed for looting during the 
suppression of the incident.339 However, the families of those who took part in the 
incident could not be arrested; instead, they were sent to Ankara by Ethem. The houses 
and properties of those captured by Ethem were demolished. Lastly, those who could not 
be arrested were made to join to nationalist forces. If they did so, their lives would be 
protected.340 
Ethem let his people burn the Çapanoğlu family houses and farms.341 On 24 June, 
he went to the town of Alaca. A Circassian village on the periphery of the town, by the 
name of Altıntaş, was surrounded by his forces. Ethem chose to carry out a raid on this 
village because its residents had fought against the Kuva-yi Milliye when they came to 
the region. Since the nationalists lost a significant number of men in that fight, Ethem 
wanted to punish the villagers. Therefore, 23 people were executed by firing squad. 342 It 
can be said that, although Ethem had a significant number of Circassians within his forces, 
he had zero tolerance for Circassians who fought against nationalists. His brutality did 
not distinguish between Circassian and non-Circassian enemies, as he had already shown 
during the Adapazarı–Düzce and Anzavur incidents. 
In the post-WWI order, there was chaos in the Yozgat region, just as there was in 
the Adapazarı–Düzce region, and in South Marmara in general, with killings and 
hangings becoming part of daily life. The governor of Yozgat, also known as ‘The Crazy 
Kurdish Governor’ (Kürt Deli Vali), announced that anyone who brought the head of a 
notorious local bandit called ‘Circassian İlyas the Murderer’ (Katil Çerkes İlyas) from the 
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village of Arpalık of Sarıkaya to the town of Yozgat would be pardoned by the state, 
regardless of what crimes he might previously have committed. Another bandit from the 
region, Ebellioğlu Musa, along with his men and Battal ‘the Black’ (‘Kara Battal’), 
pursued İlyas, and then ambushed, killed, and beheaded him. His head was sent to the 
governor, but when the Circassians heard the news of his death, they exacted revenge by 
killing Battal and his mother.343 
In the region, the horrific consequences of violence were very noticeable. With 
control of the region now in the hands of the nationalists, violence was not prevented; 
executions were merely carried out in the name of the ‘law’. Following the suppression 
of the incident, an independent court was established by Ankara, and this court hanged 
25 people. The court usually tried people on one day and executed them the next day.344 
A number of people were also executed by shooting, without any judicial process having 
taken place. A leader of a local Circassian band, Rifat ‘Düzceli Rifat’, and twelve of his 
men were exiled to Ankara because they took part in the incident. They would be tried in 
court or kept under surveillance in Ankara. However, on the way to Ankara, they were 
executed by nationalists.345 Only Rifat and one of his men escaped the execution. 
Still evading capture by the nationalists, Çapanoğlu Edip Bey decided to find a 
way of meeting with the Sultan in Istanbul, from where he could bring arms, artillery, and 
military forces to fight against the Kuva-yi Milliye. He thought that, if he reached the port 
of Samsun on the Black Sea, he could make it to Istanbul. Along with Abdülkadir Bey 
and some of his men, Edip Bey moved from the town of Akdağmadeni in Yozgat to 
Samsun. Çerkes Kara Yusuf was their guide (mihmandar).346 This region contained a 
high number of Circassian villages and settlements, which they used to overcome 
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difficulties that they faced during their journey, as the Circassian villagers and fighters 
provided them with food, horses, and accommodation. They travelled to Merzifon via 
Çorum, Tokat, and Amasya. However, when they reached Merzifon, they had to go back 
to Yozgat. Samsun proved to be an unsafe place for them because the nationalist forces 
had already taken control of the city.347 The party left using the same route that they had 
followed to get to Yozgat. A few days after their arrival in Yozgat, Edip Bey was arrested 
by local military forces of the Ankara government, and was exiled to Ankara, where he 
was to be kept under surveillance. In Ankara, he was not imprisoned, and was only 
required to attend the police station twice daily in order to show himself to officials.348 
In Yozgat, the local power struggle was won by the Ankara government. 
However, the Çapanoğlu incident increased the friction between Ethem and Mustafa 
Kemal. An investigation by the military court held the governor (mutasarrıf) of Yozgat, 
who also had good relations with Yahya Galip Bey (the governor of Ankara, who had 
close ties to Mustafa Kemal at the time) responsible for not quelling the incident. Ethem 
sent a telegram to Ankara, in which he requested that Yahya Galip be called before the 
military court. However, his demand was rejected by Ankara on the grounds that Yahya 
Galib was too sick to make the journey to Yozgat.349 One reason why this demand was 
rejected might have been the fact that Yahya Galib had not sacked the governor of Yozgat 
before the incident. Mustafa Kemal might have thought that, if Yahya Galib were to be 
tried by the military court because of his bad governance, he himself could be called to 
appear before the very same court. 350 Mustafa Kemal, as head of the assembly, bore some 
responsibility for Yahya Galib’s mistakes. He may possibly have thought that, if he gave 
Ethem the opportunity to try Yahya Galib, Ethem would attempt to try him as well. 
Moreover, Ethem explains in his memoir that Mustafa Kemal’s failure to remove Yahya 
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Galip was a mistake, despite the mistakes made by the latter during his time as governor 
of the region.351 Mustafa Kemal did not allow the military court to try Yahya Galib, and 
the incident turned into power struggle between him and Ethem. This incident was the 
second issue to develop between Mustafa Kemal and Ethem, and was the beginning of a 
crisis of authority in the national movement.  
Although the civil war continued after these incidents, the most important 
incidents, namely the Anzavur, the Adapazarı–Düzce and Yozgat, had all been 
suppressed by Ethem.352 In the eastern part of Anatolia, Kazım Karabekir waged war on 
Armenian forces. During this period, however, the western and central parts of the 
Anatolian movement were somewhat weak against Greek forces and the anti-nationalist 
uprisings. In the absence of regular troops, irregular troops were vital. Having a larger 
irregular force allowed Ethem to succeed in suppressing the three most important 
incidents early on, which proved vital for the establishment of the Ankara government in 
this part of the state.353  
 
Conclusion  
 The Adapazarı–Düzce region was one of the important places for the anti-
nationalist movement during the 1920s. Traditionally, the people of this region were loyal 
to the Ottoman Sultan. The Circassians were the predominant group of the region and, to 
them, the Ankara government and the Kuva-yı Milliye appeared to be the continuation of 
the CUP, which they held solely accountable for the disastrous outcomes of the wars over 
the past decade. The existence of the anti-nationalist movement in the Adapazarı–Düzce 
region deepened the impact of the civil war between the Istanbul and Ankara 
governments. In addition to the Adapazarı–Düzce incidents, the Çapanoğlu incident was 
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also another significant problem for the Ankara government, which lacked the military 
power needed to overcome the disorder and defeat the anti-nationalists at that time. 
Çerkes Ethem was called on by Ankara to protect the nationalist cause and prevent its 
demise at a time when it was just emerging.  
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Chapter Four: Replacement of the Bandits and Irregular Forces with the Regular 
Army in the Western Front, Çerkes Ethem, Mustafa Kemal and İsmet (İnönü)  
 
Introduction 
Why is the so-called ‘Çerkes Ethem incident’ still considered an important subject 
in Turkish historiography 90 years later? As can be seen from the images uploaded on the 
Turkish General Staff (TGS)’ web page on 26 February 2013,354 Ethem was welcomed at 
the Ankara train station by Mustafa Kemal himself in May 1920. In a previous version of 
the image, Ethem and some his soldiers’ faces had been blurred.355 Within a few days of 
the uploading of the picture on the TGS web page, a group of Circassians in Turkey 
reacted to the blurring of the image on social media by protesting (via Twitter). TGS then 
changed the image to the original version, which was clearer, placating the Circassian 
community. It is difficult to say that the release of the blurred picture was the result of an 
institutional policy at the TGS. The uploading of the image was a decision made by an 
officer or a sub-department, since if the TGS did have an institutional-wide policy 
concerning the Çerkes Ethem incident it would not have been possible for the author to 
conduct research in the TGS military archives over the last few years. During this time, 
no restrictions were imposed on access to the archives, and every document in the 
catalogues relating to Çerkes Ethem was made available. Moreover, the head of the 
archive, a brigadier general, contacted the researcher on several occasions to ask if 
anything else was required. During the period of the research, every single document 
requested was uploaded to the author’s account. This compares favourably with the 
military archives policies towards researchers ten years ago. The working conditions at 
the archive for researchers today are more flexible. However, some officials within the 
TGS have yet to adjust to this policy, as evidenced by the aforementioned issue 
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concerning the blurred picture uploaded onto the TGS web page. It is possible the TGS 
has an ambivalent policy: on the one hand, it wants to open the archives to everyone; on 
the other, it still maintains certain ideological barriers regarding particular topics, 
affecting some sub-departments and individuals within the TGS.    
The blurred version of the picture uploaded to the TGS web). After the reactions on the 
social media, TGS uploaded the original picture to the web page.  
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The original picture. Ankara May 1920. Çerkes Ethem and his armed men were welcomed 
by Mustafa Kemal at the train station. He was subsequently welcomed in the assembly as 
the ‘hero of the people’ (Münci Millet).  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ethem suppressed the three important anti-
nationalist incidents threatening the government based in Ankara, as all large-scale 
domestic threats targeted it. Mustafa Kemal then aimed to take control of the entire 
assembly and the western front. The regular army was being prepared by Ankara, and the 
war against Armenian forces in the eastern front was ending. In view of this situation, the 
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relationship between Ethem and Mustafa Kemal began to change. Mustafa Kemal, as the 
head of the assembly and fast becoming an unrivalled leader of the Anatolian movement, 
had gradually increased his power with regard to military and political issues.  
Aside from the danger from Ethem and Enver Paşa (the latter was seeking a way 
to return to Anatolia), there was no significant threat to Mustafa Kemal’s ambitions. 
Mustafa Kemal initially aimed to control and use Ethem, although he quickly learned this 
was no easy task. He concluded at the end of December 1920 that the best option was to 
exclude him from the Anatolian movement altogether. This chapter argues that there were 
several reasons why Çerkes Ethem and Mustafa Kemal’s relationships had deteriorated, 
resulting in Çerkes Ethem’s exclusion from the national movement. One reason was the 
increasing significance of Ethem’s military victories on the western front and the political 
impact this was having in the assembly, particularly after he successfully supressed the 
incidents. Although, as a military man, Ethem did not have political ambitions, he was 
fast becoming one of the most influential people among the political circles of the time. 
Due to the absence and imprisonment of a large number of prominent CUP356 members 
by the British, Ethem’s military success against the anti-nationalist groups heightened his 
importance to the political opponents of Mustafa Kemal in the assembly. Although 
Mustafa Kemal had influence over the members of assembly, he frequently encountered 
significant opposition to some of his decisions among members.357 Ethem was surrounded 
by the opponents of Mustafa Kemal, some of whom were careerists, while others were 
looking for an opportunity to strengthen their own positions against him. They attempted 
to use Ethem to solidify their movement and to balance Mustafa Kemal’s influence. 
However, this attempt, along with Mustafa Kemal’s intolerant approach to anyone who 
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opposed his own authority, and Tevfik’s (Ethem’s brother) uncompromising stance 
toward the regular army led to open conflict between the two sides and the exclusion of 
Ethem and his brothers from the nationalist core. Indeed, the mismanagement of the crisis 
between the irregular troops under Ethem and Tevfik, and the regular troops under İsmet 
and Refet Beys was an important reason for this. This chapter will first examine the 
reasons for the struggle between Mustafa Kemal and Enver Paşa in relation to its impact 
on the general policy of the Ankara government for the North Caucasus, and that towards 
Çerkes Ethem. Secondly, it will study Green Army Society, an organisation that gradually 
became an obstacle for Mustafa Kemal, and the impact this had on the exclusion process 
aimed at Çerkes Ethem by the national movement. Thirdly, this chapter will demonstrate 
how the regular-irregular army debate on the western front led to the elimination of Ethem 
from the national movement.  
 
1 - Çerkes Ethem, Enver – Mustafa Kemal struggle and Bolsheviks  
Following the Mudros Armistice, executive members of the CUP, including Talat, 
Enver and Cemal Paşas, left the empire for Germany to avoid court cases relating to their 
activities. The CUP leaders had already anticipated the Allied occupation of Anatolia, 
and had taken precautions before WWI ended. Indeed, they had arms and money hoarded 
in Anatolia. Enver Paşa also planned to go to the Eastern Black Sea coast of Sochi in the 
North West Caucasus, to pass towards Baku where the Ottoman army was strong, to take 
the region under his control and build up resistance against the Allies, particularly the 
British. Although the foremost leaders of the CUP left the empire, its mid-ranking 
members such as local governors, captains in the army and high-ranking military men, 
were all seeking out ways to preserve the empire from occupation.358 The CUP and the 
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Special Organisation were the most highly organised structures in the empire at the time 
and therefore best placed to establish a resistance movement in Anatolia. Without their 
participation, resistance was not possible in the empire. The resistance movement was 
organised top-down359 and the CUP used its organisational capabilities and military-
bureaucracy to mobilise the first non-regular armed groups in the empire, such as Çerkes 
Ethem (who was persuaded by another Circassian, Rauf (Orbay), to create a resistance 
group around Salihli against Greek forces).360 
Enver Paşa was a military general with experience fighting guerrilla wars against 
Bulgarian and Macedonian bandits, during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, but also in Libya, 
and WWI. Irregular armed groups from the national movement were close to Enver Paşa 
because of their united struggle against enemy troops during the wars of the previous ten 
years, and all had broad experience of guerrilla warfare.361 He formed a loyal group in the 
Special Organisation from those who were closest to him; even the members of the 
Organisation, as will be assessed below, backed him, although they fought for Ankara at 
the beginning of the resistance movement. Enver was an enthusiastic leader. After his 
arrival in Berlin from Istanbul in the winter of 1919, his objective was to go to Moscow 
to meet with the Bolsheviks. He was involved in six plane accidents during the attempted 
flight to Moscow; finally arriving in Moscow in August 1920.362 
The CUP leadership were still viewed as significant figures in the Muslim world 
by the Russians; particularly Enver Paşa, who was also known as ‘Seyfullah’ by other 
Muslims (the ‘sword of Islam’). To have the support of the CUP leaders was significant 
for the Bolsheviks, since they sought to influence the broader Muslim World. The reason 
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for this policy was that the majority of countries populated with Muslims, such as India, 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya were under colonial European rule 
(particularly British). Bolshevism, as an alternative ideology to capitalism, required the 
support of the ‘oppressed’ people of the world against the European powers. Although 
the Ottoman Empire had lost the war to the Allies, its leaders remained influential. The 
Bolsheviks were aiming to take advantage of this influence to use it against the Allies.  
The Bolsheviks were also seen as important allies by the Ankara government. 
However, Ankara was not seen as a legitimate representative of Turkey by the Bolsheviks 
from the outset. The Bolsheviks did not take Ankara seriously, due to civil war and 
disorder in Anatolia. To change the situation with the Bolsheviks, Ankara took steps to 
forge closer relations with them. A delegation was sent by Ankara to visit them consisting 
of Bekir Sami (Kunduh) (Chairman), Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk), İbrahim Tali 
(Öngören), Osman Bey of Lazistan (MP) and Seyfi (Düzgören) Bey.363 They reached 
Moscow train station on 19 July 1920 after an almost two month long journey. The 
representatives of the Ankara government were not welcomed according to the necessary 
diplomatic protocols in Russia; none of the members of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs were waiting for them at the station in Moscow. Indeed, the representatives waited 
about an hour at the station before being taken to a place near to the Kremlin Palace.364 
They then struggled to arrange meetings with their counterparts in Moscow over the 
following days. The Bolsheviks still considered meeting with the CUP leaders, namely 
the Paşas Talat, Cemal and particularly Enver, who had escaped to Berlin but who 
retained had a reputation in Bolshevik circles.365 Indeed, these Paşas had met with 
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Trotsky, Lenin, Chicherin, and Stalin (the leaders of the Bolshevik movement).366 Enver 
Paşa did however facilitate affairs, ensuring the representatives of the Ankara government 
were granted an official meeting with the Bolshevik leaders. 
Enver Paşa’s policy in this case is worth examining, to understand the differences 
between the two differing wings of the nationalists; one was represented by him and the 
other by Mustafa Kemal. While his aim was to form an Islamic resistance by gaining 
Bolshevik-Russian support against British imperialism in Ottoman territories, 
Afghanistan, Iran and the Muslim World, Mustafa Kemal’s, the only concern was for the 
Anatolian part of the remaining Ottoman territory. For his part, Enver Paşa thought that 
to succeed in his ambitions he would have to develop Islamic socialism.367 He also 
expected that he would have to convince the Russians to bestow financial and military 
support to spread the idea of Islamic socialism in the region. It emerges that Enver Paşa 
attempted to demonstrate to the Russians just how close his views were to socialism when 
compared with those of Mustafa Kemal.368  
Enver Paşa published a piece of work called ‘Mesai’ to map out the ideology and 
to strengthen his followers’ positions inside the assembly in Ankara. Although the Mesai 
was inspired by Marxism, it is best described as a blending of socialist, corporatist, 
Islamic and nationalist ideas.369 On the other hand, Akal claims that the CUP leaders 
supported Bolshevism for reasons that were more pragmatic, and that their aim was not 
to create a Bolshevik-inspired state in Anatolia. However, it must be noted that Bolshevik 
terminology was spreading among the bureaucrats and the military in Anatolia, following 
the Bolshevik revolution. Despite the fact that there was limited network and 
communication among people at the time, due to the uncensored and moderate number 
of Bolshevik-inspired newspapers, such ideas did permeate in Anatolia. Açıksöz 
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(Kastamonu), Albayrak (Erzurum), İstikbal (Trabzon), Öğüt (Afyon and Konya), Yeni 
Adana (Adana) were some of the Bolshevik oriented newspapers in Anatolia. What made 
the newspapers sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas was their shared enemy: namely, the 
western capitalists. Although the reasons behind support for the Bolsheviks were 
pragmatic, a large number of articles were published in these newspapers favouring the 
Bolshevik ideology.370 
Enver was relatively ambitious in his agenda and the Russians saw him as an 
important player, a force necessary to balance Mustafa Kemal, rather than an alternative 
to him. Enver had already left the empire in October 1918. Due to Mustafa Kemal’s 
opposition to his return to Anatolia, he could not find any place in the new military or the 
political structures of the post-WWI period. The eastern front commander of the Ankara 
government, Kazım Karabekir, had already been warned not to allow Enver to pass onto 
the Turkish side of the border.371 One reason for Bolshevik support for Enver Paşa was 
that they could create a division between the CUP leaders and the leaders of the Anatolian 
movement to gain benefits from this division and to expand their ideology further in 
Anatolia.372 Enver Paşa was already working on plans to bring together areas that had 
been Ottoman pre-WWI under a new Ottoman confederation. He also planned to go to 
Anatolia in the spring of 1921 with numerous military divisions, provided by the 
Russians, under his command.373 In a letter he sent to Halil Paşa in November 1920, he 
underlines that if the Russians would give him military troops consisting of Muslims, he 
would be willing to go to Anatolia to fight against the Greeks. He also emphasised that 
Şükrü (Yenibahçeli), Eşref (Kuşçubaşı), Nail (Yenibahçeli) should create a group for him 
in Anatolia.374 Enver Paşa also used one of his closest allies, Hacı Sami (Kuşçubaşı), to 
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create the group.375 He wrote to the centre of Islamic Unity in Istanbul, which was under 
his control, that they should also have contact with the Circassian brothers (Ethem and 
Reşit), who were free of suspicion and loyal to him.376 
Enver Paşa was also effective at mobilising bureaucrats, bringing politicians and 
paramilitary leaders to his side. The existing historiography does not direct attention 
towards his impact on the Anatolian resistance movement. Although he was mostly in 
Berlin and Moscow during the period 1919-1921, he remained influential within the 
movement. Indeed, several of his closest allies were positioned in eastern and western 
Anatolia. In the east, Trabzon proved an important centre for Enverists,377 the most 
prominent being Halil Paşa, Küçük Talat, Yenibahçeli Nail, Naim Cevat, Kazım Bey 
(Enver’s brother in law), Seyfi, Ali Rıza and Yahya Kaptan.378 The city afforded both sea 
and overland access to Russia through the Caucasus. Enverists used this opportunity not 
only to meet with Enver and Russian authorities but also to contact executive members 
of the North Caucasian Republic; something that would become one of the main 
differences between Enver and Mustafa Kemal in terms of their policy towards those in 
Bolshevik Russia and the North Caucasus. In the assembly, there were already 40 MPs 
close to Enver Paşa.379 He also had a close relationship with the left wing opposition in 
Anatolia, and his influence over people disturbed Mustafa Kemal,380 since he did not want 
to share his authority over the movement with Enver Paşa. Ethem, Reşit, and Eşref (the 
paramilitary group leaders) were also closer to Enver Paşa than Mustafa Kemal. They 
helped him to climb the career ladder in the army, and later to become Commander in 
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Chief.381 Moreover, it seems that one of the reasons for the conflict between Ethem and 
Mustafa Kemal was the relatively close relationship between Ethem and Enver Paşa.382 
Enver Paşa and Dr Nazım made an agreement with Ali Fuat Paşa (representative 
of the Ankara government in the Turkish Embassy of Moscow). According to their 
agreement, Enver Paşa would not involve himself in the domestic problems of Anatolia. 
He would work outside Anatolia for Islamic Unity, and together with the Russian 
Communists would battle the imperialists. However, they would not accept communism 
as their ideology, and would never work against Turkey’s interest.383 In July 1921, 
however, Greek troops moved towards Ankara to put an end to the national movement by 
occupying its headquarters. They took Kütahya and Eskişehir, and came to Polatlı, just 
50kms away from Ankara. It was here, that Enver Paşa sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal 
blaming him for behaving like a dictator and for preventing him from coming to Anatolia. 
Enver wrote that when the time came he would move to Anatolia without considering 
Mustafa Kemal’s thoughts, and that that if he were in Anatolia, there would be no conflict 
and division among the nationalists as was already happening and could be seen with the 
Çerkes Ethem incident.384 Enver met with Soviet Foreign Policy Commissar Chicherin in 
Moscow on 28 July 1921,385 later moving to Batum where he met with his own inner 
circle consisting of Halil (Kut) Paşa, Küçük Talat, Dr. Nazım and Hacı Sami (Kuşçubaşı) 
to discuss the actions they would take.386 If the Ankara government under Mustafa 
Kemal’s leadership did not succeed in halting the Greek advance towards Ankara in the 
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Sakarya battle, Enver would come to Anatolia with major Muslim forces backed by the 
Bolsheviks.387 Mustafa Kemal already grasped the severity of the situation, warning the 
eastern front commander of the army Kazım Karabekir to be vigilant against possible 
attempts to bring Enver to Anatolia.388 However, with the success of the nationalists 
against Greek forces in the Sakarya battle, two birds were effectively killed with a single 
stone: both Ankara and Mustafa Kemal were saved, while the Soviets accepted Mustafa 
Kemal’s leadership and Enver lost his opportunity to return to Turkey and become leader 
of the national movement.389  
After the battle of Sakarya, Enver turned his attention to Central Asia and his aim 
of promoting Islamic unity and fighting against the British by mobilising the Muslims of 
the region.390 He asked Sami (Kuşçubaşı) to send his brother Eşref to him.391 Enver 
probably thought it was wise to gather his inner circle around him in Central Asia after 
they had lost their battle against Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia, as a necessary part of 
mobilising other Muslims to fight with the British. However, he was unable to succeed in 
his aim and was killed in a battle against Russian forces on 4 August 1922 in what is now 
Tajikistan.  
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2 - North Caucasian Republic: The Split between Mustafa Kemal and Enver Paşa 
After the February Revolution in Russia, the North Caucasian notables established 
a committee, comprised of socialists, wealthier landowners and liberals, to organise a 
congress to discuss the future of the North Caucasia and its people.392 The congress was 
held on 7 May 1917 and consisted of 300 delegates: Circassians, Dagestanis, Abkhazs, 
Turkmens and Nogays.393 The aim of Congress was to unite the different peoples of the 
North Caucasus under the ideals of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ (as espoused by the 
French Revolution) and under a Federal-Democratic state structure in Russia.394 The 
Cossacks, who settled the region after the indigenous population of the North Caucasus 
(the Circassians, Chechens, Abkhaz, Dagestanis and Karachays) were exiled by Russia 
during the 19th century, and were already seeking self-governance. Although they 
attempted to work together with the Cossacks against the Bolsheviks, the alliance did not 
work and conflict soon emerged between the Chechen-Ingush and the Cossacks (over 
land disputes).395 Due to the conflict, and the spread of Bolshevism in the region, the 
committee altered its status from that of a federal state under Russia, becoming a 
sovereign ‘Provisional Government’ on 15 November 1917.396 Abdulmejid Chermoev 
was elected President, and independence was declared with the support of the Ottoman 
Porte on 11 May 1918. 
The independence of this entity was another cause of controversy between 
Mustafa Kemal and Enver Paşa. Arguably, the different approaches the two men took 
provided a further incentive for Mustafa Kemal to pacify those close to Enver Paşa. 
Mustafa Kemal’s policy was to secure Russian financial and military assistance for the 
Anatolian resistance campaign. He opposed any independent state in the Caucasus 
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between Russia and Turkey. For him, any possible state in the Caucasus had potential to 
prevent Russian aid arriving, and could worsen the relationships between the two 
countries. It was also believed by some Special Organisation analysts that it would not be 
possible to mobilise the Caucasian Muslims, due to their very limited political aims.397 
Therefore, he chose not to support the existence of the North Caucasian Republic. 
However, Enver Paşa and the other prominent figures of the time, such as Rauf and Bekir 
Sami (Kunduh) Beys, did not agree with this policy. For them, a barrier between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire was a crucial must-have. Enver also believed that in the post-
WWI period, such a policy should be supported, to keep the Bolsheviks out of the 
Caucasus, and cut the Armenians’ connection with Russia if Enver could gain sufficient 
support from the Caucasian Muslims and Georgians.398  
Mustafa Kemal believed that the Allies used the Caucasian nations (the Azeris, 
Armenians, Georgians and the people of the North Caucasus) to prevent Turkey from 
connecting with the Bolsheviks. For him, this was a ploy by the Allies to support the 
Caucasian republics, which would ultimately hamper the Anatolian movement’s access 
to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and India. If Turkey worked with the Bolsheviks and helped 
them in the Caucasus, the doors of these regions would then be opened to Turkey.399 He 
referred to the Caucasian states as a ‘barrier’, and expected that Turkey should fight to 
stop the Allies to establish the republics in the Caucasus.400 Mustafa Kemal underlined 
the suggestion that if the Caucasian states were to act as a wedge between Turkey and 
Russia (in other words, if they are hostile to the Bolsheviks or if they became 
independent) then Turkey and Russia would need to work together against them.401 
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Meanwhile, some of those who would later be excluded from the national 
movement supported the proposal that there be an independent Caucasus Federation in 
the Caucasus. Those espousing this view included Ali Fuat Paşa, Rauf Bey, Bekir Sami 
and Yusuf İzzet Paşa. According to Ali Fuat Paşa, the federation would be expected to 
consist of several autonomous states. However, due flawed policies executed by the 
British, such a federation could not be established.402 Rauf Bey had already worked to 
convince the Ottoman government that the government should meet with the British to 
prevent the expansion of the Bolsheviks into the Caucasus. They could then safeguard the 
region against being swallowed up by the Bolshevik movement. However, Rauf’s 
precondition was that their (the Ottoman Empire’s) independence must be recognised by 
the British.403 The 14th Corps Commander, Yusuf İzzet Paşa, was also against the 
suggestion that the Allies build a Caucasian barrier in the Caucasus, because Bolshevism 
was an ideology, and, for him, to prevent an ideology by forming a physical barrier was 
not possible.404 The 13. Corps Commander, Ahmet Cevdet, also sent a telegram to 
Mustafa Kemal emphasising that working with the British against the Bolsheviks would 
be better for both Turkey and the Islamic world. He underlined that Russia was already 
seen as an ancient enemy of the Ottoman Empire by the people, and if the Bolsheviks 
were to sustain Tsarist Russia’s policies, they would aim to occupy the east of Anatolia 
to reach the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Thus, on balance it might be better to reach an 
agreement with the British.405  
At the end of 1920, when the North Caucasian Republic collapsed under 
Bolshevik attacks, the executive delegates and founders of the republic attempted to move 
to Turkey as they had been supported by the Ottoman Empire, particularly by Enver Paşa. 
However, the political situation also then altered in Turkey. Enver left the empire, which 
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was occupied by the Allies and the Greek forces. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal came to 
power choosing not to share the same policies as Enver Paşa in terms of having a state in 
the North Caucasus between Bolshevik Russia and Turkey. Nevertheless, he had an 
ambivalent policy towards the North Caucasian Republic. On the one hand, he believed 
that if Turkey supported an independent state in the Caucasus, this would damage the 
relationship between the Bolsheviks and Turkey; moreover, Turkey would no longer 
receive military and financial support from the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, although 
he did not want to extend support to the North Caucasian republic, he preferred not to end 
their relationship with the republic either, wanting to keep them as a possible ally against 
the Bolsheviks. The Ankara government tried to use Azerbaijan and North Caucasian 
Muslims to act as a buffer against Russia in case it subsequently insisted on making the 
Bitlis and Van regions part of Armenia.406 On 23 December 1920, about 20 people; 
consisting of the President of the North Caucasia Republic, Pşimafo Kosof, a full colonel, 
three other lesser colonels, three lieutenants, two doctors, students and group of soldiers 
as representatives of the republic, moved to Trabzon from the North Caucasus.407 Their 
demands were to extend their security measures in Turkey, to serve Turkey and to meet 
with the Ankara government.408 However, despite the fact that Ankara was unwilling to 
abandon the committee entirely, they were still hankering for collaboration with the 
Russians in some fields. Russia was viewed as a saviour by Ankara, particularly Mustafa 
Kemal, in terms of military and financial support. Hence, the leaders of the committee 
were not allowed to gain an appointment with the Ankara government.409 It can also be 
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seen that Ankara pragmatically attempted to use the committee to strengthen its hand to 
bargain with the Russians. It was thereby demonstrated by Ankara that it could exert an 
influence on the North Caucasia and its representatives.410 Therefore, while Ankara might 
require financial and military aid, the Bolsheviks would know that Ankara was not 
powerless against them.  
 
3- Green Army Society ‘Yeşil Ordu Cemiyeti’ 
The Green Army Society has been a controversial topic of discussion in 
historiography. The founders of the Society, who included Mustafa Kemal, never applied 
to make the society an official one.411 It remained a secret and unofficial organisation. 
The ideology of the society developed out of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and aimed 
to mix Bolshevik ideology and Islam, and attempted to merge Islam and socialism in a 
single system, offering an alternative to the existing western capitalist one. The ideology 
was welcomed by a group of politicians and bureaucrats in Turkey since the country was 
already in a state of war at this time with the Western powers. The idea of society resulted 
from the alliance between CUP members who still had connections to Enver, Talat and 
Cemal Paşas, and leftists who wanted to become allied with Bolshevik Russia and 
Mustafa Kemal in the spring of 1920.412 All the founding members of the society were 
MPs: Tokat MP Nazım, Hakkı Behiç, Adnan (Adıvar), İzmit MP Sırrı, İzmit MP Hamdi 
Namık, Muğla MP Yunus Nadi, Saruhan MP İbrahim Süreyya, Saruhan MP Çerkes Reşit, 
Eskişehir MP Hüsrev Sami, Eskişehir MP Eyüb Sabri, Kozan MP Dr. Mustafa, Bursa MP 
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Şeyh Servet, and Afyon MP Mehmet Şükrü.413 They set up the society, and published the 
New World (Yeni Dünya) newspaper as an official publication. 
 The leftist members of the alliance believed that it was not possible for Ankara to 
succeed in defeating the Allies using its power alone. They believed that to create a union 
under the banner of socialism in the Muslim World would bring Muslims together against 
the imperialists. Moreover, Turkey would be a leader in this struggle, as it would not be 
alone in its fight against the Allies.414 They also thought that they would save the Muslims 
who were already under Russian occupation. This policy would not only benefit Green 
Army supporters, but would also be useful for the Bolsheviks, since they would only have 
to mediate via Turkey/the Green Army on behalf of the entire Muslim World.415 The 
centre of the society was Eskişehir,416 where there were labour groups that agreed with 
the ideology of the Green Army. There were also supporters of the Society in the 
assembly in Ankara. It published a newspaper to spread its Islamic-Bolshevik ideas. The 
name of the newspaper was ‘the Friend’ (Arkadaş), but the title later changed to ‘the 
Mobilised [ones]’. Thereafter, it became ‘New World’ (Seyyare Yeni Dünya) when Arif 
Oruç returned to Eskişehir from the western front on 6 September 1920.417 In the title, the 
word ‘mobilised’ was referred to Ethem’s ‘mobilised forces’ (Kuva-yi Seyyare).418 The 
relationship between the two sides was critical to both. The Ankara government required 
a vast amount of financial and military equipment to continue its struggle against Greek 
troops backed by the British. Russia was also seeking a political ally against the western-
capitalist powers, particularly the British. The Bolsheviks did not like to see the British 
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forces and Allies on its Southern border, in the Black sea region, and in Istanbul; 
therefore, they supported the Anatolian resistance movement against the Greeks.   
A huge amount of financial and military aid was given by the Bolsheviks to the 
Ankara government. In its first round of meetings with the Ankara government, Ankara 
demanded the Bolsheviks provide the following: 200 thousand rifles with 5 million 
bullets, 500 machine guns with 7.5 million bullets, military clothes and equipment for 
100 thousand soldiers, 200 aircraft, 100 lorries and buses, 40 automobiles, and some 
military experts in addition to other military equipment.419 Responding to these demands, 
the first military and financial aid was sent in September 1920. According to Yusuf Kemal 
Bey’s telegram from Trabzon, the train contained one million golden rubbles, one wagon 
for rifles, eight wagons for machine guns, in addition to 300 thousand bullets, 6 thousand 
rifles, one hundred machine guns, and eight British artilleries.420 It can be said that 
Mustafa Kemal’s strategy of relying on Bolshevik financial and military aid was 
successful during the Turkish-Greek War. Up until the end of the war, Bolshevik financial 
aid amounted to 11 million golden rubbles and 100 thousand Ottoman golden liras (equal 
to 90 million Ottoman liras).421 It is worth mentioning that Turkey’s budget was 63 million 
in 1920 and 79 million in 1921. This means that the Russian financial aid exceeded 
Turkey’s annual budget in 1920 and 1921. Total military aid was 45,181 rifles, 9,520 
bayonets, 52,599 ammunition chests, 310 machine guns, and 166,910 cannon balls, along 
with other military equipment.422 One can see the results of this aid: from the end of WWI 
to the Turkish-Greek War, Russia represented the greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire 
and was its best ally, thanks to the extensive military and financial assistance it extended 
to the nationalists of Anatolia.423 
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Mustafa Kemal was not a communist, and nor did he believe in communist 
ideology. He had differences with the Bolsheviks in terms of culture and tradition and 
aimed to gain benefits from interactions with them to protect Anatolia from occupation, 
rather than to create a new Bolshevik state.424 He routinely used communist rhetoric in 
speeches during the war to gain Russian support; as they were the enemy of Turkey’s 
enemy, they were through this mutual enmity a friend of Turkey. However, Mustafa 
Kemal struggled to maintain control of Bolshevik support in Anatolia, as the communists 
and their associations were becoming influential during this period. Small communist 
groups in Anatolia were assisted by the Bolsheviks, and of these, many members had 
been prisoners of war in Russia during WWI.425 Ankara was aware of the potential danger 
from the Russians gaining control over Anatolian communists, and an official communist 
party was set up under the control of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. The Communist Party of 
Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Fırkası) was established on 18 October 1920.426 However, the 
Bolsheviks had never believed Ankara would make communism its official political 
ideology. They already recognised that Ankara was seeking Russian support out of 
pragmatism.  
Also at this time, the influence of the Green Army organisation gradually 
increased in Ankara and Mustafa Kemal lost control of it.427 The organisation favoured 
using irregular forces rather than regular troops for fighting. The success of Çerkes 
Ethem’s irregular forces against both the Greeks and the anti-nationalist incidents 
solidified the suggestion that they use irregular forces. When Ethem was in Ankara, either 
before the suppression of the disorders in Yozgat or upon return from Yozgat, he joined 
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the Green Army.428 With the involvement of Ethem in the Green Army through his (at a 
minimum) 3000 irregular cavaliers, this became a very significant irregular armed 
political force at the time.429 One of his military units began to be called the ‘Bolshevik 
Battalion’, having about 300 soldiers and 5 lieutenants under its control.430 Although 
Mustafa Kemal attempted to keep the Society under his sway, he was unsuccessful, as it 
turned into an important centre of anti-Mustafa Kemal activity. From the outset, as noted 
above, it was endorsed by Mustafa Kemal with the aim of receiving Russian military and 
financial support. However, with Ethem’s participation in the Society, the political 
balance of power changed in Ankara. While the society increased its political influence 
and power, Ethem’s participation as leader of the leading irregular armed group of the era 
showed that it was becoming an uncontrollable political group from the perspective of 
Mustafa Kemal.431 He did not want to have to battle against powerful or armed political 
opponents in the assembly. As a result of Ethem’s increasing political and military 
influence on Ankara, and over the Bolshevik backed communists, Mustafa Kemal’s 
authority was beginning to falter. Therefore, he closed down the Society in the autumn of 
1920.432 Those who participated in the Green Army out of leftist sympathies (e.g. Eyüp 
Sabri, Adnan, Şeyh Servet, Hakkı Behiç, Nazım, and Yunus) then established the 
‘People’s Group’ (Halk Zümresi) in the assembly, offering a left wing alternative to 
Mustafa Kemal.433 However, with the exclusion of Ethem from the nationalist core, the 
leftists in Ankara were silenced by Mustafa Kemal.434  
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4- The Struggle between Kuva-yi Seyyare and Ankara government  
Ethem lacked the political experience of Mustafa Kemal. He was the leader of a 
paramilitary group and more a man of arms than of politics. He had fought on many 
different fronts, spending over ten years in the army. Mustafa Kemal, when compared to 
Ethem, was educated in one of the best schools of the empire at the time; the Royal 
Military Academy. Although he fought in several wars for the Ottoman army in North 
Africa, the Balkans, Anatolia and Syria during the eight years up until 1918, he was never 
far removed from politics. Ever since the end of WWI, he had been seeking out a role in 
the new cabinet of the Ottoman Empire, primarily to occupy the post of Minister of 
War.435 It is also claimed that the reason behind his move to the Pera Palace after the 
Moudros Armistice in October 1918 was a reflection of his political desire to become 
involved in the new cabinet. Certainly, Pera Palace was well used by the commanders of 
the occupation forces, and an important centre for those who were seeking political 
careers in the new post-WWI Ottoman political scene.436 His experience and knowledge 
of politics were more significant than those of Ethem. Ethem, however, had some 
qualities that were difficult for Mustafa Kemal to match. Although he was a member of a 
Circassian immigrant family, which had come to Anatolia from the North Caucasus, 
probably in the late 1860s, he had a large family providing him many local networks in 
Anatolia. His father was from Bandırma, west of Anatolia, one of the founders of the 
Izmir branch of the CUP, and a member of well-known local wealthy family, while 
Ethem’s mother was from the North Western town in Anatolia, Düzce. Both of places 
were settled by significant number of Circassians.  
Circassians lived as closed community for a long time. As an immigrant/diaspora 
community, they preferred to marry within their own community, avoiding mixing with 
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the different Anatolian communities. Marriages were an important factor in the survival 
of their networks and identity. They married young and built up internal community 
relations between the different regions of Anatolia. These marriages connected different 
Circassian communities around Anatolia. Another significant feature was their 
experience of war. They had fought many wars between the 1750s, up until the 1860s, 
principally against Russian forces who wanted to occupy the North Caucasus. Although 
they did not have a formal state structure in the North Caucasus, they had skilled fighters 
in their ranks. However, after many battles, they were ultimately defeated and were exiled 
to the Ottoman Empire from the Caucasus. Here, they had two options; either to begin 
their new lives as farmers, or to be recruited into the Ottoman army. The latter option was 
more preferable to many Circassians.  
Ethem experienced many paramilitary wars in the Ottoman army in the years 
leading up to the end of WWI. From the Balkan Wars to WWI, Ethem had been active in 
the military. Furthermore, when Greek forces occupied western Anatolia, he had been 
one of the first to fight against them and halt their advance into Anatolia. However, after 
a year and half of Greek occupation (beginning on 15th of May 1919), in autumn 1920, 
Ankara took crucial steps to solidify its authority in terms of its military power and 
financing, and to launch effective counter attacks. With the military and financial backing 
of the Bolsheviks, military successes on the eastern and southern fronts of Anatolia 
against the Georgians, Armenians and French forces ensued, and Ankara now had a force 
more prepared to act as a regular army than ever before. It did not need the irregular forces 
on the western front any longer. Ethem was also seen as the leader of the Anatolian branch 
of Mustafa Kemal’s rival, Enver Paşa. From the beginning of the movement, Mustafa 
Kemal did not want to challenge Enver openly. However, after some prominent figures 
of the CUP, including Rauf Bey, İsmail Canbulat and Fethi Okyar were arrested by British 
forces, no powerful political leaders against him remained. Although opposition groups 
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in the assembly prevented him from creating an authoritarian single man regime, other 
MPs supported Mustafa Kemal.437 In this situation, Ethem was the only person in Anatolia 
to command a non-political but armed group, which could potentially create problems for 
Mustafa Kemal.  
Ethem and his brother were continuously criticised as ruthless by their opponents. 
They had chosen to execute deserters and ‘rebels’ after only a short judicial process in a 
self-styled ‘military court’. This policy led to an ambiguous relationship between Ankara 
and Ethem. On the one hand, Ankara supported Ethem, since he was resistant to Greek 
forces, restoring the order in the country and suppressed anti-nationalist movements.438 
However, the way in which Ethem implemented his policy was controversial from the 
perspective if some members of the assembly. Although Ankara did not oppose the use 
of violence to supress disorder, anti-nationalist incidents, or to implement its policies, the 
excessive use of violence by Ethem would be exploited by Ankara as one factor 
demonstrating the unamenable personality of Ethem.  
The problem on the western front was that there was a power struggle underway. 
Until the regular army was militarily strengthened by Ankara, resistance against the Greek 
forces was overseen by irregular forces such as Ethem and Demirci Mehmet Efe.439 These 
irregular forces set up lines of resistance against the Greeks troops, before the regular 
forces gained power. Although they were ruthless against those who rose against Ankara, 
they organised their forces effectively ensuring order. On the other hand, there were 
people in the army and assembly who represented state power, and came to the stage very 
late. For example, İsmet (İnönü) and Fevzi (Çakmak) joined the Anatolian movement 
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very late, at the end of April 1920. Their appointment to important positions by Mustafa 
Kemal, as can be seen from İsmet’s appointment as commander of the Western front, 
caused new problems. For those who were at the front from the very beginning of the 
occupation of Anatolia, such as Çerkes Ethem, it was not easy to accept serving under 
those who came to the front very late.  
 
5 - The Beginning of the End: The Simav and Gediz Battles  
After Ethem supressed the incident in Yozgat, he returned the Western front. In 
some areas of the Western front, as with the people in Düzce, Adapazarı and South 
Marmara, many had little sympathy for the nationalist forces. The nationalists were 
viewed as responsible for the continuation of war, high taxation and conscription. For 
example, in Simav, the nationalists faced stiff opposition from the populace. On 12 July 
1920,  Greek occupation forces began to march towards Kütahya. They did not face local 
resistance in the region, particularly in Simav, where people were opposed to the 
nationalist forces.440 Ethem was appointed commander of Kütahya and surrounding areas 
on 27 July 1920, and in Kütahya 400 prisoners were released and armed by him, and 
another 150 people joined his forces as volunteers.441 He moved to Simav with 5,000 men, 
both cavalry and infantries with 4 canons and 14 machine guns.442 In Simav, a group of 
local people worked with the Greek forces. Ethem tried to convince them to do otherwise, 
but failed to so. On 30 July 1920, Ethem entered the town and fought with the Greek 
sympathisers there.443 On this occasion, 50 people were killed by Ethem’s forces and 
another 50 left wounded.444  
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He then moved on to the north of Demirci town. There, his forces confronted the 
Greek troops. Ethem attacked them using guerrilla tactics to weaken their position. Ali 
Fuat Paşa agreed with Ethem’s use of guerrilla tactics as important to the nationalists,445 
since they were already aware that the nationalists did not have sufficient military force 
or supplies to sustain a longer engagement. Ethem’s first attack was on the 30/31 July 
1920, and his forces were successful. Four days later, the Greeks launched a counter-
offensive against Ethem’s forces. Ethem’s forces withdrew to the east of Demirci town 
on 5 August.446 Then, in the early morning of 18 August, Ethem carried out a surprise raid 
against the Greeks who were then forced to the south of Demirci town. 447 The resulting 
15 day long confrontation between Ethem’s forces and Greek troops, resulted in a unit of 
the Greek army which consisted of ten thousand, losing its ability to sustain military 
operations.448 According to Ali Fuat Paşa, Ethem had successfully proved that his forces 
were not only useful for resolving domestic problems and incidents, but could also be 
helpful to counter Greek forces via guerrilla tactics.449 Ethem’s forces were officially then 
referred to by the Ankara government as the ‘First Mobile Forces’ (Birinci Kuva-yi 
Seyyare), particularly after the Kuva-yi Milliye forces began participating with the regular 
forces, following a government decision on 18 September 1920.450  
The Gediz Battle (24 October – 12 November 1920) holds an important place in 
the history of the western front. The battle was between Greek forces and the Anatolian 
movement, which consisted of the Kuva-yi Seyyare and the regular army. For Ali Fuat 
Paşa, the Gediz raid was crucial from the perspective of the nationalists, in terms of 
cutting off the lines between Greek troops in Uşak and Bursa. Moreover, the raid was not 
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costly for the nationalists, since the ammunition used during it had been obtained from 
the Italians.451 Division 61, 11 and Ethem’s forces were later moved towards Gediz. 
However, the raid proved instrumental for Mustafa Kemal and his close circle, as he was 
able to strengthen his power over the front, and later Mustafa Kemal created his own 
narrative about the period in Nutuk. Nonetheless, the events that took place here were 
controversial and increased disagreement between Mustafa Kemal and Ethem, and his 
brothers Tevfik and Reşit. This was because Ali Fuat Paşa, Ethem and Mustafa Kemal, 
and İsmet Bey were on the western front making plans to deal with Greek forces in Gediz. 
Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Bey were against attacking these forces for military reasons 
because they believed the army was not ready for such an attack. Although the attack 
could potentially be successful in the long term, due to a shortage of military equipment 
and a lack of regular army, the army would ultimately not be able to resist a possible 
Greek counter-attack.452 As a result of the battle, the Greeks had to deal with the Anatolian 
movement for the first time, and although the attack was largely an unorganised one, the 
Greek forces were forced to leave Gediz. Nevertheless, Ali Fuat Paşa, Ethem, his 
brothers, and the leaders of the regular army İsmet and Refet Beys, then criticised one 
another for the unorganised nature of the attack.453 Ethem argued that the regular army 
had not committed to fulfilling their duty. On the other hand, the Commander of the 
Western front, Ali Fuat Paşa, tried to find a middle way between the Kuva-yi Seyyare and 
the regular army, in order to reconcile them. However, his strategy did not work. 
Although Mustafa Kemal did not criticise the Gediz raid at the time, later, when 
Ethem and Ankara had seen their relationship collapse, he went on to claim that Greek 
forces had not been defeated during the encounter. He argued that they merely withdrew 
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from Gediz to avoid taking risks (because of foggy weather) and that the town was then 
taken by nationalist forces.454 As a result of the battle, he concluded that Ali Fuat Paşa 
should be removed from the western front.455 While aiming to control the Western front, 
he coveted the loyalty of the commander at the front. Indeed, it was not possible for 
Mustafa Kemal to gain complete control over the front while Ali Fuat Paşa was in charge, 
since the latter was a leading military member of the Anatolian movement who had 
moved there before Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal favoured choosing a military man 
who would be loyal to his decisions and who would not challenge him. Ismet and Refet 
were the two appropriate candidates assigned for this job. However, the problem then was 
how to remove Ali Fuat Paşa from the front without creating additional difficulties.  
In order to achieve control over military units and fronts, Mustafa Kemal used 
different strategies. Just as has already been seen in Chapter 2 in reference to the Anzavur 
Ahmed incident, loyalist Circassians and Pomaks also rose up against nationalist forces 
in the Gönen–Manyas region in early 1920. Yusuf İzzet Paşa, 456 who was the commander 
of the nationalist forces in the region, did not attack the group. Mustafa Kemal expressed 
his suspicions that Yusuf İzzet Paşa did not attack since they were also Circassians. On 6 
January 1920, Mustafa Kemal asked Bekir Sami via telegram whether, during the 
Anzavur incident, contact was made between the Circassian bandit leaders, Çerkes 
Şevket, Şah İsmail and Çerkes Ethem, Yusuf İzzet Paşa and Ahmet Fevzi Paşa or not. 
According to Mustafa Kemal, contact among the Circassians and associated support from 
military officers could be a potential cause of conflict between the Turks and 
Circassians.457 As he did not wish to face further problems on this front, Mustafa Kemal 
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invited Yusuf İzzet Paşa to Ankara to join the assembly, to become an MP. As head of 
the assembly, Mustafa Kemal could have removed Yusuf İzzet Paşa from the military 
unit. However, instead he followed a different approach, inviting him to Ankara, thereby 
preventing any possible dispute in either the assembly or at the western front. Yusuf İzzet 
Paşa accepted Mustafa Kemal’s offer, joining the assembly as an MP before he left the 
military unit. 
In Ali Fuat Paşa’s case, Mustafa Kemal employed a similar strategy to that used 
in the case of Yusuf İzzet Paşa’s, instead of forcing him to leave from the Western front. 
Due to the developing relationships with the Bolshevik Russians, Ankara required a 
permanent ambassador in Moscow to maintain relations and ensure financial aid would 
be available at a certain level. Ali Fuat Paşa was selected by Mustafa Kemal as Turkish 
ambassador to Moscow, claiming that he was a well-known general, and an enemy of the 
British. He was expected to have a good effect on Moscow.458 On November 10, the 
Ankara government appointed Ali Fuat Paşa as Ambassador to Moscow.459  
However, the plan was carried out without Ali Fuat Paşa having ever been 
informed. Indeed, he was appointed Ambassador to Moscow by Mustafa Kemal while 
still at the Western front.460 He was therefore invited by Mustafa Kemal to Ankara. Ali 
Fuat Paşa, without being aware of Mustafa Kemal’s decision, came to Ankara where he 
was welcomed at the train station by him.461 The decision was taken without any 
consultations, Ali Fuat Paşa was informed by Mustafa Kemal of the post at the train 
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station, and he expressed his surprise at the decision. In his little known memoirs 
‘Bilinmeyen Hatıralar’, Ali Fuat Paşa claims that he already felt an era of single man rule 
had begun in Ankara. According to Ali Fuat Paşa, those who had recently come to 
Ankara; i.e. those who came to Ankara after Istanbul had been occupied by the British in 
16 March 1920, that helped Mustafa Kemal establish single man rule in the country, by 
dividing up old friends.462 It was obvious to Ali Fuat Paşa at this point that Mustafa 
Kemal’s intention was to send him away from the front and Anatolia.  
Mustafa Kemal also chose to send Ethem and his brothers to Moscow along with 
Ali Fuat Paşa. Ethem and his brothers had no diplomatic career backgrounds, which 
Mustafa Kemal already knew. They were men of arms rather than men of politics or 
diplomacy. Mustafa Kemal was aware of Ethem and his brothers’ personalities and 
background. So we can question what his aim was in sending Ethem to Moscow. Possibly, 
to make him second secretary to Ali Fuat Paşa? Thus, it is apparent; his strategy was to 
eradicate potential problems efficiently by sending opponents abroad. However, for 
Ethem and his brothers, leaving the front was not readily accepted. They had been at the 
front from the beginning of the Greek occupation in May 1919. At that time, Ismet (İnönü) 
had been in Istanbul, which was under de facto occupation from the British (November 
1918);463 meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal was occupied with local and regional congresses in 
the Black Sea region. 
Mustafa Kemal determined that the Western front would be divided into two parts: 
a Western and Southern one. While İsmet (İnönü) became Commander of the Western 
front, Refet (Bele) became commander of the Southern one. According to his plan, Çerkes 
Ethem’s Kuva-yi Seyyare would serve under the Kütahya branch of the Western front. 
This meant the Kuva-yi Seyyare, with its irregular forces, would become a sub-unit of the 
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regular army.464 Ethem’s older brother Tevfik disagreed with the decision made in 
Ankara, and refused to serve under a regular military unit in Kütahya.465 Ethem and his 
brothers, especially Tevfik, were also against the appointment of Refet Paşa (Bele) to the 
front. The reason for their opposition was that Ethem and Refet had personal problems 
from the time of the Yozgat/Çapanoğlu incident. If we recollect events we can observe, 
that after he had suppressed disorder in Yozgat, a group of armed Alevis from Yozgat 
then joined Ethem’s forces at the Western front.466 However, Refet Paşa threatened the 
local Alevis of Yozgat after Ethem had quelled the disorder. This situation caused 
problems among Ethem’s forces, with Alevi soldiers leaving the front and declaring that 
if they would not be pardoned for their activities in the Yozgat incident, there would be 
no reason for them to join the nationalist forces. For this reason, Ethem tried to send Refet 
Paşa to the military court in Eskişehir, alleging that he had caused the desertion of soldiers 
from the military front. 467 However, this created a further problem between Mustafa 
Kemal and Ethem, since Refet was the Minister of Interior in Mustafa Kemal’s 
government. Consequently, Ethem’s attempt was prevented by Mustafa Kemal. 
At the beginning of the Anatolian movement, there was no proper working state 
structure in Anatolia. The central government, which was in Istanbul, was unable to rule 
the empire effectively. With the opening of the assembly in Ankara in April 1920, a 
central authority was finally beginning to re-emerge. Until the assembly opened, in the 
period between 1919 and 1920, Ethem was fighting against both the Greeks troops at the 
Western front and suppressing the anti-nationalist movements in Central and Western 
Anatolia.468 A single year had not passed since the opening of the assembly, which 
brought about an increase in Ankara’s military and financial power, before a struggle 
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began to emerge, which made irregular forces appear an unsustainable option for Mustafa 
Kemal. In November 1920, he no longer saw such a need for irregulars, as he had in the 
opening days of the assembly in April 1920. In late November, a new struggle began 
between Mustafa Kemal’s and Ethem’s circles, especially between İsmet and Tevfik, the 
latter of whom was responsible for the Kuva-yi Seyyare on behalf of Ethem. İsmet was 
the Commander of the Western front, and Ethem’s youngest brother, Tevfik, was his 
representative at the Western front. İsmet tried to take control of Tevfik; however, Tevfik 
did not consent to accept Ismet as a senior commander. Ismet sent a detachment with a 
lieutenant colonel, who prepared notices against the leaders of the Kuva-yi Seyyare.469 
Tevfik sent them back to Ismet, declaring that he would no longer accept Ismet as a senior 
commander.470 Ismet and Mustafa Kemal sought a way to control the Kuva-yi Seyyare, as 
they had other ‘regular divisions’, since Ethem and his irregular forces were becoming a 
threat to the Ankara government, interrupting the political business. Ismet demanded the 
official military reports of the Kuva-yi Seyyare, to regulate it.471 Ismet also aimed to 
control the Kuva-yi Seyyare at the front, and prevent their political intervention in the 
assembly. It was also declared that the Kuva-yi Seyyare should focus on enemy troops 
only, and nothing behind the front.472 However, Tevfik opposed İsmet’s plan to make the 
Kuva-yi Seyyare a regular force, emphasising that their forces consisted of ‘good-for-
nothings’ ‘serseriler’, whom he believed would never be able to serve as a regular force 
since they were also illiterate. He suggested they should either continue as an irregular 
force or be disbanded.473 He also refused to send military reports pertaining to his forces 
to Ismet in Kütahya, choosing to send reports directly to Mustafa Kemal in Ankara.  
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6- Bilecik Meetings 
Ethem was invited by Mustafa Kemal to Ankara to meet with representatives of 
the Istanbul government.474 However, it is worth noting that these meetings were in 
Bilecik, which was about 80 km from Eskişehir, and 350 km from Ankara in the 
Northwest of Anatolia. Ethem was in Kütahya at this time, which was also next to 
Eskişehir (about 75 km from Eskişehir and 350 km from Ankara). He also had to pass 
through Eskişehir to go to Ankara. The question raised here is what Mustafa Kemal was 
planning to do with his invitation to Ankara before travelling to Bilecik for negotiations. 
Ethem was not accustomed to having regular diplomatic meetings; as he was a 
paramilitary force leader. To solve the issues between İsmet and Tevfik, Mustafa Kemal 
moved to Eskişehir with Ethem, Reşit, Kazım, Kılıç Ali, Celal, Hakkı Behiç and Şükrü 
Beys. According to Kazım Özalp, when travelling on the train, Ethem had more armed 
people in his group than usual during the trip.475 Some counter measures were also taken 
against Ethem.476 Mustafa Kemal brought 50 guards with him,477 including Topal Osman 
(‘Osman the cripple’) his personal guard, who brought an extended armed group with 
him. Topal was one of Mustafa Kemal’s best-known and most ruthless guards at the time. 
His presence on this journey is therefore significant. Ethem expected that Mustafa Kemal 
might try to organise an attack against him.478 Indeed, in their memoirs, both Mustafa 
Kemal and Ethem accused one another of organising an armed attack against the other 
one.  
When the train arrived at the station in Eskişehir, two officers greeted Ethem. The 
officers provided some information about the regular army’s on-going preparations in 
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Eskişehir. They feared that some military units were being transferred to Eskişehir.479 The 
plan, according to Ethem, was that he would be killed by Eskişehir–Bilecik on the train 
journey. The regular army units were being readied in Eskişehir to counter possible riots 
by the people of Eskişehir.480 Ethem felt that the troop activity was directed against him 
personally, and prepared a counter–attack at the Eskişehir station. Ethem used his 
sickness as an excuse to leave the train, to rest in a house close to the station. Except for 
Mustafa Kemal, all the other members of the committee also left the train. However, due 
to suspicions over possible preparations by Ethem, Mustafa Kemal chose not to stay in 
the station, moving towards Bilecik with the train, without waiting for members of the 
committee to return.481   
The lack of trust on both sides, described above, heightened expectation of an 
armed conflict in Eskişehir, when Mustafa Kemal and İsmet arrived there. On this 
occasion Ethem left Eskişehir for Kütahya, since he believed that he was not secure there. 
Diyarbakır MP Hacı Şükrü Bey, who was also on the train with Mustafa Kemal, went to 
Kütahya with Ethem Bey. He explained that in a secret session of the assembly, Ethem 
conveyed his suspicions about the Ankara government, citing the military mobilisation in 
Eskişehir, as battalion 61 had been moved there. Ethem thought that this was one 
component of preparations being made against him by Mustafa Kemal.482 In his memoir, 
Ethem confirmed that he suspected military preparations were being made against 
Mustafa Kemal in Eskişehir, and that this meant an assassination plot. When Mustafa 
Kemal returned from Bilecik, the MPs who came from Ankara with him came together, 
and decided that Reşit, Ethem’s older brother, would go with Kazım Bey to Kütahya to 
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meet with Ethem.483 Following the meeting in Kütahya, Ethem agreed with Kazım Bey to 
serve under him at the Western front as an army commander. However, he spoke against 
Refet Bey’s appointment to the Southern Front as commander there. From the perspective 
of Ankara, it was considered contrary to military discipline to change a military 
commander based on a paramilitary leader’s opinion.484 
Superficially, it appears that the disagreement between Tevfik Bey and İsmet Bey 
was on the grounds of military strategy, and Tevfik Bey’s refusal to send reports about 
his military unit to İsmet Bey. However, we contend that the reason for the disagreement 
was not about military strategy at all. Tevfik Bey did not favour working under İsmet and 
Refet Beys. Indeed, he was not completely against the regular army, since he had already 
sent military reports to Ankara (to Mustafa Kemal). However, he had experienced 
problems with senior officers, İsmet and Refet Beys. The tension between Ethem Bey and 
the Ankara government thereby increased, as Mustafa Kemal, as head of the assembly, 
along with his close circle, had already decided to exclude Ethem from the armed groups, 
to pacify him, because he (and his brothers) could not be controlled. Mustafa Kemal 
would no longer work with them. Although Ethem had been useful for suppressing 
Anatolia’s domestic incidents, during the critical period of resistance in the absence of a 
strong regular military, there were no longer important threats from Anatolia to the 
Ankara government. Now Ankara had enough military power for the regular army against 
the Greek forces in the western front, particularly after the war against the Armenian 
forces ended at the Eastern front. Some of the regular forces were later transferred to the 
Western front from the East. The resulting agreement with the Bolsheviks meant that 
Ankara would soon have sufficient financial and military power to strengthen its military. 
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Mustafa Kemal no longer required the irregular forces at the Western front. Moreover, 
the irregulars were already creating threatened his power. 
According to Mustafa Kemal, some MPs and bureaucrats directed too much 
attention towards Ethem in Ankara. Ethem became extremely confident under the 
attentions of the people,485 encouraging the opponents of Mustafa Kemal to use Ethem 
against him. They tried to balance Mustafa Kemal’s power with that of Ethem. However, 
before Ethem came to the assembly, he had not been involved in any collusion. Despite 
the continued armed confrontation against Greek forces and the civil war in Anatolia, 
there was extensive political struggle within the assembly. The composition of the 
political assembly was diverse; including ulemas, bureaucrats, senior military officers, 
and local notables. Thus, a great many different elements of society were represented in 
the assembly. This diversity made governing the assembly challenging, complicating the 
process of arriving at concrete decisions; MPs themselves were generally striving to save 
the empire and the sultanate from Greek and Allied occupation.  
Nationalist officers successfully used bandits and irregular armed groups at the 
beginning of the resistance against Greek occupation. The nationalists did not see the 
crimes committed by the bandits and irregulars, or the releasing of convicts from jails by 
irregular forces as problematic.486 However, when the relationship between Ankara and 
Ethem became uneasy, Ankara began to find ‘excuses’ to justify its exclusion of Ethem 
from the front. Complaints were flowing in about Ethem and his brother Tevfik, 
specifically in relation to their discretionary hanging of anti-nationalists. Although Ethem 
and his brothers worked hand in glove with Ankara for more than six months, for the first 
time, on 24 December 1920, Ankara took complaints about Ethem’s acts of 
insubordination seriously. These included his refusal to accept the verdicts of military 
                                                          
485 Atatürk, Nutuk, volume 2, 27.  
486 Şener, Çerkes Ethem Olayı.47.  
129 
 
tribunals and lack of acceptance of the authority of the central government.487 Although 
the Ankara government also took harsh measurements and used independent courts to 
‘deal with’ opposition, Mustafa Kemal criticised Ethem for hanging people after only a 
short trial, without recourse to independent courts for approval.488 It is important to note 
that there was already a plan on paper to prove Ethem’s disobedience to Ankara, and as 
Mustafa Kemal’s political and military power grew, he increasingly believed that if the 
army could defeat Ethem’s forces, then no one in Ankara would question his decisions or 
make his job difficult. On 27th December, the cabinet declared that Ethem and his brother 
Tevfik had violated the assembly’s authority through their actions.489  
From the end of November 1920 onwards, both sides increasingly expressed 
doubt about the activities of the other side. However, they chose not to display their 
distrust for each other. Kind language was used in the correspondence from both sides. 
However, intra group correspondence demonstrates that the confidence between the two 
groups had already broken down. According to İsmet (who informed Ankara), Ethem was 
seeking to gather all irregular nationalist forces around his own troops so that he would 
be in a position to attempt to take control over the assembly with Bolshevist ideas.490 
Ismet’s forces were also ready to attack Ethem’s Kuva-yi Seyyare.491 Mustafa Kemal 
                                                          
487 24 December 1920. (24/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1582, 38.  
488 “The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session.”125, 29.12.1336 
(1920), 281. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001125.pdf. 
accessed 23/08/2015. On 15 February 1336 (1920), members of local group of Marmara town of Akhisar 
were arrested by the local gendarme forces, however, later on gendarme station was raided by Ethem and 
local bandits were executed by shooting BOA.DH.KMS. 53-4/32, 12 February 1336 (1920). It has to be 
mentioned that in the document Ethem’s name recorded as ‘Çerkes Ethem’ some claim that Çerkes were 
put his name after he was split up with Mustafa Kemal to supress the all Circassians in the republican 
Turkey, however, a year before his exclusion from Ankara his name already recorded as Çerkes Ethem. It 
meant that he was already known as Çerkes Ethem.  
489 27 December 1920. (27/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1585, 50.  
490 7 December 1920. (7/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1576, 16.  
491 7 December 1920. (7/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1576, 17.  
130 
 
argued in his reply that while the activities in the assembly were controlled, Kuva-yi 
Seyyare still had the ability to recruit people from the Western front.   
However, on December 23, a group of MPs moved from Ankara to Kütahya to 
negotiate with Ethem regarding the problems between himself and Ankara.492 Mustafa 
Kemal did not support the idea that a delegation should meet with Ethem. However, under 
pressure from MPs in the assembly, he agreed to send a council to Kütahya to meet with 
Ethem, in order to negotiate. The council reported on Ethem and Tevfik’s demands; 
including on the policy that Refet and Fahrettin Bey should be removed from the front, 
and that the local government should pay for their expenses incurred at the front, while 
the brothers swore not to act against the regular forces if they did not attack them.493  
After receiving the report, Mustafa Kemal, thought that the members of the 
delegation had been arrested by Ethem and had been coerced into sending the reports. 
Although it should be noted that the reports did not include any unacceptable demands. 
The delegation was not thinking in the same way as Mustafa Kemal and İsmet. Their aim 
was only to try to reconcile the Kuva-yi Seyyare with Ankara. In the assembly, moreover, 
the majority of the MPs did not favour a military attack on the Circassian brothers. 
Mustafa Kemal expected the delegation to share his ideas. Without waiting for their return 
to Ankara, Mustafa Kemal chose to end the problem and fight Ethem. Despite his position 
as head of the assembly, Mustafa Kemal believed that they did not need to inform the 
assembly of any impending military attack. If the attack were to succeed he believed he 
would receive Ethem’s approval, and that the assembly would agree as he already had 
sufficient evidence to convince its members.494 The delegation was however disappointed 
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by the approach taken by the cabinet regarding their reports and its reaction to their 
suggestions to solving the problems noted.495  
Mustafa Kemal, in his own memoir, the Nutuk, added some documents at the end 
about the incident to push forward his own version of the story. The documents suggested 
that Mustafa Kemal was seeking a way to solve the problem without causing an armed 
conflict. Then, on the 26th of December 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to Ismet 
informing him that he was thinking of explaining every point to the assembly. On 
December 28th, he sent a telegram to the delegation, informing them that the problem 
would be spoken about at government level, and that the decision would be taken by the 
government. 496 However, in one document dated 27th December 1920, not present in 
Mustafa Kemal’s Nutuk, but which can be found in the Journal of Military History 
Documents (an official journal of the Turkish Armed Forces), we see that Mustafa Kemal 
had sent a telegram to Ismet, arguing that he did not believe the problem could be resolved 
peacefully. Therefore, he explained his military plan to İsmet and Refet.497 It is 
noteworthy that Mustafa Kemal supported a military attack, but chose not to include the 
documents showing his resolve to handle the problem alone using military power in his 
memoirs.  
Two days later, during negotiations in the assembly sessions, Mustafa Kemal 
almost convinced the other MPs of the need for a military solution to the Kuva-yi Seyyare 
(December 30th).498 However, despite Ethem’s declaration,499 and after the delegation had 
informed the MPs about their meetings with Ethem and his brothers, the MPs agreed they 
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were not in favour of fighting the Kuva-yi Seyyare. Mustafa Kemal’s willingness to use 
force against Ethem and his men was contrary to the general opinion of the MPs, which 
was to avoid ‘spilling Muslim blood’ ‘Müslüman kanı dökmek’ in the country.500 As a 
result of negotiations in the assembly, and as a final offer to Ethem and his brothers, 
Mustafa Kemal informed Refet and İsmet that they should notify Ethem that if they were 
to leave the Kuva-yi Seyyare their lives would be guaranteed and the assembly would 
request a pardon in the courts.501 A day after Mustafa Kemal’s telegram to Refet and 
İsmet, Refet sent a telegram to Mustafa Kemal informing him that he was continuing his 
military preparations against the Kuva-yi Seyyare. He then prepared his unit and pushed 
some of his cavalry forward to facilitate the attack.502  
It is worth pointing out that Ethem attempted to open a place for himself in the 
anti-nationalist camp. He stated to the members of the Istanbul government, such as Ali 
Kemal that the country could not continue to pursue a war agenda any longer. It is 
significant to emphasise here, that, although Ethem was seen as no more than a leader of 
bandits, Ethem’s position changed in response to circumstances. He was one of the first 
to organise local resistance against the Greeks in western Anatolia, and many people were 
hanged by his forces, due to their opposition to the nationalist cause. However, after he 
began to fear he would be excluded from the national movement, he adopted an anti-
nationalist rhetoric.503 Ethem sent a telegram to the assembly to protest the holding of 
Istanbul government members taken by the Ankara government after the Bilecik meeting. 
He demanded their release, criticising the members of the Ankara government for 
                                                          
500 “The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session.”126, 30.12.1336 
(1920), 294-296 https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001126.pdf 
Accessed 23/08/2015. 
501 30 December 1920. (30/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1587, 56. 
502 31 December 1920. (31/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1589, 62.  
503 “The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session.” 123, 27/12/1336 
(1920) 270, the date of the telegram 27.12.1336 (1920), 
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increasing their own salaries.504 It could be said that Ethem sent this telegram to Ankara 
to gain the support of the Istanbul government and the palace, since his relationship had 
already deteriorated with the Ankara government.  
Celal Bey also mentioned in his assembly speech that when the delegation met 
Ethem and his brother in Kütahya, military equipment and soldiers belonging to the 
Ankara government had been moved to Kütahya from Eskişehir via train. This 
consignment concerned Ethem and his men, and indicated to them that it could mark the 
commencement of Ankara’s military operation against them.505 It was also emphasised in 
the speech that Kuva-yi Seyyare forces did not wish to fight against Ankara’s forces. 
Meanwhile, the preparation continued among İsmet Paşa’s unit in Kütahya. According to 
Celal Bey, İsmet Paşa was also concerned about the situation. However, he claimed there 
was no option besides the military one if Ethem and his brothers chose not to leave the 
military units. 506 Celal also believed that both sides were exaggerating the situation for 
personal reasons. It is also important to mention that details concerning the end of the 
session were completely absent from the assembly records. Thus, it is not clear how the 
session concluded.507 
After the meeting, İsmet Bey asked Ethem to leave his forces along with his 
brother Tevfik. He also stated that he had sufficient military forces to deploy against 
him.508 In his reply, Ethem accused İsmet and Mustafa Kemal of selfishness. He also 
blamed his brother Reşit Bey, arguing that it was due to Reşit’s naivety that İsmet and 
Mustafa Kemal had been given an opportunity to lead the nationalist cause, arguing that 
                                                          
504 The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session 111. 09/12/1336 (1920) 
261, the date of the telegram 5.1.1337(1921) 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001111.pdf Accessed 
23/08/2015. 
505 “The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session.”126, 30.12.1336 
(1920), 292, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d01/CILT01/gcz01001126.pdf 
Accessed 23/08/2015. 
506 Ibid. 293.  
507 Ibid. 305.  
508 Uzun, “Milli Mücadele’de Çerkez Ethem ve Kuva-Yı Seyyare’nin Faaliyetleri (1919–1920).” 171.  
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he would have fought them to prevent their emergence as leaders.509 Mustafa Kemal 
planned that Refet Bey, the head of the Southern Front army, would attack the Kuva-yi 
Seyyare with all his forces, and would also begin a propaganda campaign to break the 
unity binding the Kuva-yi Seyyare units together.510 Mustafa Kemal already thought that 
the Kuva-yi Seyyare might not wish to fight against the regular army. In this case, the 
Southern and Western front of the regular cavalries would then be expected to attack and 
pursue them.511 İsmet Bey had been ordered by Mustafa Kemal to move to Kütahya in a 
coded telegram. Ismet informed Ethem that they should move to Gediz.512 Ethem would 
then either remain in Kütahya and confront İsmet’s forces, or he would move to Gediz as 
İsmet had told him, where he would be squeezed between İsmet’s forces and the Greek 
troops. Ethem’s aide de camp, Lieutenant Sami, claimed that Ethem’s aim was to capture 
Ankara, to eliminate the assembly and to execute its executives and then reorganise the 
assembly and the army to fight against the Greeks.513 When the military attack was carried 
out by the regular army, however, Ethem avoided joining in. He withdrew his troops to 
the Gediz region without resisting the incoming army.514 He declared to the Kuva-yi 
Seyyare that there was no longer an opportunity for them to continue working together. 
They had three options, they could either join the regular forces (Ankara), join the Greek 
Forces, or live as bandits in the mountains.515 Ethem did not force his forces to follow 
                                                          
509 Ibid. 172.  
510 27 December 1920. (27/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
Document no 1584, 47. 
511 27 December 1920. (27/12/36). Harp Tarihi Belgeleri Dergisi, year 24, issue 73, September 1975, 
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512 “The Secret Session Records of the Grand National Assembly, Secret Session.”126, 30.12.1336 
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Accessed 23/08/2015. 
513 Form lieutenant Sami and the governor Demirci İbrahim Ethem’s meeting which was held on 13 
January 1921. See İbrahim Ethem Akıncı, Demirci Akıncıları, Yayınlar (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1978)., 25.  
514 Atatürk, Nutuk.80. Miralay Mehmet Arif Bey, Anadolu İnkılabı (Mücahedat-I Milliye Hatıratı 1335-
1339), ed. Bülent Demirbaş (İstanbul: Arba, 1987), 58. 
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him. He himself preferred to go into hiding in the Greek occupied zone.516 It can be 
asserted that Ethem’s decision to dissolve his forces prevented a civil war between his 
forces and Ankara. Kazım Özalp also states that after the military attack began, a group 
of officers and soldiers joined their side. Another group from Ethem’s forces did not fight 
choosing to go into the mountains.517  
After Ethem withdrew to Gediz, the regular troops attacked them. His forces were 
caught in the crossfire between the regular army and Greek forces. He then demanded a 
ceasefire from the Greeks,518 and after they agreed, Ethem attacked Ismet’s regular forces. 
İsmet then withdrew to Kütahya from Gediz on January 6th, 1921.519 Ethem continued 
his attack on İsmet until the Greek forces began their attack. The Greek forces then moved 
towards Gediz. Around Gediz, Refet’s regular forces, which had passed over the Greek 
troops now attacked Ethem,520 leading him to decide to defect to the Greeks. His plan was 
to scatter his unit; he would move into the mountains with 50-60 of his armed men. From 
there, he would move further inside Anatolia,521 where eventually due to an illness he was 
hidden in a Circassian village (Eski Manyas/ Soğuksu) in a Turkish family’s house around 
Susurluk.522 Initially, Ethem did not favour joining the Greeks contrary to his brothers, 
Tevfik and Reşit, but ultimately, they also joined the Greeks.  
After the military operation commenced against Ethem and his forces, Mustafa 
Kemal sought to justify the military attack. He blamed Ethem and his brothers for trying 
to establish a feudal structure (Derebeylik) under their control in the Kütahya, Afyon and 
Isparta regions.523 He alleged that they also aimed to replace the assembly with a new one 
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under their own control. Mustafa Kemal claimed that they then worked alone for their 
own benefit. Moreover, he claimed they had tried to influence the Bolsheviks, to organise 
a Bolshevik uprising in Eskişehir.524 While demolishing Ethem and his brothers’ 
reputation in nationalist circles, Mustafa Kemal utilised black propaganda in the 
assembly. He went further in his claims arguing that Ethem and his brothers had tried to 
collaborate with the Bolsheviks, the Greeks, the Istanbul government and even the 
British.525 However, only a month before this speech, Ethem had been in Ankara. 
Although trust had broken down between Ethem and Mustafa Kemal, there had been 
attempts to seek a solution to the problems between Tevfik and İsmet at that time. 
However, now Ethem was simply declared a collaborator.  
To cut all ties between Ethem and his forces a declaration was published by 
Western front commanders calling on Ethem’s irregular forces not to fight against the 
Ankara governments forces; this call used Islamic rhetoric and referred to Ethem as 
having been ‘Greekified’.526 It was also ordered by the Ankara government’s Ministry of 
War that, in response to Ethem’s impact on the Circassians of the Tokat, Sivas, Kayseri 
regions, they should be observed closely by military intelligence to prevent possible 
support emerging from the region for Ethem.527 In the same session, MPs voted to remove 
Reşit Bey from his deputyship in the assembly.528 On January 24 1921, Mustafa Kemal 
declared that Ethem had ceased to be of concern.529  
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Conclusion  
1920 has been described in this chapter as an especially difficult year for the 
Ankara government, since domestic problems and the civil war in Anatolia had made it 
difficult for it to fight against Greek and Allied occupation forces. On the one hand, the 
regular army had not been as strong as the anti-nationalist forces. As we have seen, the 
Anzavur, Adapazarı-Düzce and Yozgat incidents seriously threatened Ankara’s 
existence. On the other hand, Çerkes Ethem, as a leading irregular force leader at the time, 
had preserved Ankara from many disastrous outcomes. However, towards the end of the 
year, Ankara (or Mustafa Kemal) expanded its authority over the country both militarily 
and in terms of government policy. Order was restored to the areas surrounding Ankara, 
and Ethem was no longer as valuable as he had been previously. Thus, the time arrived 
for Mustafa Kemal and İsmet (İnönü) to ensure they had control over him. This situation 
provided an opening for the opposition to strengthen his military and political power, 
although Ethem had not strived for this. Ultimately, Mustafa Kemal and İsmet succeeded 
in their objective to exclude him from the nationalist cause, forcing him into the Greek 
occupied zone by January 1921.  
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Chapter Five 
The Circassian Congress, Bandits and the Gönen-Manyas Deportations 
 
Introduction  
The days following the exclusion of Çerkes Ethem from the national movement 
saw anti-nationalist Circassians take new steps to oppose the Kemalists in İzmir. They 
had collaborated with occupiers to establish a semi-autonomous structure within the 
Greek occupied zone. The members of the group were not a monolithic bloc. They had 
already fought each other during the Düzce-Adapazarı and Anzavur incidents. However, 
now they had a common enemy in the Kemalists. Among the members of the group, there 
was a variety of people from different backgrounds. They included ex-members of the 
Ottoman Special Organisation, bureaucrats, members of the Committee of Union and 
Progress, and its opposition, the Liberal Entente, Ottoman officials and bandits. All were 
now members of the Association for the Strengthening of Near Eastern Circassians Rights 
(ASNEC, Şark-ı Karip Çerkesleri Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), and included participants 
from the Circassian Congress held in İzmir (October 1921).  
In the year after the congress, the Ankara government exiled 14 Circassian 
villages in the Gönen-Manyas region to central and eastern parts of Turkey. The reason 
for this exile was to regain control over the region. In the days following the defeat of 
Greek forces in Western Anatolia (final battles were fought between the 26th August and 
9th September 1922); Circassian bandits seemed to remain the only, although a grave 
threat to the Ankara government. It was against this backdrop that the government took 
the decision to exile fourteen Circassian villages, which can be likened to a collective 
punishment for them. They were exiled because of the presence of Circassian bandits in 
the region, and the government also intended to deport all other dozens of Circassian 
villages from the region, to cut off the supply of human resources. Some of the villages 
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were exiled because some of their inhabitants were known to have joined armed groups; 
yet not all the members of the civilian population supported these groups. The only crime 
that they had committed, if it can be considered a crime at all, was coming from the same 
villages as the some of the bandits. Ankara proposed to end the alleged chaos in the region 
by removing the Circassian villages entirely from the region.  
This chapter will examine the motivation behind those anti-nationalist Circassians 
establishing an association, seeking Greek support and declaring their independence from 
both the nationalist government of Ankara and the Ottoman government of Istanbul. This 
chapter will also study the armed Circassian opposition. As a response to noted 
declarations and opposition movements, a collective punishment for the Circassians was 
applied by the Ankara government. This involved deporting them from the Gönen-
Manyas region to Central and Eastern Anatolia, something discussed in the third section 
of this chapter. This chapter argues that the tense Turkish-Greek War in Western Anatolia 
(1919-1922) convinced the Ankara government that it would be nearly impossible for it 
to control the region, and thus it sought extremely harsh methods to deal with the 
Circassians. This culminated in 4,000 deportations from the region. As a result of this 
overreaction, and the associated collective punishment, many women, children and 
innocent people in the region became victims.  
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1 - The Emergence of the Idea of Autonomy and the Circassian Congress  
A) Governorship of (Çule) İbrahim Hakkı in İzmit from April 1920 to June 1921 
Çule İbrahim Hakkı Bey was an opponent of the CUP even during the pre-WWI 
period, having been implicated in the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa in 1913.530 
Due to increasing pressure from the CUP, he had to leave the empire for Egypt, where he 
built a good relationship with the British, explaining why he was also known as İbrahim 
the English (İngiliz İbrahim).531 With the signing of the Mudros armistice (1918) he 
returned to the empire, and was appointed as governor of İzmit by Damad Ferid Paşa, 
where he remained from April 1920 to June 1921. He was a CUP opponent, as were the 
majority of the bureaucrats in the post-WWI period, appointed by the Istanbul 
government. The division between the CUP and the Liberal Party stemmed from the pre-
WWI period, when multi-party elections were first established in the empire. Later, in 
1913, the CUP dominated in terms of its political power, carrying out a military coup in 
Istanbul. İbrahim later returned from Egypt after WWI, when he was appointed governor 
of İzmit in 1920. From the beginning of the British and Greek occupation, İbrahim Hakkı 
had a warm relationship with the British. Indeed, a British officer in İzmit also considered 
him a friend.532  
The idea of autonomy came to the fore for İbrahim Hakkı when the Ottoman 
Porte533 lost control over the İzmit region in June 1921. The region was then taken over 
by the Ankara government’s forces. From April 1920 to June 1921 Çule İbrahim Hakkı 
                                                          
530 Sadrazam Mahmut Şevket Paşa was killed in 11 June 1913. After his murder, the CUP used this 
killing to silence the opposition in the empire. A significant number of military men and bureaucrats were 
retired or exiled to the peripheries of the empire by the CUP. See Ali Birinci, Hürriyet ve İtilaf. 229.  
531 Sefer Berzeg, Türkiye Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Çerkes Göçmenleri (II) (İstanbul: Nart Yayıncılık, 1990), 
42-43. He had to leave the empire in the days following of the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa due 
to his participation to the assassination. (Interview with Baki Çule, in 18 April 2015, Düzce. Baki Çule is 
the grandson of İbrahim Hakkı’s brother Arslan Bey). 
532 PRO/FO 608/113, 21 August 1919, document no 332.  
533 Porte means ‘gate’ in French. It (the monumental entrance gate of the Ottoman Government 
Departments in Istanbul) symbolizes the Ottoman Government. 
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Bey was the governor of İzmit,534 and his activities there disturbed even the Istanbul 
government. Due to his warm relationships with the British, the Istanbul government tried 
unsuccessfully on a number of occasions to remove him from power. Indeed, the Ministry 
of Interior of the Ottoman government even requested the permission of the British High 
Commissioner to remove İbrahim Hakkı from İzmit.535 The Commissioner declared they 
were not against the decision the Ottoman government had made about İbrahim Hakkı.536 
Abdülvahab Bey was appointed to the position.537 However, he was not allowed to take 
the governorship of İzmit, since İbrahim Hakkı had already organised paramilitary group 
to secure himself and the region under his governorship.538 Although the British, on paper 
at least, allowed the Ottoman government to remove him from his position, the Ottoman 
government was not able to do so, or to bring him to Istanbul for trial; indeed all attempts 
made by the Porte resulted in failure.539  
İbrahim Hakkı tried to create an autonomous structure to create a buffer zone 
between the Istanbul government and the Ankara government during his governorship. 
He opposed the actions of the Ankara government and did not allow its military units or 
supporters to live in this region. He pursued a policy that was not overly aggressive when 
trying to convince people to accept his anti-Kuva-yi Milliye move.540 He acted, in fact, 
rather peacefully. At the same time, since the Istanbul government had no authority in the 
region, public security was constantly under threat from the presence of armed bands. 
Even in mid-1919, he had been considering establishing his own armed group to ensure 
his security.541 Later, at the end of 1920, after the Düzce-Adapazarı incidents, he formed 
                                                          
534Berzeg, Türkiye Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Çerkes Göçmenleri (II), 42-43. İbrahim Hakkı Bey’s wife Pakize 
Hanım was the granddaughter of Pertev Paşa (d. 1785-1837) and daughter of Marşan Fersah Paşa. The 
family had good reputation in Egypt. (Interview with Baki Çule, in 18 April 2015, Düzce). 
535 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-1/34, document 1, 28 Kanuevvel 36 (28 December 1920).  
536 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-1/34, document 1, 28 Kanunievvel 36 (28 December 1920).  
537 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-1/34, document 2, 28 Kanunievvel 36 (28 December 1920).  
538 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-2/16, document 1, 6 Kanunisani 37 (6 January 1921).  
539 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-2/16, document 6, 29 March 1337 (29 March 1921), and BOA.DH.KMS. 60-2/16 
document 5, 14 March 1337 (14 March 1921).  
540 PRO/FO 371/5167 E5255/262/44. 21 April 1920, document 129. 
541 PRO/FO 608/113, 8 August 1919, document no 334. 
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an armed group consisting of Circassians who had been attacked by the nationalists during 
the incidents, and whose homes had been burned down.542 It appears that those 
Circassians who had suffered from the nationalist attacks were purposely selected by 
İbrahim in order to keep the region under his control by gaining their loyalty and support.  
One of İbrahim Hakkı’s local rivals was from the Maan family in the Adapazarı 
region. This was Maan Midhat, who described İbrahim Hakkı’s policies as a kind of triple 
game in one letter to Sultan Vahidettin.543 According to him, İbrahim Hakkı juggled three 
groups during his governorship. The first of which was the Circassians of the region. 
İbrahim Hakkı followed a deceptive policy of trying to convince those Circassians who 
believed that İbrahim Hakkı was implementing the decisions of the Ottoman Porte and 
the Sultan during his governorship. However, he thereby strengthened his own authority 
in the region rather than that of the Ottoman government and Sultan. The second group 
was the British, who employed İbrahim Hakkı, since they believed that he had influence 
over the Circassians of the region due to the widespread anti-Kuva-yi Milliye movement 
led by the Circassians.544 The final group was the Ottoman government, which was under 
British control by that time. Due to the occupation of Istanbul, the Porte was unable to 
take any precautions preventing İbrahim Hakkı from strengthening his authority in the 
region.545 It noteworthy that Maan Midhat claimed the troubled relationship in the area 
between the Circassians and Turks would deteriorate because of İbrahim Hakkı’s policies. 
However, the Porte and the Sultan himself believed they could influence the Circassians, 
believing they would gain their support, since they still had an important place in their 
hearts and minds.546 
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After the nationalist forces attacked İzmit on 28 June 1921,547 İbrahim Hakkı and 
his armed group left the city. However, they were unwelcome in Istanbul due to their 
activities during his governorship in the region. Some of them had attacked villages in 
İzmit along with Greek and Armenian bandits. Therefore, a group was arrested in Istanbul 
upon arrival; including Maan Mustafa.548 It is still not clear whether İbrahim Hakkı 
remained in Istanbul or if he went straight to Midilli (Lesbos) in the Aegean Sea when he 
left İzmit along with Greek forces. However, one thing was obvious: his service as an 
Ottoman governor finished when he left İzmit. A new stage had begun in his life, with 
his settlement in Midilli and collaboration with Greek forces. His aim was now to 
mobilise the Circassian population of Western Anatolia politically. His position changed 
from one of a loyal Circassian subject of the Sultan to a Circassian activist/nationalist 
with the objective of establishing an autonomous structure in the Greek occupied zone of 
Anatolia. To achieve this aim, he prepared several charters, a booklet focused on ‘the 
Circassian nationalist movement in İzmit’ under his governorship, and several proposals 
for the Circassian Congress while in Midilli.549 As will be seen below, this attempt 
affected the lives of hundreds of Circassians rather negatively. 
İbrahim claims in his writings that April 1920 was the date upon which the 
Circassian nationalist movement had begun. The movement had two important 
characteristics, its Islamic and Circassian identity. The Circassians were loyal to the 
Caliph because they were Muslims. Their identity was also important, as it was necessary 
to retain their nationalist values against Turkish nationalism.550 Moreover, according to 
this narrative, the Circassian fighters (mujahedeen, mücahid) were already fighting for 
                                                          
547 http://www.kocaeli.gov.tr/ortak_icerik/1/tarih/kocaeli%20tarihi/index.html page 4.  
548 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-2/39, document 1, 29 June 1337 (21 June 1921).  
549 Çule İbrahim Hakkı, Efkar-ı Umumiyeye Bir İzah ve Muarızlara Cevab, Şark-ı Karib Çerkesleri 
Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Beyanname ne Nizamname-i Esasiyesi, Çerkeslik Hareket ve Teşebbüs-i 
Ahirinin Esbab ve Sevaiki Tarihçesi, 1922. As it can be seen that İbrahim Hakkı used three different titles 
for the booklet. I will use the first one to refer the booklet.  
550 Ibid. 3.  
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the Sultan/Caliph against the Anatolian Turkish nationalists (Kuva-yi Milliye), who were 
recognised as rebels by the Istanbul government. The fighters kept Düzce, Bolu, Gerede, 
Safranbolu, Mederni, Hendek, Akyazı, Adapazarı, Sapanca, Kandıra, Karamürsel, and 
Yalova.551 He continued that they did not fight alone; a number of other Muslim groups 
also joined them in the fight against Ankara. Because of his success organising the anti-
Ankara movement, İbrahim Hakkı was appointed as the official governor of İzmit in 25 
April 1920 by the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Paşa.552 
The Circassian opposition was supported by Damad Ferid and Sultan Vahidettin. 
Both favoured signing a peace agreement with the Allies to avoid another war, since, 
according to them, people had had enough of war and the state had little any power to 
sustain an armed struggle. For that reason, both agreed with the Circassian intention to 
fight against the nationalist forces.553 However, the Ottoman Porte and the Ministry of 
War mostly consisted of supporters of the Kuva-yi Milliye. They tried to prevent 
Circassian attacks on the nationalists. Subsequently, Damad Ferid feared the Circassian 
movement might represent a greater danger to the empire than Mustafa Kemal’s 
movement.554 For this reason, the only force under the Sultan capable of fighting Mustafa 
Kemal was not given adequate support to fight against Ankara. The towns taken by 
Circassians were then retaken by Ankara.555  
Although Istanbul was under British occupation, İbrahim Hakkı’s relationships 
with the British made Istanbul government uncomfortable. He was rather close to the 
British and was not controlled by the Ottoman Porte. Several Ottoman governments 
attempted to remove İbrahim Hakkı from office. On 6 July 1920, Grand Vizier Damad 
Ferid Paşa tried to appoint former Antalya governor İhsan Adli Bey as the governor of 
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İzmit; however, he failed to do so.556 The successor to Damad Ferid, Tevfik Paşa, on 11 
November 1920 assigned Abdülvahab Bey to İzmit to replace İbrahim Hakkı. However, 
Abdülvahab Bey was prevented from coming to İzmit by İbrahim Hakkı’s men, as 
mentioned above.557 Abdülvahab reported that İbrahim Hakkı had a relatively warm 
relationship with the British and had some Circassian and Abkhazian military groups 
around him.558 The Porte also applied to the British Forces in Istanbul to remove him; 
however, the British did not.559 Thus, İbrahim Hakkı was not just a governor of İzmit, he 
received British support and backing from groups of armed Circassians and Abkhazians, 
making him seem rather like a feudal lord. Although he was in İzmit, which is about 100 
km from Istanbul, the Porte could not assert its authority over him.  
Ibrahim claims that due to the rise of Turkish nationalism in Ankara, the 
Circassians supported the Istanbul government and the Sultan. The Adapazarı-Düzce 
incidents were example of this support. According to him, on 11 June 1920, the Circassian 
government (Hükümet-i Çerakkisiye) was set up in İzmit; it lasted until 27 June 1921.560 
When the Greeks had to leave İzmit in June 1921, İbrahim Hakkı and his supporters asked 
for help from the Ministry of Interior in Istanbul, however help was not forthcoming as 
he claims in his own hand. He used this situation to demonstrate the changing policy of 
the Sultan, which was to not assist the Circassians, but to replace Islam with ‘Turkishness’ 
as the main ideology of the state.561 However, İbrahim Hakkı already had been involved 
in prior disputes with the Istanbul government. As noted, his relationship with the 
government had deteriorated and he had been unwilling to accept Istanbul’s decision to 
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replace him as governor ever since June 1920.562 He sent the newly appointed governor 
of İzmit back to Istanbul. Although both İbrahim Hakkı and Istanbul were anti-nationalist, 
the stubborn behaviour of İbrahim Hakkı created many problems between him and 
Istanbul.  
It is also worth mentioning that the Istanbul government refused to help the anti-
nationalist Circassians and İbrahim Hakkı when the Ankara forces took on İzmit. They 
were assisted by Greek forces instead. The Greeks took them from İzmit to settle in 
Midilli. İbrahim Hakkı set the Association for the Strengthening of Near Eastern 
Circassian Rights (ASNEC, Şarkı Karip Çerkesleri Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) in July 
1921. He prepared the charter of the Association, which stated that every North Caucasian 
(Adige, Abkhaz, Oset, Laz, Chechen, Lezgian, Kumuk and others) had a right to be a 
member of the Society.563 He tried to show the Greeks that there was Circassian 
opposition to the Kuva-yi Milliye from the beginning, and that they came together around 
him as the centre of the movement. 
The deteriorating situation between İbrahim Hakkı and the Istanbul government 
was arguably the trigger for the birth of ASNEC. At the beginning of the process, the 
reason for establishing the association was not one based on ideology or ethnicity. 
Ethnicity took an important role only later, after problems began with the Istanbul 
government. In his own writings, İbrahim Hakkı mentions that the Circassians had no 
problems living with an Ottoman identity,564 since the Ottoman identity was intentionally 
constructed as a political identity of the subjects of the empire. The Ottoman and 
Circassian identities did not clash, and ‘Ottomanness’ proved an umbrella identity for the 
subjects of the empire. Under this umbrella, every religious and ethnic group had its own 
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identity. The Circassian identity was an ethnic and cultural one. However, according to 
İbrahim Hakkı, when the Ottomans began to follow the policy of Turkishness, the 
Circassians also began following their own way, triggering a need for Greek assistance.565 
Until the ‘wrong people’ came to power in the empire, the Circassians were very loyal to 
the Ottomans. Unfortunately, since they had to leave the Ottoman Empire due to the 
problems they had experienced during the previous two years, they began to establish 
their own nationalist organisations.566 This led Ibrahim Hakkı to begin to develop 
‘Circassianness’ as a political identity. İbrahim Hakkı also intentionally exaggerated the 
nationalist spirit of the Anatolian movement. While there were nationalist MPs, 
bureaucrats, and officers in the movement, the main reason for most people going to 
Ankara was to save the empire and the Sultan/Caliph from the occupation. The 
participants in the national movement and in the Assembly in Ankara consisted of 
different ethnic and religious groups. İbrahim Hakkı ignored these points to legitimise his 
own attempt to pursue attempts to carve out a new political niche for himself.  
Despite the fact that the Sultan and some other groups in Istanbul opposed helping 
Ankara, the Porte supported it. Consequently, he was the governor of İzmit; and the 
Circassians came together to support him. The Circassians had to defend themselves with 
the Greek forces against the Kuva-yi Milliye, because they encountered a lack of support 
from the Istanbul government.567 They moved to Midilli to seek political asylum from the 
Greek government.568 The Circassians had suffered for the previous 8 years from state 
pressure, ever since the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa (11 June 1913) up until the 
Kuva-yi Milliye (1919).569 It can be said that Ibrahim Hakkı aimed to create a discourse 
claiming the Circassians had been victims of the Ottoman State’s policies over the 
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preceding decade. This was partly true; however, not only the Circassians, but also other 
groups in the empire had been placed in a difficult situation by the conflict and wars 
during the previous decade. 
This period was already one of ‘perception wars’ between rival groups. İbrahim 
Hakkı joined in this, by declaring that the Istanbul government had altered its policy to 
accept Turkish nationalism. His aim was to strengthen his hand against criticism for his 
movement that came from the Istanbul government and other Circassians. Some 
Circassians took up important positions in the Ottoman army and bureaucracy. To prevent 
reactions from them, İbrahim Hakkı blamed the so-called nationalist policies of the Porte.  
 
B) The Congress 
Adequate attention has not yet been paid by historians from inside and outside of 
Turkey regarding the Circassian Congress. This incident was only mentioned in some of 
the scholarly works covering the period.570 It can be said that the congress was an attempt 
by a group of notables who thought Greek occupation and British support would be 
permanent in the region. It was not possible for them to work with the Ankara 
government. The aim of the congress was to obtain Greek support. However, the congress 
was not expected to lead to a separatist movement among the Circassians of Turkey. 
There was no mass support from the majority of Circassians.571 Rather, it can be 
characterised as a more limited political move by some notables in the Düzce-Adapazarı, 
Bilecik and Gönen-Manyas region. Other Circassians, including those who lived in the 
Black Sea region, Central Anatolia and South Anatolia did not participate in this congress, 
and they may have been entirely unaware of it.  
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 When Ankara took İzmit from the Greek and British forces on 28 June 1921, 
İbrahim, as governor, had to leave the city. İbrahim aimed to create an autonomous 
structure under Greek occupation, and moved to Midilli to work with the Greeks. He 
prepared the first declaration of the ASNEC in Midilli to the Greek government. In this 
declaration, İbrahim Hakkı underlined that the Circassians had left the North Caucasus 
because of the Russian occupation of the region and settled in the Ottoman Empire in the 
1850s and 1860s. They were more loyal to the Ottoman sultanate than even the Turks. In 
the empire, the Circassians took on important positions in the bureaucracy and military. 
However, when incompetent individuals came to power, the co-existence of different 
ethnic and religious groups within the empire was in danger. Like the other groups in the 
empire, the Circassians had now begun to carve out their own path.572 Despite the 
Ottoman Sultan’s opposition, the Porte had allied with the Kemalists; therefore, İbrahim 
Hakkı claimed, the Circassians were gathering around him to fight the Kemalists.573 
From this declaration, it seems that İbrahim Hakkı was trying to legitimise his 
movement by accusing the Porte of pursuing ‘Turkishness’ policies. He also used the 
historic exile of the Circassians574 as an analogy with the current situation they faced. In 
the former case, the Circassians were massacred en masse and forced to leave the North 
Caucasus, where they had had their own principality and structures. However, in the 
Ottoman period the Circassians had lived for a long time as subjects of the Sultan, equal 
to other groups. They were not treated by the Ottoman Porte in the same way as they had 
been by the Russian forces. However, İbrahim Hakkı now used the Circassian exile to 
reach into the emotions of the Circassians. He aimed to convince the Greeks that the 
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Circassians fought against the Ankara government without mentioning all those who had 
supported the Ankara government.575 The aim of İbrahim in preparing this declaration 
was to ensure that ASNEC would be recognised by the Greek government as legitimate.  
Some Circassian local notables also supported the Greek-Circassian alliance 
proposed by İbrahim; there had been a previous agreement between several Circassian 
notables (Beys) and the Greek occupation forces. According to that agreement, İzmit, 
Bolu, Biga and the Bandırma region would be governed by both Greeks and Circassians 
together under British control.576 Furthermore, in the İzmit-Adapazarı region, it was 
argued in the agreement, would be retaken with the support of Circassians. The Greeks 
supported Çerkes Bekir and Ragıb577 in pursuance of this aim. However, they did not 
succeed in recapturing the region from the nationalists.578 Nevertheless, the intention is 
clear: anti-nationalist Circassians had tried to influence the Greeks by exaggerating their 
impact on Circassian society as a whole. They had declared to the Greeks that there were 
about five thousands Circassian under their influence. However, this did not accurately 
reflect reality.579 
On the other hand, the activities of İbrahim Hakkı had been harshly criticised by 
leaders of the Society for Circassian Mutual Aid (Çerkes Teavün Cemiyeti) such as Müşir 
Fuad Paşa. He underlined that the society represented the Circassians, not İbrahim Hakkı; 
he also underscored that İbrahim Hakkı had been rejected by the society and was therefore 
to be considered shameless. Ultimately, only 300-400 Circassians joined his movement, 
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and the other Circassians paid little attention to his activities.580 It is worth mentioning 
that Müşir Fuad considered İbrahim Hakkı, Ahmed Anzavur and Şah İsmail in the same 
category: as having no relations with ‘Circassiannes’ (Çerkeslik). Thus was because their 
activities could not be linked with the remainder of the Circassian community who were 
loyal to their state and their people.581 One can argue that Müşir Fuad Paşa attempted to 
simplify anti-nationalist Circassian activities by citing that a ‘mere 300-400 people’ were 
backing İbrahim Hakkı, ignoring many Circassians’ broken relationships with the Ankara 
government. He aimed to prove the anti-nationalist Circassians’ marginalisation. While 
only a small number of the hundreds of thousands of Circassians in Anatolia worked with 
the Greeks, one could argue that the majority of Circassians favoured Istanbul and the 
Sultan/Caliph and not the Ankara government, and so could easily be mobilised during 
this period, as seen in the Anzavur incident and the Adapazarı-Düzce incidents. 
 
C) The Declaration by Congress  
There was also an internal struggle among the anti-nationalist Circassians.582 This 
centred on who would lead the congress. One group supported Kazım Bey from 
Manyas/Yeniköy. Another group, which Takığ Şevket and his men dominated, supported 
Çerkes Ethem. The commander of the Bandırma branch of the Greek occupation forces 
unsuccessfully sought a middle way between the two. He asked for Ethem’s help, but 
Ethem and his brother Reşid convinced Şevket not to interrupt the congress.583 Although 
only a very small number of Circassians joined the group, the congress was known as ‘the 
Circassian club’ among the people.584 The club was not only representative of the 
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Circassians; it also consisted with other people working with the Greek and the British 
forces. Some Circassians, for example those in Manyas (which was an important centre 
of the Circassian club), opposed the club. Yusuf Bey, from Haydar village, Çerkes İsmail 
Bey and Hafız Ahmed Efendi from Demirkapı were all arrested by the Greeks and exiled 
to Greece due to their opposition.585 
 The majority of the participants of the Circassian Congress (24 October 1921) 
were from the Düzce-Adapazarı region. Three non-South Marmara originating Circassian 
families dominated the congress. The families from Çule, Bağ and Maan were all 
residents of the East Marmara and West Black Sea regions (Düzce, İzmit, Adapazarı and 
Eskişehir) and well-known families among the Circassians.586 The most prominent 
figures at the Congress were (Pşevu) Reşit Bey (Çerkes Ethem’s brother) and the old 
governor of İzmit (Çule) İbrahim Hakkı (who was also the preeminent person of the 
association and at the congress). On 11 October 1921, 24 people came together as 
members of the congress in İzmir. The members then made a declaration (the participants 
of this congress were from the Greek occupied zone of Anatolia). Although hundreds of 
different Circassian families lived in the region, only 15 Circassian families were 
members of the congress. It is necessary to quote from the declaration at length:  
The authorities signed below are the representatives of the Circassian people of western 
Anatolia, which is today under the Greek occupational army, [and in particular of ] 
Balıkesir, Bandırma, Erdek, Gönen, Biga, Kirmasti, Mihaliç [Karacabey], Bursa, İnegöl, 
Yenişehir, Aydın, Manisa, Izmir, Eskişehir, Kütahya, Afyonkarahisar as well as İzmit, 
Adapazarı, Hendek, Düzce, Bolu and their environs. They are also the founders of ‘The 
Association for the Strengthening of Near Eastern Circassian Rights’ [which is] sanctioned 
by the Greek government. This meeting, which is in the form of a congress, undertakes its 
national rights as a minority based on the national rights as determined by the national 
principles accepted and declared by the Great Powers at the end of the Great War. The 
representatives ask for their national demands with the declaration that the Circassians 
will seek refuge under the Allied Great Powers, who agreed among themselves to force 
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Separatism, Violence, and Collaboration acceptance [of these rights] of the losing states, 
and its partners, in particular the Greek government. 
The population of Circassians today residing in Anatolia is at the very least two million. 
Circassians defend and maintain their national traditions through language, customs, 
feelings and civilization...They are in the contemporary family of civilizations and are a 
part of the white race and the distinguished Aryan family....  
Upon the collapse of the Arab government and upon the decision of the Egyptian 
government in Cairo, the Circassians were continuously in the governments that were 
established in the Arab lands, North Africa and Syria for three centuries. In the Caucasus, 
which is their national homeland, the Circassians formed a republic [which was] 
independent administratively and politically. They are the famous fighters [who] 
continuously fought for twenty years against the Russian Empire, under the administration 
and command of the well-known Sheikh Shamil (Şeyh Şamil), who saw the danger of the 
Russian invasion.  
A population of two million Circassians from the northern and western Caucasus, which 
was composed of three million people, was suspicious of [Russian actions] and bit by bit 
emigrated to Turkey (at that time the Sublime Porte extended a protective invitation). The 
one million people that stayed in the North Caucasus have today grown to a population of 
three million according to Russian statistics. 
 According to calculations, the two million Circassians who immigrated to Turkey would 
have risen to a population of between three to six million. Unfortunately, today it is closer 
to two million. The reason why is this: It is extremely clear that there were tragedies in 
transport as a result of mismanagement, which is impossible for the Ottoman government 
to deny. As a result of being sacrificed to these catastrophes, the Circassians have been 
denied four million of its population. 
 Thirteen years before with the institution of constitutional rule, the Turkish administration 
became bereft of correct policies. Now filled with feelings [stemming] from Turkishism and 
Turanism, Turkish administrators followed at this unique moment in history a false policy 
of terrorism, by means of Turkification, towards the various Ottoman nationalities. With 
the destruction of the nationalities and the destruction of the vital security of non-Turks, 
the Circassians were stirred with a just grievance coming from a ‘pure desire of self-
preservation’. Because of these continuous calamities, Circassians have [moved towards] 
a national goal of self-preservation and commit themselves to armed resistance against the 
mass murder of the Circassian nation.  
Because of this, Circassians have lost thousands of their precious children. Their 
property and animals have been stolen and their villages burned. In short, Circassians 
have been and continue to be in a state of defiance in this war despite being allotted no 
sanctuary and the destruction and seizure of their property. However, it is not [the case] 
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that Circassians did not join the world war either as commanders or as soldiers with their 
farm animals. But like various other nations, they were forced by their feelings and by the 
law. Nevertheless a very small portion of Circassians joined the Anatolian revolutionaries 
(filled with false feelings) right after the ceasefire. Mustafa Kemal [says] his movement 
supports the foundation of the sultanate, yet the Kemalists are seen and understood as a 
movement against humanity and with false policies. Regretfully, a very small number of 
Circassians have entered into the service of this movement. 
 The Circassians in the Sublime Porte, who continue to support the Caliphate, are 
especially working together with the Kemalists. Despite this self-sacrifice, [the Porte] still 
neglects the Circassians. After not seeing that they will be saved, the Circassians decided 
correctly and naturally to join the Greek army, which promises to preserve them, in the 
occupation zone. (There is no doubt that Albania and the Arab States similarly sought 
foreign saviours well before). These Circassians, who have struggled for a year and a half 
and who have saved thousands of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims from mass murder, 
should be praised for their services. 
 The understanding Greek government, which is included in the highest levels of civilization 
and humanity among nations, recognizes no difference among Circassians, Armenians and 
especially Rum. It has provided for the welfare of Circassian immigrants and refugees in 
the form of substance and settlement. 
 It is fitting to remember, with thanks and with kind words, those who aid and extend trust 
to our countrymen taken as prisoners of war, those under the submission of Kemalist 
oppression and to the Circassian people living in areas under the administration of the 
military occupation since the days the Greek government set foot in Anatolia.  
As a consequence of these kind actions, the Circassians hope and request that, because 
of their convictions, they be included in the understanding of civilization and their legal 
and human rights be defended. These things have been [discussed] face to face between 
the Circassians, which is a secular nation, and the Rum peoples. 
 The goals of this petition are:  
 
A. Recognition of our national existence. 
B. To make known that the secular Circassian nation lives in constant danger. 
C. To advance the demand that the Circassians wish to live as an element of peace under 
Greek protection in order to protect the Circassians of the Near East from the sins of the 
Turkish administration. [This is in response to] the Ottoman government which was a 
warring and tumultuous element in Europe and the Near East, both within and without, 
which denied a competent, modern and civilized administration and which collapsed 
because of the mismanagement of the sultan over the last three hundred years. [This 
continued with] the constitutional government, which stood in the place of the Ottoman 
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government, which insisted, under the extreme Turkists, that it did not recognize the human 
rights of non-Turks in Anatolia. This is an impossible denial of the truth according to the 
civilized world.  
As a consequence, our congress requests a statement to the petitioners, who expect action 
with impatience, regarding the acceptance of our demands which are national [in nature] 
according to the Allied Great Powers and their partners. 
 1. The application of the laws regarding the guarantee of human rights to minorities to all 
Circassians, laws that were accepted and proposed among the states following the war and 
that was to be brought into the Near East.  
2. The imposition of protection under the civilized Greek government [and] of the desired 
[fulfilment] of the predestined unity of the Circassian nation with the Rum nation, which 
has been agreed upon. The Greek government hopes by force to [further] the progress and 
development [of these two nations]. 
3. The rendering on an indemnity from the Turkish government to the Circassian nation 
for all the damages incurred.... 
4. The participation of our representatives in the peace conference in order to negotiate 
our national demands. 
 
The following individuals undersigned the document.  
 
Adapazarı representative— (Bag) Talustan Bey  
Izmit representative— (Çule) ˙ Ibrahim Bey 
Izmit representative— (Çiyo) Kazım Bey 
Hendek representative— (Bag) Osman Bey 
Düzce representative— (Maan) Ali Bey  
Düzce representative— (Hamete) Ahmet Bey  
Kandıra and Karasu representative— (Maan) Şirin Bey 
Yalova–Karamürsel representative— (Ançok) Yakup Bey  
Bilecik representative— (Bag) Rifat Bey 
Eskişehir representative— (Bag) Kamil Bey  
Geyve representative— (Çule) Beslan Bey  
Bursa representative—Harunelreşit Efendi  
Biga representative— (Ançok) İsa Nuri Bey  
Gönen representative— (Lampez) Yakup Efendi 
Gönen representative—Hafız Sait Efendi of the Regional Committee  
Erdek representative— (Şahabel) Hasan Bey  
Bandırma representative— (Neçoku) Hasan Bey  
Bandırma representative— (Brau) Sait Bey  
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Bandırma representative— (Berzek) Tahir Bey 
Balıkesir representative— (Bazadog) Sait Bey 
Manisa representative— (Pşev) Reşit Bey  
Aydın representative— (Kavaca) Hüseyin Bey  
Kütahya representative— (Açofit) Sami Bey’587 
 
The text, which was sent by İbrahim Hakkı to the Greek government in Midilli, 
provided the basis of this declaration. However, in the three months between July 1921 
and October 1921, some changes were made to it. Thus, there are some differences 
between the first version of the declaration written by İbrahim Hakkı and the final version 
of it (as quoted above). In the first version of the declaration, it was mentioned that 
Circassians, Kurds and Turks, who were also in opposition to the Kemalists, would live 
peacefully in Western Anatolia. However, in the final edition, the reference to Turks and 
Kurds had disappeared. The only emphasis was on the Circassians, since the movement 
had transfigured to become an ethnic one. Another important emphasis was on the 
Circassians who had fought for Ankara. In the first edition, it was stressed that they had 
left Ankara, and returned to the Porte, Sultan and Circassianness (Çerkeslik588). However, 
in the final version of the text, the words ‘Porte’ and ‘Sultan’ were excluded from the text 
and only Circassianness remained.589  
The vice governor of Aydın province informed the Porte that a group of 
Circassians had come together at the seaside in İzmir (Kordon) in a coffee house 
(Kainfoti’nin kahvesi).590 The gathering was organised by İbrahim Hakkı Bey. Although 
Ethem was not one of the signatories to the declaration, his brother Reşid and his men 
had participated in the meeting.591 The decision was taken by the participants that they 
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would not recognise the Ottoman government, but would recognise Greek rule instead. 
The Vice Governor did not take the meeting seriously, since there were only 25 
signatories who had been supposed to represent all the Circassians in the region.592  
The other Circassians, or those still loyal to the Sultan, then criticised the congress 
and its participants, defining them as ‘good-for-nothings’ ‘Serseriler’. They underlined 
that the Circassians were still loyal to the Caliph along with the Turks, and that the 
congress and its participants in no way represented the Circassians. They also declared 
that those who participated in the Congress were simply a few people working for their 
own ends, with no intention to benefit the Circassians.593 The majority of the loyal 
Circassians of the Ottoman Empire remained as either military men or bureaucrats. After 
the declaration by loyalist Circassians, two leading and two regular members of the 
Circassian Congress prepared an additional text. In this text, which was signed by 
Talustan Bey, İbrahim Hakkı,594 Mehmed Sami and Mehmed Said drew an analogy 
between their own movement and the Arab independence movement. According to the 
text, during WWI, the Arabs had sought the help of the Allies to protect their nation 
against increasing Ottoman burdens and atrocities. The Circassians now encountered the 
same problem and so sought Greek help.595 They also criticised loyalist Circassians who 
remained silent as their fellow Circassians were being hanged by nationalist forces during 
clashes in İzmit and the surrounding areas.596  
 
 
                                                          
clear what they referred to by using the term ‘Circassian government’ to refer to the Circassian Congress 
or not.  
592 BOA.DH.KMS. 60-3/26, document 2, 3 Kanunievvel 1337 (3 December 1921). 
593 Çule İbrahim Hakkı, Efkar-ı Umumiyeye Bir İzah ve Muarızlara Cevab, Şark-ı Karib Çerkesleri 
Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Beyanname ne Nizamname-i Esasiyesi, 26. Vakit newspaper 29 rebiülevvel 
1340 – 30 Teşrinisani 337.  
594 While Talustan Bey was the head of the association, İbrahim Hakkı was its vice precedent. ‘An 
explanation to the public’, Çule İbrahim Hakkı, p.32. 
595 Çule İbrahim Hakkı, Efkar-ı Umumiyeye Bir İzah ve Muarızlara Cevab, Şark-ı Karib Çerkesleri 
Temin-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Beyanname ne Nizamname-i Esasiyesi, 9 Rebiülahır 1340, 32.  
596 Ibid. 30.  
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2 – Circassian Opposition in the Western Anatolia  
Following the Turkish – Greek War, Ankara still had difficulty consolidating its 
authority in South Marmara. To gain control of the region Ankara employed very harsh 
policies against its opponents. Execution by shooting was commonplace during both the 
war and in the years immediately following. On 5 September 1922, Ankara government 
forces advanced towards Gönen, where the nationalists were exposed, and opened fire on 
the Circassian and Christian districts in the town as a skirmish erupted between 
nationalists and local armed groups. However, it is noteworthy that despite ten hours of 
clashes in which 150 people from the local forces were killed and 170 others were taken 
hostage; only one person was killed on the nationalist side.597  
Two approaches existed for the opponents of Ankara; one was to fight against the 
Kemalists to the end in collaboration with the Greeks, while the second was to leave the 
country because there was no opportunity to sustain their way of life. Initially many chose 
the first option; however, ultimately they had to take the second as Ankara’s power in the 
region grew. Some Circassians, such as Kirmastılı Çerkes Davut, Osman Çavuş of 
Akhisar/Selendi, Anzavur’s son Kadir, and Kısıkça Çerkes Hasan Bey, believed that the 
Ankara government’s policy was to wipe the Circassians from the region and this led 
them to collaborate with Greek forces.598 Irregular Circassian forces used Midilli Island 
as a staging ground to incite the people of the South Marmara against the Ankara 
government.  
There were a number of different opposition groups in South Marmara at the 
time.599 Although there were some intelligence reports on the activities and estimations 
                                                          
597 İbrahim Ethem Akıncı, Demirci Akıncıları, Yayınlar (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1978), 
360. Ahmet Efe, Çerkez Ethem (İstanbul: Bengi Kitap Yayın, 2009), 460. 
598 Akıncı, Demirci Akıncıları, 216-217. 
599 Some Circassians were also involved in banditry activities under the Greek controlled Thrace during 
the Greek forces leaving from the region. Maanzade Ali Bey, Bağzade Refik Bey, Parmaksız Torunzade 
Nezih Bey, Bağ Osman Bey, Karabigalı Kara Mustafa (one of Ferid Paşa’s servant) Koçzade Şerif Bey 
were the leading persons of the bandits TİTE. K53G71B71-3001, 04/10/1338 (1922).  
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of their numbers in the region, with one claiming that there were six thousand Circassian 
and Turkish anti-nationalists in the Kirmasti, Susurluk, Mihalliç and Gönen areas, it is 
very difficult to calculate the precise number of anti-nationalists.600 Towards the end of 
the war, although Greek occupation forces were often suspicious of Circassians activities, 
they nonetheless attempted to use some of the anti-nationalist Circassians in South 
Marmara against the Ankara government, to provide security in the region.601 A number 
of Circassians colluded with the Greeks, since they had already broken ties with Ankara, 
and their return to the nationalist cause was prevented by a decision taken by the cabinet 
in Ankara.602 The decision also stipulated that they would be executed if arrested by 
government forces.603 One could argue that both the Greeks and the British used armed 
groups to pressure Ankara during the Lausanne Peace Treaty negotiations held between 
Turkey and the Allies from November 1922 to July 1923.  
Among the armed groups, the support for the British and the Greeks was vital, 
because they had no opportunity to reconcile with the Ankara government. Some ex-CUP 
and Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa agents from among the anti-nationalist Circassians were seeking 
ways to start an insurgency to achieve their aims. One noteworthy example was a plan by 
Kuşçubaşı Eşref Bey. Eşref had split with the Ankara government and joined Ethem when 
Ethem had met with the Greek general in Dereköy/Susurluk on 28 January 1921.604 
Eşref’s activities between February 1921 and April 1923 remain unclear. However, in 
April 1923 Eşref came to the stage in Midilli as the founder of the Anatolian 
                                                          
600 TİTE. K57G55B55a001, 09/07/1338 (1922).  
601 TİTE. K50G180B180001, 18/6/1338 (1922). 
602 Just a year after Ethem was excluded from the national movement, he and other opposite Circassians, 
Abkhazians and Eşref Bey’s situation was discussed between the Ministry of War and the Cabinet. Even in 
the case of their pardon, Ministry of War asked from the Cabinet that whether they would be free to come 
to Anatolia or not. On 22 January 1922, the Cabinet declared that they would not be allowed to come to 
Anatolia. Ankara insisted that they should be far away from Anatolia. BCA. 30 18 1 1.4.45.16, 22. 1 
(January). 1338 (1922).  
603 Çerkes Hasan, Kazım, İbrahim, Hasan Fehmi, Ragıb were some of them TİTE. K59G137B137-1001, 
1 July 1338 (1922). 
604 Emrah Cilasun, “Baki ile Selam” Çerkes Ethem (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2004), documents (no page 
number). 
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Revolutionary Society (Anadolu İhtilal Cemiyeti). The Society was established in Athens 
and then moved to Midilli in April 1923.605 The aim of the Society was to start an anti- 
nationalist uprising with the support of the British and the Greeks in Western Anatolia 
and to overthrow the Ankara government.606 As with the other armed groups of the region, 
the majority of this group’s members were Circassian. However, it should be emphasised 
that the intention behind recruiting members from this group was not to create a 
Circassian national aspiration; this was something that did not exist among the group’s 
members. They benefitted from being Circassian in terms of easy network access and 
creation; however, one cannot say that they worked to advance the Circassianness 
(Çerkeslik) issue. 
The driving force of the group was to oppose the Ankara government, because 
they feared that if that government were to take complete control over the region it would 
either execute them or force them from it. One of Eşref’s aims was to create chaos in 
South Marmara and to overthrow the government. For this aim, a declaration was 
prepared for the military in order to convince the soldiers not to fight against them for the 
Ankara government.607 The declaration would be circulated in Istanbul with the support 
of the people, and at some houses and via centres of the Anatolian Revolutionary Society, 
which he hoped would open in Istanbul.608 The evidence shows that Eşref preferred to 
avoid fighting with the Turkish security forces, choosing instead to convince them to rise 
up with him against the Ankara government.  
To this end, he utilised his networks in Istanbul, İzmir, Thrace and Anatolia. He 
met with the different opposition groups to solidify the opposition movements in Western 
                                                          
605 ATASE.İSH. 1666/88, document no aa 23/06/1339. According to an intelligence report, there were 
300 anti-nationalists in Midilli who left İzmit for Midilli after the Ankara government’s forces took the 
city in July 1921. They consisted of Muslims, Circassians and Rums. TİTE. K48G17B17-1001, 
23/05/1338 (1922).  
606 The Greeks in particular helped them to create a chaos in western Anatolia BOA.HR. İM. 81/ 57. 23 
August 1339 (1923).  
607 ATASE.İSH. 1667/87 and 87aa 24/7/39. 
608 ATASE.İSH. 1667/87 and 87aa 24/7/39. 
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Anatolia. These included representatives of the Izmir Rum Association, Taşnak Party, 
Pontus Association (Agop Pargasiyan and Virnat Beys), various officers from the British 
intelligence such as Antoy, captains Grenuville and Harry, lieutenant Ralung and 
William, Arthur Korpa and others like Çerkes Mustafa, Çerkes Kazım, Cemaleddin, and 
Hayreddin Beys.609 The core of the organisation comprised Çerkes Ragıb, Çerkes Hurşid, 
Çerkes Osman in Sakız Island, Gürcü Muharrem and Çerkes İsmail in Athens.610 With 
this help, Eşref attempted to mobilise the Circassians of South Marmara against the 
Ankara government. He also approached local Circassian notables in the districts of 
Bandırma, Gönen and Manyas; however, as had happened when he was working for the 
nationalists in February 1920 in Adapazarı, the local notables paid little attention to his 
activities.611 He had no impact on the local notables of Bandırma, Gönen and Manyas. 
The Anatolian Revolutionary Society also tried to mobilise the anti-nationalists in 
Istanbul and issued copies of a declaration prepared by the society to promote their ideas 
among anti-nationalist circles in Istanbul.612 Rahmi Bey, the well-known former governor 
of İzmir, whose son had been kidnapped by Çerkes Ethem in 1919, was the main 
personality involved on the Istanbul branch of the committee. He mentioned that their 
aim was to overthrow Mustafa Kemal and to return the Ottoman Sultan to Istanbul.613 
Eşref and Reşid were also active in Athens and the various Greek islands. Ankara 
monitored their activities through officials in Athens. Furthermore, Ankara planned to 
place one of their agents in the group to pose as an anti-nationalist to gather 
information.614 The group later moved the headquarters of the committee to Bucharest 
under Hoca Vasfi’s control. 
                                                          
609 ATASE.İSH. 1666/ 88, document no aa 23/06/1339. 
610 ATASE.İSH. 1666/ 88, document no aa 23/06/1339. 
611 ATASE.İSH. 1666/88, document no ac 23/06/1339. 
612 ATASE.İSH. 1666/88, document no ac 23/06/1339. 
613 PRO/FO/ E11493/8401/44.document no 140,141, 11/9/1923.  
614 BOA.HR.İM. 77/44, document 2, 29 June 1923.  
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Çerkes Ethem, his brothers, Eşref, Anzavurzade Kadir and some other Circassians 
were known to gather in a pub in Athens sometimes.615 Kadir would be sent to the Ayvalık 
coast with four thousand Circassians living on Sakız island (Chios). This group also 
planned the assassinations of leading figures in the national movement, such as Mustafa 
Kemal, İsmet, Fevzi, Nureddin and Refet Paşas.616 Nevertheless, one should be cautious 
and note that some of the correspondents sent by the Turkish military services 
exaggerated the activities of Çerkes Ethem and the other Circassian dissidents in Greece. 
For example, it was mentioned in one report that four thousand Circassians living in Sakız 
might join Kadri’s military attack against the Ankara government.617 These four thousand 
Circassians were later settled in three villages in Athens and Thessalonica with their wives 
and children. The numbers referred to in the correspondence should most likely be viewed 
as hyperbole. According to other correspondence relating to the same report, Ethem, 
Reşid, Tevfik, and Eşref were expected to organise an attack against the Ankara 
government with 20,000 Circassians and 8,000 Greek volunteers.618 It can be said that if 
anyone had 20,000 armed people under his/her control at the time in South Marmara, 
he/she could easily set up his/her own state. It seems likely that the report was a huge 
exaggeration.  
Other active groups during this period, in the Biga – Gönen – Manyas areas, can 
also be listed: the Teğmen Mehmet Ali çetesi (‘Sub-lieutenant Mehmet Ali’s gang) in 
Manyas; the Kel Ali çetesi (which stood for ‘Ali the Bold’) in Gönen; and, lastly, the one 
led by Kanlı Mustafa, ‘Mustafa the bloody’ in Biga.619 Mehmet Ali’s group became 
depleted in Dikili following a battle with Ankara’s forces. After this Mehmet Ali (Takığ) 
                                                          
615 ATASE.İSH. 1666/53, document no aa 03/05/39 (1923).  
616 ATASE.İSH. 1666/53, document no aa, 03/05/39 (1923).  
617 ATASE.İSH. 1666/53, document no aa, 03/05/39 (1923). 
618 ATASE.İSH. 1666/53, document no aa, 03/05/39 (1923).  
619 Mülazim-i evvel Mehmet Ali Çetesi, Kel Aziz Çetesi, Kanlı Mustafa Çetesi see Mehmet Fetgerey 
Şoeneu, Tüm Eserleri (Kafdav: Ankara, 1997), 224-25.  
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Çerkes Şevket620 took control of the group. In December 1922, he was active in the 
Aegean Islands and tried to pass over to Western Anatolia. He also attempted to mobilise 
the Circassians of the region to sustain his anti-nationalist activities. From the shores of 
Dikili in the Aegean Sea, north of İzmir towards the north east of the region to Düzce in 
the coast of Black Sea, there were a huge number of Circassian settlements. While they 
were seen as loyal subjects of the empire in the late Ottoman period and were settled near 
the capital by the Ottoman government, with the emergence of the ‘new Turkey’ they 
were now viewed as threat. With this suspicion came the deportation of Circassians from 
South Marmara and the Adapazarı regions. The Circassians’ loyalty to the Ottoman State 
and armed opposition to a group of them against the nationalists were seen as problems 
by Ankara. With the declaration of the end of the Ottoman State by the Ankara 
government (after the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate on 1 November 1922) the armed 
Circassian groups became more active in the region than ever before. In the post Turkish-
Greek war period, the only armed threat to Ankara was from these armed groups. 
Although the Circassians of the region clearly did not favour the Ankara government, as 
clearly seen during the Anzavur incident and in related documents, neither did they 
support an armed struggle against them in the post-Turkish-Greek War era. 
The intelligence services of the Ankara government informed the nationalist 
leaders that Çerkes Şevket was planning to attack from Athens with 25 armed men, and 
that he was moving towards Edremit and Ayvalık in Western Anatolia via the Aegean 
Islands.621 His aim was to reach the Manyas, Kazdağı, Bozdağ area to prepare the people 
there for further uprisings – largely by gaining the support of local Circassians.622 Şevket 
                                                          
620 In some of the records he was known as Çerkes Ethem’s brother, which was not true but he was very 
close to Çerkes Ethem. He was from Mürüvetler village of Manyas, also known as Takığ Şevket or 
Mürüvetlerli Şevket.  
621 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no al 04/02/1339 (1923) According to this document, Çerkes Ethem 
was in Germany at that time.  
622 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no al and ak 27/12/38/ ATASE.İSH. 1667/7, 21/1/39 (1923). 
According to same report Ethem was in Limni and ready to come to the region after Şevket’s attack. 
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argued that with the participation of local Circassians the group would be able to start an 
uprising that would then lead to a broader insurrection against the nationalist 
government.623 The group came ashore between İzmir Foça and Dikili in a two-staged 
landing, on 18 and 20 December 1922 under Şevket’s leadership.624 The group also aimed 
to assassinate leading figures of the Ankara government. However, after a skirmish in the 
town of Kaplanköy between Şevket’s group and nationalists, two individuals from 
Şevket’s group were killed and nine captured by nationalist forces. Seven of these were 
questioned by the nationalists on the activities of the group.625 Although a leading 
member of the group was a Circassian, it also consisted of Turks. Eight people were 
Circassian from Manyas, while others were from Izmir, Ayvalık, Antalya, 
Afyonkarahisar and Konya.626  
The nationalists took further precautions following this event, fearing that those 
who could not captured would move to the Manyas region (eight of those captured were 
from Manyas).627 Thus, the government’s attention was turned towards Manyas. It is also 
important to mention that, for Ankara, not only was the South Marmara region under 
threat, but so was Adapazarı. Even here, there was a threat of an anti-nationalist raid led 
by Şevket’s group.628 This fear was related to the high population of Circassians, which 
meant that Şevket’s group could take action in the region. This created paranoia for the 
Ankara government regarding the Circassians in the region, who they thought could rise 
against the Ankara government. The First Army Command sent warnings to commanders 
                                                          
However, another intelligence report claims that Ethem was in Germany with his brother. ATASE.İSH. 
1666/26, document no al 04/02/1339 (1923).  
623 ATASE.İSH. 1667/7, 21/1/39 (1923). 
624 ATASE.İSH. 1667/7, 21/1/39 (1923).  
625 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no al and ak, 27/12/38 (1922).  
626 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no al and ak, 27/12/38 (1922). Their names were Şevket, Kadir (son 
of Mehmet), gendarme lieutenant Mehmed Ali, Harun Çavuş, Arab Hamdi, Abdül, Yusuf Efendi, Yusuf, 
Mehmed Çavuş, Mehmed Efendi (son of Mustafa), Bekir, Kadri, Bayram, Vapur İbrahim, İbrahim (son of 
Tahir), Mustafa, Mehmed, Tahsin. There are too many details about the members of the group, ranging 
from their ethnicity and age to what clothes they had on them at the moment. ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, 
document no am, ama.  
627 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no al and ak, 27/12/38 (1922). 
628 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no ah, 29/12/38 (1922).  
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in İzmit and Adapazarı that the Circassians should be observed closely but secretly by 
military intelligence. Due to the activities of the armed groups in the region, they should 
also be kept under strict control.629 If anyone in the region worked with armed 
Circassians, then the military authorities should be informed.630 The Circassian 
Association of Istanbul (Çerkes Teavün Cemiyeti) was also monitored by representatives 
of the Ankara government. As a consequence of Anzavurzade Kadir’s presence in 
Istanbul, the Ankara government suspected that he was attempting to contact members of 
other associations and the Circassians in İzmit-Adapazarı.631 
In this context, Şevket’s family members were harassed after he became involved 
in anti-nationalist activity in South Marmara, where he was branded a ‘traitor’ by the 
government. He, however, took revenge punishing those who claimed this, especially 
those who caused upset to his family.632 He hid in Söğütlü village,633 close to Gönen. 
However, a few days later, a villager from Söğütlü informed the gendarme of his 
whereabouts. The gendarme carried out military operations and he was killed on 7 June 
1923.634 His aunt and his aunt’s husband were arrested. His aunt was punished with a ten-
year sentence.635 Şevket’s killing by nationalist forces caused indignation among the 
Circassian residents of the area. The government then became concerned about an 
uprising in the region, since the majority of Şevket’s group was from the Gönen and 
Manyas region.636 
                                                          
629 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no ad 18/1/39(1923) and ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no ab, ac. 
It is also important to mention the Ankara government saw Georgians a similar threat as the Circassians. 
It was thought that Georgians could also join the Circassians armed groups. ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, 
document no aa.  
630 ATASE.İSH. 1666/26, document no ac. 
631 ATASE.İSH. 1534/139, document no aa, 28/11/38 (1922)-07/12/38 (1922).  
632 Oral History project by Kuban Kural, ‘Unutulan Geçmişin Peşinde: ‘Gönen – Manyas Çerkes 
Sürgünü’, interview with Gürol Demir, http://www.gusips.net/analysis/sozlutarih/4338-gurol-demir-
babam-yillar-sonra-kayseri-de-surgundeyken-dayimin-oturdugu-evi-buldu.html accessed 01/03/2015.  
633 Ibid.  
634 Şoenu, Tüm Eserleri, 224- 25.  
635 Fetgerey claims that Şevket’s aunt’s husband was not punished since he was not Circassian. Şoenu, 
Tüm Eserleri, 224-25.  
636 Kural, ‘Unutulan Geçmişin, interview with Gürol Demir 
http://www.gusips.net/analysis/sozlutarih/4338-gurol-demir-babam-yillar-sonra-kayseri-de-
surgundeyken-dayimin-oturdugu-evi-buldu.html accessed 01/03/2015.  
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Moreover, a second group came to the region from the port of Dalyan, which was 
close to the other Circassian settlements in South Marmara. The Circassian members of 
this group were not from the Gönen-Manyas region,637 and the group itself was centred 
in Greece.638 Their leader was Ali, and they had prepared a manifesto against the Ankara 
government. Another important group was led by Mustafa ‘the bloody’. Anzavur’s son, 
Kadir, was a member of this group. They tried to come to Biga through the British 
occupied zone of Çanakkale. However, they were attacked by nationalist forces around 
Biga, and some were killed, including Kadir. The remainder of the group were captured. 
Between 70 and 150 people were active in the band, 15 of whose members were 
Circassian.639  
 
 3 – Gönen-Manyas Deportations  
Ankara’s main policy when trying to halt the activities of the gangs was to destroy 
their sources of recruitment and financing. The Circassians were targeted by the Ankara 
government, which had tried to wipe their political and economic presence from the 
region in order to take effective control over the area and to cease bandit activity.640 When 
Anzavur came to the region bringing an uprising against the Ankara government in the 
early 1920s, he was supported by people from several villages: Muratlar,641 Keçeler, 
Bayramiç, Üçpınar, Karalar Çiftliği, Çerkes Keçidere, Karaağaçalan, Ayvalıdere, Hacı 
Menteş, Sızı Hasanbey, Çerkes Çalı Oba and Asmalıdere (Muhacir–Türk).642 Anzavur 
was not only supported by the Circassians of the region, but also by Turks and other 
                                                          
637 Şoenu, Tüm Eserleri, 225-227. 
638 Ibid. 225-227.  
639 Şoeneu, Tüm Eserleri, 226-227.  
640 Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores, 146.  
641 Several people from this village were executed by shooting by the Kuva-yi Milliye Kemal Özer, 74.  
642 Özer, Kurtuluş Savaşında Gönen. 72. A lieutenant, Mehmet Ziya Şahan, informed Kemal Özer about 
these villages. Most of these villages were deported by Ankara to eastern and central Anatolia in May and 
June 1923.  
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groups sympathetic to the anti-nationalist movement.643 The people here saw Ankara as 
a resource centre for gangs, which had to be removed from the region. Ankara hoped that 
by employing this policy, the birthplace of banditry in Western Anatolia would be 
destroyed. This security-centred policy brought about a collective punishment for many 
civilian Circassians in the region. Without differentiating between whether individuals 
supported the gangs or not, the Circassian villagers and the Circassians in otherwise 
ethnically mixed villages were exiled to Central and Eastern Anatolia. It should also be 
noted here that it was argued by some witnesses to the incident, that in order for the new 
state to develop an idea of a Turkish nation, a Turkish national grudge directed towards 
the Circassians proved useful, while also punishing their formerly close relationship with 
the Sultanate.644 
 Conversely, it can be argued that the anti-nationalist Circassians were stuck 
between the Greek forces and Ankara. Ankara had already concluded that they would 
have no place in South Marmara. Kuşçubaşı Eşref and Çerkes Ethem (although the latter 
was in Germany at the time), through his close connections with Çerkes Şevket and in 
view of Şevket’s presence in the region, led the nationalists to believe that Ethem too was 
active in the region. Their groups were clearly seen as security threats by the Ankara 
government, which believed that Eşref and Ethem would attempt to raise the Circassians 
of Biga and the Karesi regions against Ankara.645 On 7 May 1923, the Ankara government 
cabinet declared via a government order (Kararname) that anyone who informed the 
government of the activities of the Eşref and Ethem groups would be awarded 200 
Turkish liras. Alternatively, those who supported these armed groups would have their 
villages erased from region and would be deported to other parts of Anatolia.646 It should 
                                                          
643 Ibid. 72. Kemal Özer learned this information from the first secretary of the local court in Gönen, 
Sadık Aydınıoğlu.  
644 Şoenu, Tüm Eserleri, 193-194.  
645 BCA. 30 18 1 1.7.18.16, 7 May 1923.  
646 BCA. 30 18 1 1.7.18.16, 7 May 1923. 
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be underscored that this government order was announced a month before the Gönen-
Manyas deportations were carried out. It can also be argued that the removal of the 13 
Circassian villages from the region were based on this same government order. Ankara 
saw the Circassians as a security problem, whether they backed the anti- nationalist 
movement in the region or not. For Ankara, being a Circassian from the region meant one 
had was a potential rebel. Therefore, the government punished these individuals 
collectively without differentiating the innocent from the bandits. 647 If armed groups 
clashed with the army, the army would consider it reasonable to fire on the entire village. 
Due to the extraordinary situation in the region, the government took harsh decisions. 
Policies of intimidation from the government engendered fear among the Circassian 
residents of the region.648 They were encountering collective punishment carried out by 
the government. Without distinguishing criminals from the innocent, and women and 
children, the government chose to exile all the residents of entire villages.  
Takığ Şevket’s village Mürvetler was the first village to be deported en masse by 
the government. This occurred in December 1922. In addition, 13 other Circassian 
villages were deported to East and Central Anatolia. Fetgerey also suggests the 
populations of the 14 villages were exiled to Central and Eastern Anatolia because of their 
perceived links with the Anatolian Revolutionary Association.649 The exiled villages 
included those in Gönen: Üçpeykar (Üçpınar) 28 May 1923,650 Muratlar 5 June 1923; Sızı 
9 June 1923; Keçideresi 13 June 1923; Keçeler 17 June 1923. The exiled villages of 
Manyas included: Kızıl Kilise 7 June; Yeniköy 7 June; Dumye 7 June; Ilıca 11 June 
Karaçalılık 13 June Bolağaç 13 June; Değirmenboğazı 21 June Hacıosman 21 June. The 
                                                          
647 Merve Tram, Kollektif Cezalandırmanın Tarihi ve Bugününden Bir Kesit, 
http://www.gusips.net/blogger/2244-kolektif-cezalandirmanin-tarihi-ve-bugununden-bir-kesit.html 
accessed in 01/03/2015.  
648 Şoenu, Tüm Eserleri, 231-232.  
649 Şoenu, Tüm Eserleri, 222-223.  
650 From this village 45 people died during the exile due to the circumstances in the exile. Kural, 
‘Unutulan Geçmişin, interview with Hakkı Acı http://www.gusips.net/analysis/sozlutarih/4336-hakki-aci-
yaslilar-hic-bahsetmiyorlardi-bu-konulardan-eskiden-yasakli-konulardi-bir-yerde.html.  
169 
 
total number of exiled people was 3,500-4,000.651 If any of the Circassians were married 
to a Turkish person, they would also be exiled.652 In total, the 14 villages had cultivated 
around 40,000 acres of land. The land was extremely fertile in this region, and every 
village had also comprised of about one thousand animals (horses, cows, oxen, and 
sheep).653 The exiling of the 14 villages not only led to the economic destruction of the 
Circassians, but also accelerated their assimilation process, by weakening them as a 
community in terms of their identity and culture.  
After the exile had begun, some nationalist Circassians, those who had fought 
alongside the nationalists were also exiled.654 Bekir Sami (Günsav), who was also from 
the Manyas region, and one of the first persons to organise the national movement in 
Western Anatolia (but who then split with Mustafa Kemal) wrote two letters to Mustafa 
Kemal and Kazım Paşa to prevent the deportation of innocent Circassians, and those who 
had fought alongside the nationalists during the Turkish-Greek War. He underlined that 
there were many Circassians in the national movement from the Manyas region and that 
the government should be more careful when deporting Circassians, emphasising also 
that they should not be killed.655 The impact that these letters had is unclear, although 
subsequently, the Ministry of Defence issued a declaration stipulating that the relatives 
of those who had fought with the nationalists would not be exiled.656 It is clear that not 
all the residents of the villages were anti-Ankara. Esat Bey from Dereköy, for example, 
was the head of the Association of Defence of Rights of Gönen (Gönen Müdafa-yı Hukuk 
Cemiyeti), who had fought for the nationalists during wartime. When martial law was 
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declared in Gönen by the nationalists on 20 June 1920, he was appointed as head of a 
paramilitary unit that consisted of about 300 men and worked for the Kuva-yi Milliye. 
Later, he was killed in a clash by anti-nationalists while serving in the unit.657 
The conditions under which the villages were exiled were extremely cruel. For 
instance, the residents of Dereköy were forced to walk to Bandırma, a journey of three 
days. They gathered in Bandırma in an area akin to an open-air prison. After ten to fifteen 
days, they were then packed like sardines on wagons used to transport animals. Those 
from Dereköy were sent to Kayseri.658 Another 28 villages (10 were from Gönen villages 
and 18 from Manyas) were also informed by the government that they would also be 
exiled. 659 Only two were fully populated by Circassians. The remaining 26 villages were 
mixed, with Turks and others. However, only the Circassian populations of these villages 
were to be exiled. The Circassian residents of the villages sold their houses and land for 
low prices, since they would be exiled in a matter of days. However, the government 
changed its course and halted the second round of exiles.660 
The Gönen – Manyas exiles did not result in any massacres, as seen in the case of 
Dersim in the mid-1930s and the Armenian tehcir of 1915. However, although few people 
died or were killed during this exile, the incident remains etched in the memory of those 
descended from the exiles of the Gönen- Manyas region.  
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Conclusion  
The notion of autonomy was not welcomed by the Circassians. Only a group of 
Circassians who had already had problems with the Ankara government used the idea of 
autonomy to ensure their place in Anatolia in a Greek occupied zone. Those who backed 
the Circassian Congress had already fought against the Ankara government from early 
1920 onwards. They could imagine what punishment was in store for them once the 
Ankara government had finished fighting on other fronts. However, although the majority 
of Circassians did not support the Congress, they did not back the Ankara government 
either. The Congress was nevertheless unsuccessful in achieving its goals. With the defeat 
of the Greek forces, prominent figures of the Congress and the opposition more generally 
left Anatolia. However, in South Marmara the disorder, which was created by armed 
Circassians and their groups continued. The security of the region greatly concerned the 
Ankara government. Meanwhile, negotiations in the Lausanne were on going between 
Ankara and the Allies. The lack of security in the region could be viewed as a 
disadvantage to Ankara in these negotiations, and it was thus seen as necessary that the 
chaos cease as quickly as possible. To this end, Ankara made a decision that was 
detrimental to the local Circassians in the region: they were deported without due regard 
for who was a criminal and who was simply an innocent bystander. Ankara thus chose 
not only to terminate the bandit activities of the Circassians, but also to punish the 
Circassian residents of the Gönen-Manyas region indiscriminately, by exiling them to 
Central and Eastern Anatolia.  
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Chapter Six: The 150’ers, Circassians and the Turkish State 1924-1938 
 
Introduction  
  In the post-Turkish War of Independence period (1922), armed opposition was 
seen as more dangerous for Ankara than any political opposition. Therefore, regular 
armed Circassians of Adapazarı-Düzce and South Marmara were declared personae non 
gratae and were put on a list prepared in April 1924. The opposition of Circassians abroad 
on the one hand was a threat to Ankara, since they still had the capability to organise 
assassination attempts and uprisings in Anatolia. However, on the other hand, although 
they insisted on opposing Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalists, towards the 1930s they lost 
their capability to carry out armed activities and affect developments inside Turkey. 
However, the continuity of their opposition in the 1930s became useful for the Ankara 
government, as they made it possible to strengthen its support among people further and 
create unity around Mustafa Kemal, the cult character of the regime. This chapter will 
focus on the anti-nationalist activities of a group of Circassians from 1924 to 1938, and 
on the Turkish state’s treatment of the Circassians in the early republican period. In 1921 
with the exclusion of Ethem from the nationalist cause, the Circassian opposition 
increased its activities against Ankara, particularly towards Mustafa Kemal and his circle. 
This opposition continued until 1938, when members of the list of personae non gratae 
(the Yüzellikler), the so-called ‘150’ers, were pardoned by the state. Those who stood 
against the nationalists, such as the organisers of the Adapazarı-Düzce incidents, and 
those who were excluded from the nationalists by the Ankara government, such as Çerkes 
Ethem and Kuşçubaşı Eşref, came together against the Kemalist movement. Although 
they had previously encountered problems among each other, they now had a common 
enemy in the Kemalists. Çerkes Ethem, Tevfik, Reşit, Kuşçubaşı Eşref, his brother Çerkes 
Sami, Çule İbrahim Hakkı, Maan Mustafa, a group of Circassians and Abkhazians from 
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the western Anatolia region, and some Muslims of Anatolia provided the impetus behind 
this opposition. This opposition first appeared in the Greek occupied zone of western 
Anatolia, after which time it continued outside Turkey, as members of the group were 
deported by the Turkish government (having been declared personae non grate in 1924). 
This chapter will first focus on how the list of personae non grate was prepared by the 
Grand Assembly of Turkey, and the motivation for including 86 Circassian people661 on 
the list. Secondly, it will focus on the anti-Kemalist activities of those Circassians on the 
list, such as assassination attempts and the organisation of uprisings; and discuss how in 
response, their anti-Kemalist and more so anti-Mustafa Kemal activities were used by the 
Turkish state to strengthen support for Mustafa Kemal. Thirdly, the chapter will study 
how a policy from the Turkish state directed towards the Circassians was shaped by 
circumstances in the single party period when the regime restricted the expression of 
Circassian identity and language in public.  
 
1) Making the List of ‘Traitors’  
Anti-Ankara activities reached a highpoint in South Marmara in the post Turkish-
Greek war period between 1922 and 1923 (during the Lausanne negotiations). The groups 
of armed Circassians settled on the Greek island of Midilli in the Aegean Sea after the 
war, as mentioned in the last chapter. The anti-Ankara Circassians exacerbated the state 
of disorder that prevailed in Turkey. Although the state took harsh measures to prevent 
this, by deporting the Circassians to central and eastern Anatolia without differentiating 
between criminals and innocents in the spring and summer of 1923, gaining absolute 
control of the region took time. On the other hand, the punishment of the participants in 
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the Circassian congress, and that of other anti-Kemalist Circassians was not yet complete. 
The government took a further step to punish its wartime opponents.  
At the Lausanne Conference, the Allies forced the Ankara government to declare 
an amnesty for those who had opposed it during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-
1922). The state pardon was to be extended to all members of the Istanbul government, 
and all anti- nationalist bandits, with the exception of one hundred and fifty named 
individuals. Permission was given to the Ankara government by the Allies at the 
conference agreement. However, the decision about who should be on the list proved 
difficult for Ankara, since after almost two years of civil war and four years of occupation 
in Anatolia, many people could have been added, from western to eastern Anatolia, and 
from members of the Istanbul government to bureaucrats (including the significant 
number of bureaucrats, officials and officers who had worked under Allied rule). The 
decision making process was the subject of enormous discussion in the assembly in 
Ankara, which examined who should be put on the list.  
As a result of the discussion, four hundred and fifty people were decided upon by 
the assembly. The final version of the list included one hundred fifty people, decided by 
executives in Ankara. When one looks at the list, it emerges that a significant number of 
those on it were local people, and very few were important bureaucrats and political 
figures. The Ottoman family had already been deported by Ankara and the Sultanate was 
abolished when the list was being prepared by the cabinet and the parliament in April 
1924. Therefore, no one was added to the list from the Ottoman family. The criteria for 
the list were unclear. It can be seen that the participants of the Anzavur, Adapazarı-Düzce 
incidents, Circassian Congress, and local Circassians of the South Marmara (Gönen-
Manyas regions) were on the list. At least 86 names on the list were Circassians, the 
majority being local people and villagers. This prompts the question: why was the Ankara 
government mainly fearful of a group of Circassians? 
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Although the representatives of Turkey negotiated in Lausanne with the Allies to 
attain only a limited amnesty for those who had opposed it during the Turkish-Greek war, 
their demands were not accepted by the Allies, whose aim was to protect the minority 
groups and their wartime supporters.662 At the end of the Lausanne negotiations, the 
Ankara government had to accept that only one hundred and fifty people would be 
punished, and a pardon had to be issued for the rest. In the official Turkish historiography, 
only these 150’ers were to be considered ‘traitors’. However, the reality was much more 
complex than the official historiography suggests. Thousands of people who we know 
about from the official documents, newspaper records and assembly sessions’ records 
were anti-nationalist activists during the war, ranging from local bandits to the civil 
servants, military officials and politicians. Istanbul and the rest of the country were de 
facto occupied by the Allies immediately following the Mudros Armistice in November 
1918.  
Although the French and Italian occupation did not last long, the British and Greek 
occupation continued until November 1922 in western Anatolia, Istanbul, and part of the 
eastern Thrace. During these long four years, occupation forces worked with hundreds of 
Ottoman officials to restore order in Anatolia. One can claim that the Allies were not seen 
only as occupiers by some local people and officials. For them, the allies would be the 
new rulers of western Anatolia, since the people of Anatolia were already tired of war, 
having experienced more than ten years of it, since the disastrous times in North Africa, 
the Balkans, and Anatolia. In the post-WWI period, the Anatolian movement was not 
taken seriously initially by the Istanbul government and the local people. The nationalists 
were considered a continuation of the CUP, which was seen by the people as the cause of 
the current disastrous situation being encountered by the empire. Therefore, to admit the 
                                                          
662 Hakan Ozoglu, From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic : 
Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic (Westport, CT, USA: Praeger, 2011), 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10508639. 22.  
176 
 
existence of the Allied occupation meant the termination of a long war, offering an 
alternative to launching an adventure against the Allied supported Greeks with limited 
military power. However, history reveals that the latter circumstance was not simply an 
adventure. The nationalists won the war, both against their internal rival and the Greeks. 
Now the time had arrived for their opponents to pay the price. 
The personae non gratae list was prepared during a closed session of the assembly 
in April 1924. After two separate sessions to debate the issue, the MPs declared the names 
of the ‘traitors’. It was claimed by the assembly that the 150’ers had not recognised the 
assembly and its authority. The legal basis for their punishment was the High Treason 
Law of 29 April 1920 (Hıyanet-ı Vataniye Kanunu). According to the article, those who 
did not recognise the authority of the assembly were deemed to have committed high 
treason.663 To determine the members to be added to the list the assembly held a secret 
session on 16 April 1924. The demands for the session came from the Minister of Interior, 
Ahmet Ferit (Tek) Bey.664 On the day on which the issue of the 150’ers was discussed in 
the Lausanne negotiations, the Ministry of the Interior and the General Directorate of 
Security (Emniyeti Umumiyye Müdüriyeti) were already preparing the list. They 
demanded the names of those who had been involved in anti-nationalist activities during 
the Turkish-Greek War, and from towns that had either been occupied by the Allies and 
Greeks or involved in the incidents against Ankara. As a result of this process, six hundred 
names were determined by the ministry and the General Directorate of Security.665 It 
could be understood from Ahmet Bey’s speech that the classification of the list had 
already been completed by the ministers in a cabinet session. The list was classified by 
groups, such as Vahidettin’s Entourage, the cabinet members who signed the Sèvres 
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Peace Agreement, members of the Ottoman cabinet who organised the Kuva-yi İnzibatiye 
forces, and its high ranking military generals, Çerkes Ethem and his close circle, members 
of the Circassian Congress, the leading bandits, and the organisers of the three 
committees: the committee of Caliphate; the committee of Anatolia; and the committee 
of the Revolution.666 Furthermore, those who had committed high treason, some members 
of the local administration, the military, police, and journalists were also on the list, 
presented under separate categories.667 The final category was that of ‘other people’ (diğer 
eşhas). Akçoraoğlu Yusuf of Istanbul proposed the list should be prepared based on the 
principles which the assembly should decide (i.e. who was a traitor). However, the 
minister of the interior, Ferit Bey, responded by saying that those ‘people who were in 
the category of ‘other people’ are bandits etc. Would you like any other principle?’668 
None of the members of the Ottoman family were included on the list, since they had 
already been deported from Turkey after the law calling for ‘the abolishing of the 
caliphate and deportation of the Ottoman family from the Republic of Turkey’ was issued 
on 3 March 1924. With this law, every single member of the family, son-in-laws, and 
people whose mothers were related to the family were deported. Their Turkish 
citizenships were revoked and they were banned from entering Turkey.669  
Ferit Bey explained in the closed session that they had prepared four different 
lists. The first one included one hundred fifty names, the second one included three 
hundred, the third one included those who were to lose their citizenship, and the fourth 
one included all six hundred names. That is, he emphasised that they had six hundred 
names on the lists in total.670 The discussion continued during the session. İhsan Bey of 
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Cebelibereket and Mazhar Bey of Aydın claimed that if they tried to find every single 
person working against Ankara, then the list would consist of thousands of people.671 The 
cabinet considered that when the list was prepared not only those who had committed a 
crime against Ankara would be in the list, but also those who still had the potential to 
pose a threat to Ankara. Ferit Bey gave the example of the 42 people who had already 
been sentenced to death for high treason. They still had the potential to challenge 
Ankara’s authority in the region and to cause chaos.672  
One could also observe that the majority of the list consisted of local people. 
Ankara did not consider the Ottoman bureaucrats and military men to be as threatening 
as those who had the potential to rise up in the regions. Therefore, it is apparent that the 
chaotic situation in the Gönen-Manyas region and Circassian Congress was the most 
discomforting concern for Ankara. Those involved in the local anti-nationalist movement 
were also a threat since they were expected to continue their anti-nationalist activities and 
had the potential to mobilise more people. Under the title ‘other people’ (diğer eşhas) 
there were more than 30 local people from the Gönen and Manyas region. The majority 
of the names on this list were Circassian. The names were mentioned along with those 
from other villages, such as Mustafa Remzi of Düzakçı village. Although some of the 
villages had a mixed Turkish and Georgian population, the majority were populated by 
Circassians, and Ankara punished the Circassians due to their post-WWI activities and 
their participation in the Anzavur incident. Although some participants’ names were 
already mentioned during the session, a few were moved from the list later on since some 
political figures were put on the list. Some of the participants in the Anzavur incident 
were already sentenced to receive capital punishment. However, the Lausanne agreement 
did not allow Ankara to execute these individuals. Either they had to be pardoned, or they 
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must be added to the list of the so-called 150’ers. However, Ankara found a third way to 
punish them. Those who were not resident in Turkey at the time were accused of working 
for a foreign army. A group of those included on the list simply had their Turkish 
citizenship revoked since they had already left the country for Greece and had reportedly 
worked for the Greek army. This decision by the Cabinet resulted in ensuring just one 
hundred and fifty names remained on the list.673 
However, a criticism came from Ali Sururi Bey of Karahisari Şarki, who 
underlined that the list did not consist of political figures, but rather of members of the 
Liberal Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası). It was formed of bandits who could not harm 
the general public.674 At the end of the discussion over whether political figures should be 
on the list or not, Hulusi Bey of Karesi articulated that any Circassian named on it would 
be equal to a battalion of soldiers.675 Therefore, they should be added to the list and not 
the political and intellectual opponents of Ankara. Fikret Bey of Ertuğrul also opposed 
the current list, as it consisted of individuals who were not deemed capable politically. 
He argued that this was a matter of security, and that intellectual and political figures 
should be added to the list.676 It was also questioned during the session, why not a single 
Armenian or Rum (Anatolian Greek) was named on the list, as some MPs, such as, 
Saraçoğlu Şükrü of İzmir, argued that some Armenians and Rums had betrayed the 
state.677 However, the Lausanne Treaty stated that no non-Muslims, Armenians, Rums or 
Jews should be included on the list, even if they were involved in anti-nationalist activities 
during the Turkish-Greek war.678 Thus, to avoid further problems with the Allies, the 
Kemalist government chose not to include any Armenians or Rums on the list.  
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It can be understood from the session records that many MPs were not wholly 
aware of the details of the discussion regarding the potential members of the list. The 
Minister of Interior, Ferit Bey, apparently stated the names one by one while the MPs 
were talking, yelling, and shouting. When the turn came to name the participants of the 
Circassian Congress, Ferit Bey called the names using their Circassian family names, 
such as Lampad Yakup. Interestingly, despite being a member of the cabinet partly 
responsible for deciding who would be on the list, he did not know what these Circassian 
family names meant. He explained to the assembly that the Circassians used Greek names, 
and that these family names were Greek names.679 This assumption is mostly likely to 
have been based on a belief that the Circassians were heavily pro-Greek.  
It is also worth mentioning that not all anti-nationalists who posed a threat to the 
Ankara government appeared on the list. For example, the members of the Çapanoğlu 
family were not added, despite the incident organised by them in Yozgat being one of the 
most vicious to have taken place in the summer of 1920. If nationalist forces especially 
Çerkes Ethem had not succeeded in gaining control over the region and had suppressed 
the incident, it could have spread towards Ankara, the heart of the national movement. 
However, when he took control of the region, and set up a military court dozens of people 
were executed, and order was restored in favour of Ankara. However, Ethem was one of 
the names highest up the list and no member of the Çapanoğlu family was present there.680  
Ankara had declared Ethem a traitor on the basis that he went to the Greek-ruled 
region after his split with Ankara. It was risky for Ankara to simply drop his citizenship 
and prevent his return to Turkey based on this alleged ‘betrayal’, since Ankara was not 
be able to prove Ethem had ever served in the Greek Army. If Ethem worked for the 
Greek occupation forces, Ankara could apply the citizenship law and article 1044 
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(Tabiyet-i Osmaniyye Kanunnamesi), whereby a citizen who had worked for any other 
army rather than the Ottoman army could have their citizenship revoked without any other 
explanation. Therefore, placing Ethem on the list of personae non gratae provided a 
greater guarantee that he would be neutralised than would have been possible using article 
1044. Clearly, a political motive, i.e. to prevent Ethem’s return to Ankara, was the reason 
why he appeared on the list.681 Just a year after Ethem was excluded from the national 
movement (1922), the situation regarding him and the other oppositionists (the 
Circassians, Abkhazians and Eşref Bey) was already being discussed by members of the 
Ministry of War and the Cabinet in Ankara. In regard to their pardon, the Ministry of War 
asked the Cabinet whether they would be free to come to Anatolia or not. However, on 
22 January 1922, the Cabinet declared that they would not be allowed to come to 
Anatolia.682 Ankara insisted that they should be kept far away from Anatolia.  
When looking at the situation objectively, one can also claim that there were no 
substantial ideological differences between the Kemalists and some of 150’ers. Some of 
those on the list had once been affiliated with the CUP in its early years (as had the 
majority of the Kemalists in the post-1908 period). After the constitutional revolution of 
1908, the CUP did not take power directly. Rather it remained behind the scenes, acting 
as a check on power (Denetleme İktidarı) until the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa 
on 11 June 1913.683 However, with the growing authority of the CUP, some members 
broke with it. They were the victims of the repressive policies of the CUP towards the 
military and bureaucracy. They lost their jobs, were retired or sent into exile on the 
periphery as punishment. The CUP turned its back on ideas associated with the second 
constitutional period, relating to ‘justice, equality, and liberty’ deepened divisions with 
its opponents. The post-WWI struggle between the nationalists and anti-nationalists in 
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the post-1908 constitutional revolution period deepened the division between the CUP 
and the Liberal Entente, which was established in November 1911 after some policies of 
the CUP in the post-revolution were judged unappealing to them. Some Liberal Entente 
members were required to leave the empire after the CUP’s coup d’état on 23 January 
1913 in response to increased pressure from the CUP; namely, Rıza Nur, Ali Kemal, 
Mevlanzade Rıfat, Nureddin Feruh, and Sadık Bey.684 Furthermore, after the assassination 
of Mahmut Şevket Paşa on 11 June 1913, some CUP opponents were dismissed from 
their jobs, and others were arrested. Hundreds of people were sent into political exile.685 
For those suffering under CUP rule, the post-WWI period offered an opportunity 
for the CUP pay the price of its repressive policies of the past. It was a time to take 
revenge. The members of the Liberal Entente completely opposed the national movement, 
since its members had come from the CUP. As one these, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, made it 
clear, they would rather live under the Allies’ or infidel gavur rule than that of the CUP.686 
After the CUP leadership left Turkey in 1918, the members of the Liberal Entente came 
to power, and pursued their policy of non-resistance against the Allies. For them, the 
Ottoman State did not have any power to continue its armed resistance. The only way to 
protect the state from disintegration was to conclude a peace agreement with the Allies. 
However, the nationalists defeated Greek forces in 1922, in addition to their long time 
opponents of the Liberal Entente, due to their anti-nationalist activities during the 
Turkish-Greek war of 1919-1922, and were added to the list of traitors in April 1924 by 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Their names were: Gümülcineli İsmail Hakkı Bey, 
Rıza Tevfik (Bölükbaşı), Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Konyalı Zeynel Abidin Efendi,687 and 
İzmit Governor (Çule) İbrahim Hakkı.  
                                                          
684 Ibid. 213.  
685 Ibid. 229.  
686 Erdeha, Yüzellilikler Yahut Milli Mücadelenin Muhasebesi. 75. Amit Bein, Ottoman Ulema, Turkish 
Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition. Stanford University Press, 2011. 102,103.  
687 Erdeha, Yüzellilikler Yahut Milli Mücadelenin Muhasebesi , 61. 
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2) The Names 
The Ministry of Interior decided upon 149 names and the owner of Köylü 
newspaper Refet Bey was later added to the list making 150 names as declared in the 
official newspaper of the government Resmi Ceride on 7 January 1925. The names were 
arranged into nine groups as follows:  
Vahidettin’s Attendants  
1- Kiraz Hamdi 
2- Commander of the Special Attendants’ Unit Zeki  
3- Prosecutor of State Treasure Kayserili Şaban Ağa 
4- Tütüncübaşı Şükrü 
5- Head of the Aides de camp  
6- Colonel Aide de camp Tahir  
7- First Aide de camp Avni  
8- Former Director of State Treasure Refik  
 
Those who signed the Sèvres Agreement and Cabinet Members who took a 
role in the Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye688  
9- Former Şeyhülislam Mustafa Sabri  
10- Former Minister of Justice Ali Rüşdi  
11- Former Minister of Agriculture and Trade Cemal 
12- Former Minister of Navy Cakacı Hamdi 
13- Former Minister of Education Rumbeyoğlu Fahreddin  
                                                          
688 Ozoglu claims that this group were selectively chosen since not every Cabinet member who worked 
for the Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye was put into the list. This included people such as Cemil Paşa (Topuzlu), 
Minister of Public Works and Ahmet Reşit (Rey) the Minister of Interior. Hakan Ozoglu, From Caliphate 
to Secular State. 47.  
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14- Former Minister of Agriculture and Trade Kirilhançerci Remzi   
 
The members of the Council who signed the Sèvres Agreement  
15-  Former Minister of Education Hadi 
16-  Former Head of Şurayı Devlet Rıza Tevfik  
17-  Former Bern Ambassador Reşid Halis  
 
Those involved in Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye 
18- The General Commander of Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye Süleyman Şefik  
19- Aide de camp Cavalry Lieutenant Tahsin  
20- Commander in Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye Colonel Ahmed Refik  
21- Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye machine gun commander and the aide de camp of Damad 
Ferid Paşa Tarık Mümtaz 
22- Commander in Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye Ali Nadir Paşa 
23- Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye member Colonel Fettah 
24- Kuva-yi İnzibatiyye member Çopur Hakkı  
25- Former Governor of Bursa Gümülcineli İsmail 
26- From Ayan Konyalı Zeynelabidin  
27- Former Governor of Cebelibereket Fanizade Mesud 
28- The Head of the Liberal Entente Colonel Sadık  
29- Former Governor of Malatya Halil Rahmi (Bedirhani)  
30- Former Governor of Manisa Giritli Hüsnü  
31- Former Head of Military Tribunal Nemrud Mustafa 
32- The Mayor of Uşak Hulusi  
33-  Former governor of Adapazarı Traitor Mustafa 
34- Former Mufti of Tekirdağ Hafız Ahmed 
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35- Former Governor of Afyonkarahisar Sabit  
36- Former Governor of Gaziantep Celal Kadri  
37- The General Secretary of Liberal Entente Adanalı Zeynel Abidin 
38- Former Minister of Foundations Vasfi Hoca 
39- Former Governor of Harput Ali Galib  
40- Former Vice Governor of Bursa Aziz Nuri  
41- Former Muftu of Bursa Ömer Fevzi  
42- Former Adviser of Qadı of İzmir Ahmet Asım  
43- Former Istanbul Guardian Natık  
44- Former Minister of Interior Adil  
45- Former Minister of İnterior Mehmed Ali  
46- Former Governor of Edirne and Vice Mayor of Istanbul Salim 
47- Kütahya governor (during Greek Occupation) Hocarasizde İbrahim  
48- Governor of Adana Abdurrahman 
49- Former MP of Karahisarşarki Ömer Fevzi  
50- Lieutenant (Torturer) Adil  
51- Lieutenant (Torturer) Refik  
52- Former Governor of Kırkağaç Şerif 
53- Former Governor of Çanakkale Mahmud Mahir 
54- Former Commander of Istanbul Emin  
55- Governor of Kilis Sadullah Sami  
56- Former Governor of Bolu Osman Nuri  
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Edhem and his Friends (Edhem ve Avanesi)  
57- Çerkes Edhem 
58- Edhem’s brother Reşid 
59- Edhem’s brother Tevfik  
60- Kuçşubaşı Eşref 
61- Kuşçubaşı Eşref’s brother Hacı Sami  
62- Former Commander of Akhisar İzmirli Küçük Ethem 
63- Düzceli Mehmed’s son Sami Açofit  
64- Burhaniyeli Halil İbrahim  
65- Susurluk/Demirkapılı Hacı Ahmed 
 
Those who participated in the Circassian Congress 
66-  Bağ Osman from Hendek/Sünbüllü village  
67- Former Governor of İzmit İbrahim Hakkı  
68- Beraev Said  
69- Berzek Tahir 
70- Maan Şirin from Adapazarı/Harmantepe village  
71- Kocakömeroğlu Hüseyin Söke Ereğli/ Tekeli village 
72- Bağ Kemal from Adapazarı/Talustanbey village  
73- Hamta Ahmed  
74- Maan Ali  
75- Harunelreşid from Kirmastı/Karaorman village 
76- Eskişehirli Sefer Hoca 
77- Bigalı Nuri Bey’s son Ali  
78- Kemal from Adapazarı/Şahinbey village 
79- Lampat Yakub from Gönen/Tuzakçı village  
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80- Kompat Hafız Said from Gönen/Bayramiç village 
81- Retired Colonel Ahmed from Gönen/Keçe village 
82- Bizedurug Said, a lawyer in İzmir 
83- Şamlı Ahmed Nuri 
 
Police  
84- Former Police Director of Istanbul Tahsin  
85- Former Vice Police Director of Istanbul Kemal 
86- General Chief of Police Vice Director Ispartalı Kemal 
87- Former Director of the First Branch of Istanbul Police Directory Şerif 
88- Former Head Officer of the First Branch of Istanbul Police Directory Said 
89- Former Officer in Arnavutköy Hacı Kemal 
90- Chief Police Officer Namık  
91-  Police Chief of Şişli District Nedim  
92- Police Director of Edirne and Governor of Yalova Fuad 
93- Former Police Director of Adana Yolgeçenli Yusuf 
94- Former Officer in Unkapanı Sakallı Cemil  
95- Former Officer in Büyükdere Mazlum 
96- Former Second Police Chief of Beyoğlu Fuad 
 
Journalists 
97- Member of the Liberal Entente and owner of Serbesti Newspaper Mevlanzade 
Rıfat 
98- Owner of Türkçe Istanbul Newspaper Sait Monla  
99- Owner of Müsavet Newspaper in İzmir İzmirli Hafız İsmail 
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100- Former Director of Post and Telegraph, and Owner of Aydede Newspaper Refik 
Halid 
101-Owner of Adalet Newspaper in Bandırma Bahriyeli Ali Sami  
102-Owner of Temin Newspaper in Edirne and Hakikat Newspaper in Selanik Neyir 
Mustafa 
103-Former Correspondent of Köylü Newspaper Ferid  
104- Owner of Alemdar Newspaper Refik Cevad  
105- Pehlivan Kadri from Alemdar Newspaper 
106-Owner of Ferda Newspaper in Adana Fanizade Ali İlmi  
107- Owner of İrşad Newspaper in Balıkesir Trabzonlu Ömer Fevzi  
108- Owner of Doğruyol Newspaper in Aleppo Hasan Sadık 
109-Owner and Director of Köylü Newspaper İzmirli Refet 
 
Other People 
110- Tarsuslu Kemalpaşazade Selami  
111-Tarsuslu Kemalpaşazade Kemal 
112-Süleymaniyeli Kürd Hakkı 
113-Son of Mustafa Sabri İbrahim Sabri 
114-Manufacturer Bursalı Cemil  
115- Spy for English well known Çerkes Ragıb 
116- Haçinli Kazak Hasan who worked for the French Army 
117- Leader of bandit Süngülü Çerkes Davud 
118-Major Çerkes Bekir 
119-Necib, Brother in law of manufacturer Bursalı Cemil  
120-Inspector Ahmed Hulusi  
121-Madanoğlu Mustafa from Uşak  
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122-Yusufoğlu Remzi Tuzakçı village of Gönen 
123-Hacı Kasımoğlu Zühtü Bayramiç village of Gönen 
124-Kocakuzuk Osmanoğlu Şakir Balcı village of Gönen 
125-Koç Ali, son of Koç Memed, Muradlar village of Gönen 
126-Aziz, son of Mehmed, Ayvacık village of Gönen 
127- Osman, son of Balcılı Ahmed Keçeler village of Gönen 
128- Molla Süleymanoğlu İzzet İldiz village of Susurluk  
129-Kara Kazım, son of Hüseyin, Muradlar village of Gönen 
130- Arap Mahmut, son of Bekir, Balcı village of Gönen 
131- Guardian Yusuf, Rüstem village of Gönen 
132- Eyüb, son of Ömeri Balcı village of Gönen 
133- İbrahim Çavuş, son of Talustan, Küçükler village of Gönen 
134- İbrahim, son of Topallılı Şerif, Balcı village of Gönen 
135- İdris, son of Topal Ömer, Keçeler village of Gönen 
136- İsmail, son of Kurh, Bolağaç village of Gönen 
137-Canbolat, son of Muhtar Hacı Bey, Keçeler village of Gönen 
138- İshak, son of Yusuf, Kayapınar village of Marmara 
139-Sabit, son of Ali Bey, Kızık village of Manyas 
140- Selin, son of Deli Hasan, Balcı village of Gönen 
141- Osman, son of Makinacı Mehmed, Çerkes town of Gönen 
142- Kemal, son of Kadir, Değirmenboğazı village of Manyas 
143- Galib, son of Hüseyin, Keçeler village of Gönen 
144- Salih, son of Çerkes Said, Hacı Yakub village of Manyas  
145- İsmail, brother of slain Şevket, Hacı Yakub village of Manyas 
146- Deli Kasım, son of Abdullah, Keçeler village of Gönen 
147- Kemal, son of Corporal Hasan, Çerkes town of Gönen 
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148- Kazım Efe, son of Kadir, and brother of Kemal, Değirmenboğazı village of 
Manyas 
149- Yallaçoğlu Kemal, Kızık village of Gönen 
150- Tuğuğlu Mehmed Ağa, Keçeler village of Gönen.689  
 
The people on the list were not deprived of their Turkish citizenship when the law 
was first passed. At this time, only their entrance to Turkey was restricted. However, later 
on, on 28 May 1927 with law number of 1064, they had their Turkish citizenship revoked 
by the assembly, losing their citizenship rights.690 The government also forced them to 
sell their property. Government declaration (Kararname) number 880 was signed by the 
Cabinet on 10 September 1927, indicating that the 150’ers had to sell their properties. 
They were given only nine months to do so.691 For those who had died before 1927, their 
families were authorised to bury them inside Turkey. However, after the law was passed 
depriving them of citizenship, even their corpses were not allowed to pass back over the 
Turkish border.692  
Military courts were another tool used by the state in this period to strengthen the 
government’s authority over people. This topic is not part of this thesis and further 
research is required on the role of the military courts, but a brief note is needed. The new 
Turkish state relied on the military courts to sentence and intimidate wartime criminals 
and its opponents; thereby, creating a new ideal for the model ‘loyal citizen’. The 
assembly also passed laws to punish civil and military servants for their wartime 
activities. The names of the military servants expelled from the military were released in 
                                                          
689 Resmi Ceride, 7 January 1925. 3,4.  
690 Şaduman Halıcı, “Yüzellilikler” (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bİlimler Enstitüsü, 
1998). 29.  
691 BTCA. 030_01_88_551_9 – 1,2,3. A letter from Kuşçubaşı Eşref Bey to the Finance Minister Hasan 
Polatkan, (Eşref mistakenly used the title ‘Başvekilim’, meaning ‘my prime minister’; however, Hasan 
Polatkan was not the Prime Minister, he was the Finance Minister) in 10.06.1953.  
692 Halıcı, “Yüzellilikler.” 69. 
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the official newspaper on 7 April 1924.693 In relation to civil servants, another law was 
passed on 26 May 1926 (Mücadele-i Milliye’ye İştirak Etmeyen Memurin Hakkında 
Kanun); Law number 398. It was published in the official newspaper on 14 June 1926.694 
1250 of the 3150 civil servants whose files were investigated were expelled from their 
jobs, also losing their retirement rights. This list consisted of three hundred members of 
the Association of Friends of the English (İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti), and another three 
hundred were sentenced to death, including journalists who had voiced unfavourable 
opinions.695 Their problems with the state continued until 1952.696 The people on the lists 
at least secured certain rights, yet the court was used as an important tool of the regime 
during the early republican period to punish any opposition. There were also some trials 
based on an article in the so-called ‘punishment law’ that criminalised anyone insulting 
Turkishness, the government, the army, the president, the assembly, the republic, or the 
justice system (Türklüğü, Hükümeti, Orduyu, Reisi Cumhuru, Meclisi, Cumhuriyeti, 
Adliyeyi Tahkir (hakaret, aşşağılama). There are no details regarding how fair the trial 
process was and few details about the cases in the archive documents; only briefly were 
the legal grounds for the trials mentioned in the documents. The courts had to request 
permission from the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) by 1938; and the TGNA 
was the only authority allowed to give permission to sentence people accused of insulting 
the state, the president, and other aforementioned republican units. The records of the 
trials started in 1926 and ended in 1938, when a change in the law was proposed by Prime 
Minister, Celal Bayar, to shorten the long bureaucratic process and to accredit the local 
courts to handle cases from 10 March 1938.697 From 1926 to 1938, the courts investigated 
1027 separate cases. The average application number was about 500 per year from 1933 
                                                          
693 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/68.pdf . Halıcı, 31.  
694 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/398.pdf . Halıcı, “Yüzellilikler.” 31.  
695 Ibid. 32.  
696 Ibid. 32.  
697 BCA. 030_10_00_00_15_84_11_1, 2. 10 March 1938.  
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to 1937.698 Almost half of the applicants were allowed by the assembly to bring the case 
to the courts. Are knowledge of these pre-1938 cases is a consequence of the legal 
obligation imposed on the Ministry of Justice to ask permission from the assembly to 
allow prosecutors to investigate the alleged insults. However, from 1938 onwards, it is 
not possible to establish how many cases were investigated, or how many people were 
sentenced by the local courts, since these records are not yet open to researchers reviewing 
the Republican Archives.  
 
3) Anti-Kemalist Activities of the 150’ers 
When the war was won by the Ankara government forces, opposition groups left 
the region. From 1922 to 1938, the opposition attempted to organise an anti-Ankara 
movement in different countries and cities. Prominent among these were Western Thrace, 
Thessalonica, the Aegean Islands, particularly Limnos (Midilli), Aleppo and 
Damascus/Syria, Amman/Jordan, and Iraq. In exile, some of the 150’ers followed a 
similar path to the Young Turks, opposing Abdülhamit II. Their aim was to create chaos 
in Turkey and then overthrow the government. They were able to work with other anti-
Ankara groups of the period, such as the Armenian Tashnaksutyun and Kurdish groups, 
just as the Young Turks had done prior to the 1908 revolution.  
Before the Lausanne agreement, which was signed in July 1923, hundreds of anti-
Kemalists had already moved to Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands.699 The anti- 
nationalist Circassians left the region with the Greek forces. Of note, several thousand 
Circassians went with Çule İbrahim Hakkı and asked the British to resettle them. 
However, the British forces could not easily find a suitable place for resettlement. At the 
time India, Palestine, North Iraq, Greece were among the options examined.700 İbrahim 
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699 Evren Dede, http://www.azinlikca.net/yazarlar/evren-dede/bat-trakyada-150likler-i-.html, Accessed on 
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Hakkı wrote to the British ambassador in Athens to try and convince him that due to their 
work under England against the Kemalists, the Turks now hated them, and they should 
be sent to Cyprus for safety.701 As a result of these correspondences, they were settled in 
three villages in Greece; one established close to Thessalonica, and another two near 
Athens. A group were later put on the list of the 150’ers. More than a thousand people 
lived in the three villages until they were pardoned by the Turkish state in 1938. Some of 
these Circassians settled in Western Thrace, especially around Gümülcine (Komotini in 
Greek), such as Hafız Reşad Efendi, becoming key symbols in the anti-Kemalist 
movement in Western Thrace. Hafız Reşad published several newspapers and Islamic 
magazines, continuing his opposition until his death in 1981.702 The archival sources are 
very limited concerning the activities of these people, and the 150’ers in Western Thrace 
and Gümülcine in particular. Neither the Greek National archives, nor the Foreign 
Ministry archives of Turkey have permitted researchers access to their records to review 
the activities of these people in Greece. However, it is unthinkable that hundreds of anti-
Kemalists people could live in Greece without the express permission of Greek 
authorities, so there must have been some records kept regarding the relationships 
between the Greek authorities and the anti-Kemalists. In addition, it can be argued that 
the Turkish government would have certainly followed the activities of the 150’ers. 
Although police records do exist on these people, they have not been opened to 
researchers by the authorities of the Turkish Republican archives; furthermore, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has records on them. Some of the Turkish consulate 
employees were assigned to track them.703 However, these records have not yet been 
opened to researchers.  
                                                          
701 PRO/FO 317/7919 E 14515/27/44. 158-162.  
702 Caner Yelbaşı, Bir Muhalifin Portresi, http://ajanskafkas.com/gorus/bir-muhalifin-portresi-hafiz-ali-
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Although Turkey and Greece signed the Lausanne peace treaty in 1924, a kind of 
cold war endured between Turkey and Greece until 1928.704 Greece supported the anti-
Kemalists and the wartime activities of those people who left Turkey, due to their actions 
against the Kemalists. In the years following the deportation of the 150’ers from Turkey, 
Greece was at the centre of the anti-Kemalist activities. There were four different anti-
Kemalist groups in Greece: Hacı (Çerkes) Sami, Çerkes (Çule) İbrahim Hakkı, Nigehban-
ı Hukuk, and Çerkes Ethem’s groups. Ethem’s group consisted of Reşid, Tevfik, major 
Kürt Abdullah, Captain Ethem, Çerkes Kazım, lieutenant Kemal and Sabri.705 Çerkes 
Ethem did not remain quiet in Greece awaiting pardon by the Kemalists. Indeed, contrary 
to existing historiography, Çerkes Ethem remained undaunted in his attempts to challenge 
Ankara during his lifetime. He sought a way to put an end to the Kemalist regime and 
take revenge on Mustafa Kemal. On 4 April 1925, Ethem, Sami and Mevlanzade Rifat, 
moved to Baghdad using Greek passports, to negotiate with Sheikh Tahir, a local sheikh 
there.706 According to the police reports, Ethem was in Beirut and Syria in the June-July 
1925 period with Mevlanzade Rifat.707 However, he was forced to leave Syria due to 
pressure from French forces. He then moved to Aleppo. In Aleppo, Ethem contacted 
Artufi and another local citizen. He sent both to the Urfa region in Turkey.708 According 
to some reports, he and Mevlanzade Rifat were paid 500 English liras by the British 
forces, and Vehip Paşa claimed that the application process had been completed for 
Ethem’s stay in Syria in November 1928.709  
Ethem had already communicated with Kurdish groups and tribes in the north of 
Iraq. Over the next four years, Ethem attempted to create a Circassian dominated 
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opposition group against the Kemalists. He sought out Circassians from Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria and those who had settled in Greece.710 In Amman, Jordan Çerkes Ömer Hikmet, 
who was the director of the court, Kabartay Mehmet Taş, a member of the Amman 
Assembly along with Kabartay Sait Mufti and Muhtar İsmail were all key supporters of 
Ethem in Jordan.711 They would meet in cafes in Amman and Hemdan. In Cairo, Reşid 
met with Tevfik, Çerkes Haydar and the director of Camii Al Azhar Çerkes 
Abdülhamit.712 Based on the reports from the national police archive, Halıcı argues that 
in 1929, Çerkes Reşid, Tarık Mümtaz and a group of Circassians organised a meeting in 
Cairo.713 They printed stamps and created a flag to symbolise their movement. The colour 
of the flag was green and it had the Islamic declaration of faith (Kelimeyi Şehadet) printed 
on it.714 It is also claimed by the national police that some Circassians from Greece and 
Damascus were also expected to participate in the uprising in the Dersim region, in March 
1927 along with Kurdish groups.715 Ethem’s own writings reveal that he followed a pro-
Kurdish policy in that period, voicing complaints about the cruel (zalimane) policies of 
the Ankara government towards the Kurds.716 However, there are few sources describing 
his activities with the Kurdish groups in this era, aside from a few police reports. 
The exiled members of the Ottoman family, and some of the 150’ers, also 
contacted one another through letters. The elderly Şehzade Mahmud Şevket Bey, a 
grandson of Sultan Abdülaziz, contacted the former Minister of the Interior Mehmed Ali 
(number 45). They went on to establish an anti-Kemalist newspaper, and worked to 
demolish the Kemalist regime.717 Şehzade Mahmud wrote in one of his letters that they 
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had nothing to do with all the Kemalists, and that he hated Mustafa Kemal, as his problem 
was only with Mustafa Kemal and his friends.718 They also mentioned Amman in their 
correspondence. In one of his letters, on 2 January 1932, Mahmud Şevket asked Mehmed 
Ali how they might communicate with those who were in Amman, as this was where 
Çerkes Ethem had stayed for a long time. In the next letter, he mentioned that due to 
ongoing smuggling along the Turkish border with Syria and the Black Sea, it was easy to 
enter Turkey.719 He asked Mehmed Ali Bey for Çerkes Ethem to prepare some Circassians 
as an armed force. He also asked that the Kurdish leaders and Armenians (komites) 
prepare for an uprising.720 Kazım (number 148 on the list) from 
Bandırma/Değirmenboğaz, organised correspondence between Çerkes Ethem and a 
Şehzade.721 Ethem used ‘Alelhas’ as a nickname when writing letters.722 He requested 
financial support from one of the Şehzades, probably Ömer Faruk Osman, the son of the 
last Caliph Abdülmecid Efendi. He further stated that they should work for a revolution, 
which would save the people of Anatolia from oppression. After the revolution, they 
should then establish a democratic system, which did not necessarily have to be a 
republic.723 
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4) Taking Revenge: The Insurgency and Assassination Attempts by the 150’ers 
  The first assassination attempt was organised by a group of former CUP members 
in June 1926. They planned to assassinate Mustafa Kemal during his trip to İzmir. 
However, on 15 June 1926, the attempt was reported to the governor of İzmir, and 
prevented.724 Dozens of people were detained and the attempt became an opportunity for 
Mustafa Kemal to wipe out both his political and armed opponents. In August 1926, 
Kuşçubaşı Eşref wrote a letter to Refet Bey (probably to Refet Bele). In it, he accused the 
Ankara government on the basis that some nationalists had also been executed by Ankara 
due to personal problems rather their role in the İzmir assassination attempt.725 He was 
upset by the Ankara government’s policies, in that the attempt was used to silence the 
people. He also observed that several groups could resist Ankara, such as the Kurdists 
(Kürtçü), Assassins (Suikaştçiler), İttihadists (İttihadcılar).726 The Kuşçubaşı brothers 
Eşref and Hacı Sami727 were all close to Enver Paşa, (particularly Sami, who was Enver’s 
right hand-man in his last days). Kamil Erdaha claims that due to the struggle between 
Enver Paşa and Mustafa Kemal during the Turkish-Greek war, the Kuşçubaşı brothers, 
and especially Hacı Sami, expressed feelings of enmity towards Mustafa Kemal, since he 
did not allow Enver to return to Anatolia.728 Shortly after this rejection, Enver was killed 
by Bolshevik forces near Dushanbe, Tajikistan in 1922. After an unsuccessful 
assassination attempt in İzmir in 1926, Mustafa Kemal tried to root out and silence the 
opposition, and spread his absolute authority throughout the country. The CUP executed 
included Dr. Nazım, İsmail Canbolat, while other important figures from the nationalist 
struggle were detained by the regime, such as Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy. It 
can be claimed that Ankara had rid itself of prominent figures in the Liberal Party by 
                                                          
724 Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor : The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the 
Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 / (Leiden : Brill, 1984) 144.  
725 BCA. 030-0-010-000-000-107-702-2.2. 22.08.1926. 
726 BCA. 030-0-010-000-000-107-702-2.2. 22.08.1926. 
727 He was also known as Çerkes Sami, Kuşçubaşı Sami.  
728 Erdeha, Yüzellilikler Yahut Milli Mücadelenin Muhasebesi, 108.  
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adding them to the list of 150’ers. With the İzmir Assassination trial, the remaining 
leaders of the CUP were executed, and its political opponents were detained, and 
imprisoned. The silencing of the opposition was complete with these two cases. One can 
speculate that this affected Hacı Sami and Eşref, in that they further saw a need to carry 
out an assassination against Mustafa Kemal, and to raise up the people of Anatolia for an 
insurgency.  
Sami, his brother Ahmet and three other Circassians Hakkı,729 Düzceli Mecid,730 
and Sökeli Mecid,731 came to the Kalamaki dock of Kuşadası from the Sisam island of 
Greece, which is about 20 miles from the Kalamaki Dock, on 17 August 1927.732 Their 
plan was to follow a route from Kuşadası to Çine, Madran, Salihli, Akhisar, Kütahya, 
Afyon and to arrive in Ayaş (Ankara) by 15 September 1927, where they would plant a 
bomb on the railway, with the attention of exploding it when Mustafa Kemal, his 
ministers and MPs took a train from Istanbul to Ankara. However, almost 8 days after 
they reached Kuşadası they were seen by the nomads around the Madran Mountain on 24 
August 1927. The nomads complained to the local gendarme forces about these strangers. 
Based on the complaints of the nomads, gendarme forces came to the region and a 
skirmish erupted between Sami, his retinues and the gendarmes. Sami and his brother 
Ahmed resisted until the end, but were killed by the gendarmes; the rest of the group, 
Hakkı, Düzceli Mecid, and Sökeli Mecid were captured and brought first to İzmir and 
then to Istanbul for trial on 30 August 1927.733 The reason for holding the trial in Istanbul 
                                                          
729 Düzceli Hakkı (1882-1928). He was born in Düzce/Bıçkı village, married and had eight children. He 
fought in the Balkan War, and Caucasian front of World War I and then he came back to Istanbul and 
became an official. In the post-WWI period he was also in the Adapazarı and İzmit regions. He left the 
region probably with (Çule) İbrahim Hakkı in June 1921 for Midilli. Cumhuriyet, 27 August 1927, 1, 6 
November 1927, 3, and 19 January 1928, 3.  
730 Düzceli Mecid was the nephew of Hakkı, he was from the Bıçkı village of Düzce, see Cumhuriyet, 27 
August 1927, 1, and 19 January 1928, 3. According to his statement in court, he was taken as a hostage by 
the Greeks in Bursa during the Turkish-Greek War, and then he was sent to Midilli and Athens.  
731 Sökeli Mecid, according to his statement in court, fought in Hüseyin the shepherd’s group during the 
Turkish-Greek war. He was taken hostage by the Greeks and stayed in Midilli. See Cumhuriyet, 6 
November 1927, 3. 
732 Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1927, 3. 7 November 1927, 2.  
733 Cumhuriyet, 31 Ağustos 1927, 1,2.  
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appears to have been to use the case to intimidate residents who might still not be loyal 
to the republican regime, since the city had been the capital of the Ottoman State more 
than 450 years, and the anti-nationalist movement was very active there during the 
Turkish-Greek War. It should also be noted that after Mustafa Kemal left Istanbul on 16 
May 1919 to go to Anatolia, he returned only on 1 July 1927, as Istanbul was not thought 
to be a secure place for many years. This explains why, when an opportunity arose, the 
regime grasped it to consolidate its power and show itself to the people of the city.  
Some people were also arrested in the investigation,734 starting with Sami’s 
younger brother Mekki,735 and his relatives Ahmed, Halil, and Rasuh Beys, and Atıf Bey, 
an ex-military commander of İzmit, who was arrested for their relationship with the 
group’s members.736 With the exception of Hakkı, Düzceli Mecid, Sökeli Mecid, and 
Mekki, many others were released. The suspects would be tried under various articles of 
the penal code, including article 126 which stated that those who fought against the 
Turkish republic would be executed; article 146, stating that those who incited disorder 
could be punished with execution; and article 156, which proclaimed that those who 
carried out an assassination or an attempted assassination of the president would be 
executed.737 The trial began on 5 November 1927. According to Hakkı’s statement in 
court, Vehip Paşa and the old governor İzmir and CUP member Rahmi Bey had also 
supported the insurgency.738 Vehip Paşa was in Romania and was to return to Anatolia to 
raise the Kurds in the Dersim region. The plan was to travel to Anatolia immediately after 
the old CUP members were executed for their alleged involvement in the İzmir conspiracy 
                                                          
734 The Prime Ministry Republican Archive (BTCA) records, particularly the court records, have not been 
opened yet on this incident. Newspapers are the only source for the trial. Cumhuriyet newspaper 
published most of the court records when the trial happened. Therefore, I used the Cumhuriyet which was, 
ideologically speaking, the closest newspaper to the regime at the time.  
735 Due to his father’s opposition to Abdülhamit II, his father was exiled to Mecca; Mekki was born there 
in 1901. According to his statement, he fought for the Kuva-yi Milliye under Edib Bey in Salihli during 
the Turkish-Greek war. Later on, Mustafa Kemal ordered his arrest. It is not known when he was released 
exactly, but after his release he lived in Istanbul/Üsküdar. See Cumhuriyet, 7 November 1927, 1,2.  
736 Cumhuriyet, 6 September 1927, 1. 7 September 1927, 1.  
737 Cumhuriyet, 4 October 1927, 2.  
738 Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1927, 1.  
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of 1926. However, due to a lack of money and Sami’s illness they had to postpone their 
plan.739 They were armed, had rifles, bombs, and about 250 bullets per person; they also 
carried some food, bandages, and some tincture of iodine in their bag to treat any possible 
wounds.740 They walked in the night, and slept and hid in the morning, over a period of 8 
days from the 17 August 1927. Kuşçubaşı Eşref was also going to join them bringing 
dynamite (after Sami was killed by the gendarme forces Eşref chose not to come to 
Anatolia). If they could succeed in the assassination of Mustafa Kemal they would publish 
a declaration on behalf of the Sultan (probably Abdülmecid II), and all over the country, 
even in Trabzon, and an insurgency would be launched. Then the Sultan and the members 
of CUP would be able to return to Anatolia.741 Hakkı also emphasised that if Sami had 
not already organised people in Anatolia to support him, he would not have become 
involved in the situation in the region.  
It was also underlined several times by the newspaper that Çerkes Ethem and 
Reşid were also behind the group, supporting Sami and his retinues to carry out their plan, 
although none of the suspects mentioned this.742 It is also noteworthy, as it helps to explain 
the negative approach to the Circassians in the early republican period, that the head of 
the court asked Hakkı whether he had fought against the Kuva-yi Milliye or not? Hakkı 
said that he had fought; but, that everyone else had also fought: 
 
Hakkı: I fought but it was like everyone else.  
Head of court: How? Was there anyone else who fought against Kuva-yi Milliye other 
than Circassians?  
Hakkı: Of course, who organised those rebellions, only Circassians?743  
 
                                                          
739 Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1927, 3. 
740 Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1927, 3. 7 November 1927, 2.  
741 Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1927, 3. 
742 Cumhuriyet, 8 September 1927, 1,2. 11 September 1927, 4.  
743 Cumhuriyet, 6 November 1927, 3.  
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The suspects were not represented in court by a lawyer, and were questioned 
directly by the court, and their trial lasted only two days. At the end of the second day, 
the prosecutor declared his indictment that Hakkı, Sökeli Mecid, and Düzceli Mecid were 
to be sentenced to death for their attempt to assassinate the president, their involvement 
in armed activities against the Republic of Turkey, and their attempt to change the 
constitutional order. Eşref and his relative Mustafa were given life sentences in absentia, 
due to their involvement in the Çerkes Sami group and their attempt to assassinate the 
president and change the constitutional order. However, Mekki, Sami’s younger brother, 
was found innocent and released by the court.744  
The group was accused of attempting to assassinate Mustafa Kemal; however, 
they were captured on Madran Mountain, which is more than 700 miles away from Ayaş, 
Ankara. Despite their lack of opportunity to carry out an assassination attempt, they were 
sentenced to death for their supposed intent. Eşref and Mustafa were also sentenced to 
death for their involvement in the preparation of the uprising, even though they were not 
in the court to be questioned.745 Hakkı, Düzeli Mecid, and Sökeli Mecid were executed 
on 18 January 1928, in Eminönü square, Istanbul. The regime clearly this trial to 
intimidate its opponents by executing the three in the heart of Istanbul in front of hundreds 
of people.  
Another assassination attempt was allegedly organised by Ethem in 1935.746 A 
Circassian man, Yahya747 was arrested by the police forces. According to the subsequent 
investigation, he and another four Circassians organised an assassination attack against 
Atatürk on the orders of Çerkes Ethem and his brother Reşid. Urfa MP Ali Saip 
                                                          
744 Cumhuriyet, 7 November 1927, 2. 
745 Cumhuriyet, 7 November 1927, 2. 
746 Same as with Sami’s case, the Prime Ministry Republican Archive (BTCA) records, particularly the 
court records, have not been opened yet on this incident. Therefore, I used the Cumhuriyet newspaper. 
747 Yahya was from the Yukarıotluk village of Çarşamba/Samsun, born in 1316 (1898) and from the 
Sapsugh ‘Şapsığ’ branch of Circassians, a farmer and workman.  
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(Ursavaş)748 was also involved, providing material support to the assassins. A man named 
Üzeyir, the brother of one of the assassins,749 had complained about the group, which then 
led to the arrest of Yahya and the other members of the group. According to the 
prosecutor, Kuşçubaşı Eşref came to Syria and met with Ethem, where the men planned 
the assassination attempt together. Eşref said that he started (his own) history with the 
sword and he would finish it with sword.750 The prosecutor used the correspondence 
between several of the 150’ers, including Ethem, Maan Mustafa and Eşref, and the 
activities of Yahya as evidence of the planned assassination attempt. In the letters, 
although there was evidence suggesting that they had some plans to come Turkey, there 
was no convincing proof relating when and how they would come to Turkey, and with 
what connections they would succeed in their aim. It is impossible to know what 
motivation the prosecutor had when using the correspondences as evidence in the trial.  
Yahya had gone to Syria to make money in order to marry a girl from his own 
hometown. He stayed in Syria for a few months with the Circassians and then crossed the 
border and went to Jordan where he met with Ethem in Amman, and was asked about 
Turkey and its political and military situation. Ethem also told him that he would join the 
Kurds and they would rise against Ankara, in an uprising that would be more organised 
than the Sheikh Said one in 1924.751 Six months later, at the end of summer 1935, Ethem 
sent Yahya to Turkey, and told him that Ali Saib (Ursavaş), Maraşlı İdris, and Şemseddin 
Bey of Çokak town would help him. This statement was made by Yahya during the police 
investigation before the trial; however, in court he denied the latter part of the statement 
concerning his meeting with Ethem. He told the court that the statement about Ethem had 
been made under torture. It appeared that the prosecutor was looking for a motive behind 
                                                          
748 Ali Saip Ursavaş (1885-1939), Colonel, MP from CHP, and head of Independent Court.  
749 Üzeyir was owner of farm in Maraş.  
750 ‘Eşref kılıç ile başlamış olduğu tarihi yine kılıçla kapatacaktır’. Cumhuriyet, 8 February 1936, 8.  
751 Cumhuriyet, 8 February 1936, 8. 
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Yahya’s going to Syria and exaggerated the situation, despite the fact that he went there 
to make money to marry a girl from his hometown, and to find his relatives in Syria. In 
Syria and Amman, his relatives and some other Circassians helped him by giving him a 
job, and providing accommodation for him. The prosecutor found the relationships to be 
strange and unbelievable coincidences, and made the situation the basis of his 
investigations.752 However, it appears that the prosecutor had fabricated a story based on 
Yahya’s journey to Syria. Due to his lack of knowledge of Circassian networks and 
traditional customs, the prosecutor misinterpreted the situation. In Circassian tradition 
and customs one is not allowed to ask a guest, who comes to your home or village, how 
long he is going to stay, one is only expected to feed his guest and provide him with 
accommodation.  
Hamdi and his friends, Yakub and Aziz, later designated assassins by the 
prosecutor, stayed in Üzeyir’s house. Later, Üzeyir went to the local court and declared 
that he had some enemies and that those enemies would slander him. He said he was 
scared by his friends anti-Atatürk talk. It seems that he took this move as a precautionary 
measure, since he had hosted Hamdi and his friends in his house, and these people were 
seen to be working on anti-state activities.753 However, Üzeyir’s brother Arif confessed 
that he also saw the people, and heard from Çerkes Ethem’s brother Reşid in Jordan that 
a group of people would be sent by them and that they had told him that he should inform 
his brother Üzeyir, who should ask Ali Saib (Ursavaş) to conceal the group.754 Ali Saib 
was a very close friend of Üzeyir.755 The distance between their farms was about 18 hours 
by foot.756 Üzeyir claimed that Ali Saib had corresponded with Ethem, and that he himself 
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754 Cumhuriyet, 8 February 1936, 11. 
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756 It is worth mentioning that although the beginning of the dispute is not known exactly; before or after 
the alleged assassination attempt there was an argument over the land between Üzeyir and Ali Saip 
(Ursavaş) from the 1930s. According to the statements of Üzeyir Bey’s son and grandson, their land in 
Kesikli and Mecidiye villages of Adana (now Osmaniye after 1996), were seized by Ali Saip, just as he 
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had given a letter to Ali Saib from Ethem.757 Yahya also supplied the names of Ali Saib 
and the local governor of Çokak town, Şemseddin Bey, to the prosecutor for their 
involvement in the alleged assassination.758 Ali Saib’s immunity was lifted by the 
assembly on 18 October 1935; he himself also voted to revoke his immunity.759 In his 
speech to the assembly, Ali Saib underlined that he loved Atatürk and that it would be 
impossible for him to work with someone like Çerkes Ethem to kill Atatürk who ‘created’ 
‘yarattı’ (meaning like God). Regarding the discussion about his ethnic identity, which 
was claimed to be Kurdish or Circassian, Ali Saip emphasised that he was pure Turkish, 
and that only Turkish blood flowed in his veins.  
It is important to note that this case was transformed into another opportunity for 
the Kemalists and the press. The Kemalists used the case to strengthen collectivisation 
among their supporters by mobilising thousands to curse the traitors who had attempted 
to assassinate their divine leader. Student Unions, the Bars, and the People’s Houses 
organised protests around the country from east to west, including among the Armenians, 
the Jews and Assyrians. Many groups condemned the attempt, prayed for the president 
and sent telegrams to the presidential palace expressing their support for Atatürk.760 Two 
large demonstrations were organised in Ankara and Istanbul on 22 October and 23 
October 1935 and thousands of people joined them. This was turned into a nationwide 
event and exploited by the regime.  
                                                          
did to some other Circassians of the region. Ali Saip used his position as MP and head of the Independent 
Tribunal to seize Circassian land in the region. Üzeyir Bey’s son took the case to court; however, 
although the trial started in the early 1950s, it has not finished yet. The European Human Rights Court 
(EHRC) was also involved in to the trial process, and it was decreed by the court that €19.200 
compensation should be paid to the heirs of Üzeyir Bey in 2009. Haşim Söylemez ‘Çerkezlerin Toprak 
Kavgası’, Aksiyon, 03 June 2000. 
www.aksiyon.com.tr/dosyalar/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsld=506223 accessed on 
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757 Cumhuriyet, 8 February 1936, 10. 
758 Cumhuriyet, 8 February 1936, 9. 
759 Cumhuriyet, 19 October 1935, 1.  
760 Cumhuriyet, 27 October 1935, 1,7. 20 October 1935, 1, 8. 28 October 1935, 1.6.  
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For more than a week, the news of the alleged assassination attempt was in the 
newspaper headlines. The telegrams sent to Atatürk were published by the newspapers 
every day. On the other hand, the press used very negative, discriminative and humiliating 
language. Before the trial started, Cumhuiryet had already condemned Çerkes Ethem and 
his brother, labelling them villainous ‘alçak’761 According to Cumhuriyet, the French 
colonial administration and the Circassians of Syria were working against Turkey.762 The 
members of the Circassian community were accused of assisting the assassins. Those who 
were detained were called cursed people ‘melun’ by the newspaper. Cumhuriyet also 
declared, ‘an assassination on Atatürk is an assassination on the fatherland and the 
republic, an assassination on Atatürk is an assassination on the nation and Turkishness, 
an assassination on Atatürk is an assassination on history and the future, an assassination 
on Atatürk is an assassination against humanity and civilization.’763  
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762 Cumhuriyet, 22 October 1935, 1. 
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Cumhuriyet newspaper 19 October 1935. ‘Cursed Assassins Under Justice! Villainous 
Çerkes Ethem!’  
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 Cumhuriyet newspaper 24 October 1935. ‘Istanbul’s Hatred for the Traitors!’ 
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Cumhuriyet newspaper 23 October 1935. ‘Villains are being Cursed!’  
 
 Çerkes Ethem and his brother Reşid were arrested in Amman, Jordan, due to 
increasing pressure from Turkey over their involvement in the assassination attempt; 
however, they were then released on bail. Ethem’s other brother Tevfik, Kazım İsmail, 
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and Edib Kemal were also arrested in Haifa.764 Ankara warned the French colonial 
administration about the activities of Ethem and his co-conspirators, and officially 
requested the French rulers to deport them (Ethem and Reşid).765 The trial began on 9 
January 1936 in Ankara, and there were nine suspects in court: Yahya, Üzeyir, Arif, 
Şemsettin, Şaban, İsmail, İdris, Aziz, and Ali Saib. The allegation of the prosecutor, Baha 
Arıkan, was that they had set up an armed group to assassinate Atatürk.766 The language 
he used was simplistic and he attempted to incriminate the suspects using small pieces of 
evidence. For example, when giving his statement about Yahya, he said that because 
Yahya was a deserter and had been imprisoned before, he was capable of doing any kind 
of viciousness.767 However, in the days following the opening of the trial, some members 
of the court were still not convinced that there had been an actual attempt to assassinate 
Atatürk. The prosecutor was not happy with the suggestion voiced by some officials that 
the entire case was a conspiracy, and he explained in a very demagogic way that the 
people had not only attempted to take Atatürk’s life but also that of the entire Turkish 
nation, since Atatürk was the soul and representative of the 17 million people.768 
However, when it came to proving the assassination attempt, the prosecutor was not able 
to convince the members of the court. At the end of a long judicial process, the trial ended 
in the acquittal of all the suspects, on 17 February 1936. The reason for the acquittal was 
a lack of evidence and some suspects’ testimony that they had suffered torture at the hands 
of the police, and had therefore accepted whatever the police had told them during the 
police interrogation. However, during the trial, they did not accept the claims, and at the 
end of the trial were acquitted.769  
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769 Cumhuriyet, 18 February 1936, 7. 
210 
 
The trial findings suggest that Ethem and his close circle had always intended to come 
back to Turkey and overthrow the government and Atatürk. However, over time they had 
lost their ability to mobilise the people, and had insufficient opportunity to gain support 
either inside or outside of Turkey, to succeed in realising their aims. The final serious 
attempt was carried out by Çerkes Sami in 1927, but he paid for it with his life. Although 
the Greek government had used them against Turkey for a long time, it was forced by the 
Turkish government to deport them from Greece. Towards the end of the 1920s, Ethem 
and his close circle were no longer allowed to stay in Greece, and any financial support 
previously extended to them was taken away by the Greek government. As relations 
improved between the two governments, the Greeks lost their desire to use Ethem and 
others. On 30 October 1930, Turkey signed a friendship agreement with Greece. Turkey 
then demanded the deportation of the 150’ers who had settled in Western Thrace among 
the Turkish minority in the region. Mustafa Sabri, Gümülcineli İsmail, Aziz Nuri, Sefer 
Hoca of Eskişehir, İbrahim Sabri, number 124 Remzi, number 136 İdris, and number 146 
Kasım were deported by the Greek government.770 Ethem and a group of anti-Kemalists 
then went to the Middle East to continue their opposition. Although Ethem and his close 
circle did not have sufficient support to carry out an insurgency and overthrow Atatürk, 
the idea did not die. It seems that they talked about this topic until end of their lives, and 
Turkish Intelligence Services supposed they posed a potential threat to Atatürk.  
The final trial, which took place in 1935, was established by a prosecutor based on 
exaggerated Turkish Intelligence Service reports; therefore, the court could not find any 
evidence to sentence the suspects for the assassination attempt. It is worth mentioning 
here that the language used by the press had dramatically changed by the end of the trial, 
when the suspects were acquitted by the court. They were called cursed people ‘melun’ 
throughout the trial from their arrest to the end. However, although the press had labelled 
                                                          
770 Halıcı, “Yüzellilikler.”100.  
211 
 
them guilty before the court made its decision, at the end of the trial, the press addressed 
its stance, referring to them as merely suspects.771 The only benefit the regime gained 
from this trail was that the alleged attempt was turned into a national event; from the east 
to the west of Turkey, every group cursed or felt it necessary to be seen to curse those 
who had allegedly attempted to assassinate their president. Atatürk once more 
strengthened his position as the symbol of the nation, and either willingly or reluctantly, 
people came together around him, his statues, and in city centres to curse those who 
attempted to assassinate him.  
 
5) The Turkish State and Circassians  
A)  Anti-Kemalist Circassians abroad, and Circassians in Turkey 
From the archival resources, it emerges that the Turkish State was wary of the 
anti-Kemalist Circassians, punishing some and monitoring others. On the one hand, 
Ankara castigated those anti-Kemalist Circassians who had either moved themselves or 
had been deported by the Ankara government outside of Turkey in the post Turkish-Greek 
War period, removing citizenship from some and prohibiting their return to Turkey. On 
the other hand, they remained closely monitored by the Turkish Consulates. For instance, 
a group of Circassians from Predromos village of Karaferya in Greece participated in a 
celebration of Greek Independence Day in Thessalonica in 25 March 1937.772 This was 
considered peculiar by the Turkish consul, since they had been brought to Thessalonica 
to celebrate from their own village, some sixty kilometres away. He elaborated that they 
had been removed intentionally by the local Greek rulers and the military. He was irritated 
by their attitude and therefore insisted that the local Greek governor receive a warning 
from the Turkish authorities over this matter.773  
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212 
 
Hakuç Çerkes Canbolat was from Uzuntarla village of İzmit. He served as a 
battalion commander and established a bandit group in Midilli at the end of the Turkish-
Greek War. After the war, Canbolat moved to Greece, where he became the local 
governor (Muhtar) of Muradlı village of Gümülcine.774 On 18 April 1925, Canbolat had 
his Turkish citizenship revoked by the cabinet, since he had worked for the Greek 
government as a local governor.775 Çerkes İsmail was another such example. He was a 
bandit, from Karabacak village of Boğazlıyan, Yozgat, and born in 1889. He had escaped 
from Turkey to Syria where he worked as an officer in the Circassian unit.776 İsmail also 
had his citizenship revoked on 24 July 1930 for violation of the article forbidding Turkish 
citizens from working in another army without obtaining permission from the 
government.777 Çerkes Ethem and his nephew Arslan also suffered the same fate. The 
cabinet decided that due to their desertion and service for another country their citizenship 
would be removed. However, in the government order, which was signed by the president 
Mustafa Kemal and the members of the Cabinet, no details were given about Ethem and 
Arslan’s desertion, their activities or under what foreign country they served.778  
Some changes were made to citizenship law on 23 May 1927. This was named 
law 1041 (Şeraiti Muayyeneyi Haiz Olmayan Osmanlı Tebaasının Türk Vatandaşlığından 
İskatı Hakkında Kanun).779 With this law, an increase in the deprivation of citizenship can 
be seen. Çerkes Neguç Yusuf Suad from Cedidiye/Düzce saw their citizenship revoked 
on 3 October 1928 based on this law.780 Hapaç Çerkes İzzet of Esma Hanım village of 
Düzce witnessed the same, due to his absence in the Turkish-Greek war and his activities 
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in the post war period on 3 December 1933.781 Çerkes Ali Haydar of Esma Hanım village 
of Düzce participated in the anti-nationalists uprising in Düzce in 1920, leaving Turkey 
for Bulgaria, where he published the Dostluk newspaper against the Kemalist regime. 
Although he was not on the list of the 150’ers, he did not return to Turkey until 1938. 
After the amnesty was declared, Ankara softened its policy toward the anti-nationalists. 
Ali Haydar came to Edirne in 1938 to apply for his return to Turkey. The cabinet 
determined that he would be allowed to return, but because of his suspicious behaviour, 
Ali Haydar had to stay in Amasya.782  
It should be underlined here that due to the activities of the anti-nationalist 
Circassians, the Circassians of Syria were also monitored by the Turkish Embassy. The 
Circassian Union was established in Quneytra, with a branch in Damascus. The union 
concentrated on political matters and charity work.783 The officers of the Circassian 
regiment of Syria were also members of the society. Some anti-Kemalist Circassians, 
such as Nuri Canbolat contacted these Circassians.784 The activities of these societies were 
viewed seriously by the Turkish government; the President, Prime Minister, Chief of the 
General Staff, Head of the Intelligence Service, and the General Secretary of the 
Republican Party were all informed about the activities of this union, by the Aleppo 
Consulate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.785 The assassination attempt, and 
exaggerations of the activities of some Circassians outside of Turkey such as Çerkes 
Ethem, led to increased pressure on the Circassians by the state in the early republican 
period.786 Although Ankara pressurised the Circassians, much as it did other groups in 
Anatolia, it did not attempt to deport or send the Circassians from Turkey back to the 
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North Caucasus. Moreover, Ankara opposed moves from outside to encourage the 
Circassians to move to the North Caucasus. A Circassian student in the Al Azhar mosque 
in Cairo, Yusuf bin Ahmed, prepared a declaration to encourage the Circassians to return 
to their homeland in the North Caucasus. This declaration was labelled dangerous by the 
Ankara government and it was banned from circulation inside Turkey.787  
  
B) Restrictions on the Circassian Identity and Language; and the case of the 
First Miss World from Turkey Keriman Halis 
It is worthy of mention that non-Turks were not permitted to express their ethnic 
identities in public in the early republican period. One example of this is the case of 
Circassian ‘beauty queen’ of Turkey and subsequently the World in 1932, Keriman Halis. 
Keriman was born and raised in Istanbul in 1913; she was from the Bijnau family who 
were Circassians.788 She participated in the Miss Turkey Competition in 1932, after the 
competition was first organised by Cumhuriyet newspaper in 1929.789 The regime used 
the organisation for several reasons; to emphasise its modernist ideology and show the 
world that Turkey was a modern country, as well as showing how the Turkish race was 
beautiful, and how the republican regime had liberated women from ‘backward Ottoman 
male dominant’ culture. From 1929 to 1932, three Miss Turkey winners were sent abroad 
to participate in the Miss World Organisation, although none of them could win any titles. 
In 1932, Keriman Halis was chosen as Miss Turkey and sent to Belgium for the Miss 
World competition, where at the end of voting the majority of the members of the jury 
voted for her, and she was chosen as Miss World.  
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When she gained the title of Miss World, this presented a good opportunity for 
the republican media and politicians to promote the success of the regime as liberating 
women and giving them the rights they deserved. Thirty thousand telegrams were sent to 
Keriman Halis by people to celebrate her success.790 Her success also suited Mustafa 
Kemal; he made a statement to the effect that he already knew that the Turkish race was 
historically one of the most beautiful races in the world; therefore, he found the result 
entirely understandable. He congratulated both the Cumhuriyet and Keriman Halis for 
showing the whole world the beauty of the Turkish race.791 It is also ironic that although 
Keriman Halis was born and raised in Istanbul, her family was originally from the 
Hacıosman village of Manyas, a Circassian village whose residents were deported by the 
Ankara government in 1923 for the anti-Kemalist activities of a group of Circassians in 
the region, as explained in the previous chapter. Despite this, Keriman Halis became the 
symbol of the modern Turkish race and state, being used by the regime as the ‘new face 
of the modern Turkish woman’. After she became Miss World, she was in the headlines 
of the newspapers for more than a month in Turkey. One headline in Cumhuriyet read 
‘Turkish Beauty Conquered the World’ (Türk Güzeli Dünyayı Fethetti). Keriman Halis 
went to France from Belgium, where she was welcomed and a dinner given in her honour 
by her French hosts. The republican press used this situation to increase nationalist 
sentiment after the mayor of Deauville/France spoke positively about Turkey. To 
Turkey’s press, Keriman Halis was not only a Miss World, but also a symbol for use on 
the international stage.792 Her rejection of a prince’s offer of marriage and the British 
Press’s references to her becoming Miss World were also reported in the headlines of the 
Turkish press in a very interesting way; for them it symbolised ‘the east defeating the 
west for the first time (İlk defa Şark Garbi mağlup etti). Furthermore, most probably the 
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newspaper exaggerated the situation since Keriman Halis had told the Cumhuriyet she 
had rejected the offer since she would like to marry someone from her own race, which 
meant someone from the Turkish race.793 
 
 Cumhuriyet newspaper 1 August 1932. ‘Miss Turkey Keriman was Chosen as Miss 
World’  
 
 
                                                          
793 Cumhuriyet, 11 August 1932, 1,4.  
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 Cumhuriyet newspaper 4 August 1932. ‘Turkish Girl who Conquered the World!’ 
 
Cumhuriyet newspaper 3 August 1932. ‘The Turkish Girl Who Became Miss World!’  
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 Cumhuriyet newspaper 31 August 1932. ‘Thousands of People welcomed Miss World!’  
 
  When she returned to Turkey, Keriman Halis was welcomed by hundreds of 
people at Sirkeci train station in Istanbul on 31 August 1932. She was invited to other 
cities in Turkey and abroad. She travelled around Turkey and visited Egypt on 30 March 
1933; however, on this visit something unpredictable happened, of which the Turkish 
regime did not approve. Although the national media and state propaganda attempted to 
show her to the world as the progressive face of the Turkish women, race, and the 
revolution, when she visited Egypt emerged that she was not of Turkish descent but 
Circassian. At a dinner given in her honour in Cairo she met with a group of Circassians 
by chance. In the ensuing conversation, she told them that she was also Circassian. 
However, her Circassian origins had never been mentioned in public before, as she had 
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always been presented as representing the beauty of the Turkish race and the modern 
western face of the Turkish people by the Republican regime. Al Ahram newspaper, based 
in Egypt, published the news of her encounter with the Circassians in Egypt, and her 
Circassian identity became known to the public.  
Although Keriman Halis denied the truth of the story in her interview with 
Yenigün magazine (probably fearing further problems with the Turkish regime), she was 
banned from future public engagements and from attending public events by the 
republican regime.794 The Cumhuriyet newspaper archives reveal that although there were 
hundreds of articles and dozens of headlines and pictures about Keriman Halis before she 
went to Egypt (from 1 August 1932 to 30 March 1933), after her return from Egypt to 
Turkey on 19 May 1933, there was just a single very small news item on page 3 with no 
picture, and no welcome ceremony was organised for her.795 After her visit to Egypt, there 
was barely any news about her in the media, since the regime did not want her brought to 
the attention of the public.796  
During the early Republican era, the Circassians had faced restrictions and 
pressure from the state. The language issue was a focal point of the struggle between the 
state and the Circassians. The state aimed to create a unified identity and an official 
language that had to be Turkish. In rural areas, teachers and officials aimed to control and 
prevent the expression of non-Turkish mother tongues, but their efforts were 
unsuccessful. However, despite its limitation in the rural context, in the city centres, the 
state was very well organised and able to prohibit the publication of materials related to 
the Circassian language, culture and history, and the use of Circassian in public places. 
The author Çerkes Mehmed Bey applied to the government and the assembly to register 
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two books on Circassians for copyright. However, his books were categorised as harmful 
publications (muzır neşriyat) by the government, due to their content. The government 
determined that the publications would be prohibited and withdrawn from circulation on 
1 November 1926.797 Another example was the Latin alphabet form of the Circassian 
language, which was prepared and published in Syria, but not allowed by the government 
within Turkish borders. It was seen as dangerous and officially prohibited by government 
orders on 9 June 1932.798  
 
6) The Declaration of an Amnesty for the 150’ers 
 In 1938, the suggestion that there should be an amnesty for those involved in the 
activities against the Turkish state came to the forefront of political debate. It was thought 
that the Turkish Revolution had been successful, and that it would no longer be possible 
for the 150’ers to become involved in any activities against the Turkish state, since half 
of them had already died and the other half were not in a position to take further action. 
The government’s proposal of an amnesty was made to reduce the hardship of the family 
members of the 150’ers.799 In addition, the people on the list were not able to harm the 
republican regime or its leaders any longer. They had lost their influence and access to 
networks that would have allowed them to mobilise the masses against the regime. The 
majority were ageing, and thus unable to involve themselves in any armed activities 
against the state or the Kemalists. Only a few still posed a threat to Ankara, and they were 
not allowed to come back to Turkey; e.g. Çerkes Ethem, his brother Reşid and number 
55 Sadullah Sami.800 There was a long discussion in the assembly over the amnesty. Some 
MPs were completely against it. Emin Sazak of Eskişehir spoke expressing surprise that 
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Celal Bayar’s government would pardon the 150’ers.801 He emphasised that he would like 
to have seen these people killed, as Ali Kemal had been, i.e. by lynching; and that he 
would like to kill them by scratching out their flesh.802  
Despite the opposition voiced, an amnesty was declared by the government. It was 
issued for three different categories of people. The first group was the 150’ers. According 
to the law, these people would still have limited citizenship rights. They were not allowed 
to receive any salary for their previous service under the Ottoman government, and could 
not work in the Turkish government for the next 8 years; they could work as journalists, 
but the law did not allow them to become owners or editors of a newspaper.803 The second 
group were those sentenced according to the rules of the special council (Heyeti Mahsusa 
Kararları); they would have full citizenship rights, except for in a few areas. They were 
not permitted to work in government service for the next two years.804 The final group 
were those sentenced in the Independent Tribunal (İstiklal Mahkemeleri). Twenty-five of 
these were still in prison. They were pardoned and were to have full citizenship.805 The 
Minister of Justice, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, demanded from MPs that, although he had noted 
the long discussion and reaction against the 150’ers, they consider their families and 
children since they had not committed any crimes against the state but rather were victims 
of their fathers or husbands’ mistakes.  
Thus, although the Kemalist regime labelled the 150’ers as traitors to the state and 
did not forgive the members of the list until 1938, after the amnesty was declared in 1938, 
some of their descendants faced no discrimination by the state. They were able to take on 
roles as bureaucrats, high-ranking military officers and diplomats. Rıza Tevfik’s grandson 
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Deniz Bölükbaşı was a diplomat and an MP from Nationalist Act Party (MHP); Mustafa 
Madanoğlu’s son Cemal Madanoğlu was a general in the Turkish army; Ahmet Refik 
Bey’s (number 20) son was a general director of the state owned Turkish tobacco and 
alcoholic beverages company ‘TEKEL’; (number 11) Cemal (Keşmir)’s son Halit Nazmi 
was the Minister of Finance for the CHP between 1946-48; and, (number 14) Remzi 
Paşa’s son, Şevket Mocan was an MP for the Democrat Party.806 Therefore, it is possible 
to claim that once the regime had secured its position, the Kemalists no longer viewed the 
descendants of the 150’ers as a threat to the state. Moreover, those who no longer had any 
problems with the regime, even if their fathers and grandfathers had once been ‘traitors’ 
for the state, were permitted to hold high bureaucratic and even military positions.  
Despite this, a small group of 150’ers continued to be involved in anti-Kemalist 
activities. Although Ankara was working on the idea of pardoning the 150’ers in 1938, 
on 5 April 1938, the Turkish government, through its Jerusalem consulate demanded from 
the King of Jordan, Emir Abdullah, that Ethem and Reşid should end their anti-Atatürk 
activities.807 İhsan Tunalı, the Turkish Consul in Jerusalem was sent to Jordan by Ankara 
to demand from King Abdullah that Ethem should stay in Amman without involving 
himself in any anti-Ankara activities. Abdullah guaranteed that Ethem would stay in 
Amman, and that he would come under the observation of both the Jordanian authorities 
and local Circassians. If he became involved in any activities against Turkey, the King 
assured him, then all the Circassians would be deported from Jordan.808 Nevertheless, they 
established anti-Ankara organisations, including the Türkiye-Anadolu Yıldırım Komitesi 
(Turkey-Anatolia Thunderbolt Committee), in 1938. Celadet Bedirhani, Kürt Emin 
Broski, Kürt Rifat, Ali Haydar Hoca, Çerkes Reşit, Ethem and his close circle convened 
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the committee.809 The aim of the organisation was to overthrow the Kemalist regime, and 
to establish a state that would provide freedom and equality to its citizens. The religion 
of the state would be Islam. Turkish written in Arabic script would be the official 
language. The system of government was to be decided by the assembly.810 In May 1941, 
Ethem attempted to move to Damascus from Amman. However, he was thwarted by the 
French authorities. Following a demand from Ankara and Amman, Ethem and his friend 
Emin were arrested for a short time.811 Later, Ethem went to Aleppo, and met with some 
Circassians there. They included Selahattin Tamuh, Hasan, Çerkes İsmail from Istanbul 
and some others.812 After the Second World War started, the meeting focused on the 
possible German occupation of the Caucasus where Russia was in charge. The Germans 
promised that if they could occupy the Caucasus, then the Circassians, Georgians, and 
Azerbaijanis would have their own government under a federal state. The main idea of 
the meeting was to create propaganda to encourage the Circassians of Turkey and Syria 
to fight the Germans against Russia for their own government there.813  
It has to be emphasised that in Turkish historiography Ethem has always been 
portrayed as having rejected the pardon of the Turkish state, since he considered himself 
not guilty, and did not involve himself in any activities against Atatürk and Kemalists. 
Moreover, he rejected the idea of returning to Turkey even after the 150’ers had been 
pardoned. However, the records disprove this. After the amnesty was declared, the 
Turkish government informed its consulates that Ethem and Reşid should not be 
permitted Turkish passports and visas. On 11 June 1942, the National Police Directorate 
asked of the Prime Minister that the brothers be stripped of their Turkish citizenship.814 
Although this did not happen, Ethem was not refuse permission to come to Turkey. He 
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applied to the Turkish consulate twice; the first time in 1942 and then again in 1947. 
Despite his having been pardoned by the state after the amnesty law was passed, he was 
refused entry to Turkey due to his continued activities against the Turkish state.815 Among 
Ethem’s brothers, Tevfik was the first person to come to Turkey after the law was passed. 
However, he faced financial problems; as although his family had a mill, two houses, and 
about five hundred and eighty acres of land in Balıkesir, legal problems meant that he had 
difficulties reclaiming these assets.816 After Ethem’s death, Reşid’s son asked President 
Celal Bayar to allow his father’s return to Turkey in 1950. The Ankara governorship 
allowed Reşid to return to Turkey on 13 June 1950.817 Reşid came back to Turkey on 2 
September 1950, and settled in his son Hakkı Burcu’s house in the Bandırma district of 
Balıkesir,818 where he died in September 1951.  
 
Conclusion  
The list of 150’ers was prepared to ensure there would be no prospect of armed 
opposition to the new Turkish state. Therefore, many political names were not included 
on the list. Some of those, still judged to have the capacity to oversee an armed struggle, 
such as Çerkes Ethem and the Kuşçubaşı brothers were put on the list, and continued to 
be very active abroad. Their aim was to start an insurgency in Turkey, overthrowing the 
government and Mustafa Kemal. They had plans to do so for some time, but only in 1927 
did Çerkes Sami’s attempt come to fruition. The outcome of the attempt was that Sami 
and his brother Ahmed were killed, and three others were hanged based on the decision 
of the Istanbul court’s decision. This was the last serious attempt by the 150’ers to oppose 
the Kemalists and Mustafa Kemal. The attempts also represented an opportunity for the 
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republican regime to gather its citizens around the cult character of the republic, Mustafa 
Kemal. Citizens clustered together to practice rituals and curse those who had acted 
against their leader and the republic. These rituals were akin to religious ones. Keriman 
Halis’ becoming Miss World was viewed as a significant opportunity for the republican 
regime, since she was the true face of modern, liberated face of Turkish woman, which 
the regime wanted to show the world. Large events were organised to promote and 
celebrate her success both inside and outside of Turkey. However, when her Circassian 
origins were made public, she was hidden from public view and disappeared from the 
headlines. From being seen as a model for the new Turkish woman, and the face of the 
modern republic, she became an undesirable image, due to her ethnic origin. Her case 
shows that a narrow mind-set existed among the early republican policy makers, as they 
sought to create a homogenous nation from among the very different religious and ethnic 
groups that remained at the end of the empire. Although Keriman Halis did not suffer 
from state repression to the extent that anti-Kemalist Circassian military-men did, her 
case still reflects the fact that the Kemalist state had no sympathy for expressions of 
Circassian identity in the early republican period. When someone committed the error of 
displaying their non-Turkish ethnic identity in public, as Keriman Halis did, they were 
banned from public view and lost the praise of the regime. 
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Conclusion  
This thesis aimed to underline the transformation of the Ottoman Empire, by 
detailing its progress from empire to nation state through the lens of the paramilitary and 
political activities of the Circassians from 1918 to 1938. It not only focused on the history 
of Circassians in Turkey, but also the major breakpoints of modern Ottoman-Turkish 
history, including the creation of the Turkish nation state in the post WWI era, by 
providing a case study of the Circassians. It proposed to demonstrate how one loyal group 
of subjects in the Ottoman Empire, the Circassians, were forcibly turned into ‘loyal 
Turkish citizens’ of the new republic. Some of dictatorial policies of the early republican 
rulers denied the different identities of the people, demanding they adopt a Turkish 
identity. The Circassians were forced to assimilate as prohibitions were made against the 
use of non-Turkish languages, and other expressions of their identity in public places.  
The late Ottoman period witnessed profound breaking points in the empire’s 
history. At the beginning of the second constitutional period in 1908, political matters 
were excessively discussed within elite circles of the empire. After a relatively free 
atmosphere, following the loss of Bosnia, the occupation of Tripolitania by the Italians, 
and the Balkan Wars, the political split gradually became more distinctive. Political 
divisions increased between the two main political groups, namely the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) and the Liberal Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilaf). Although these 
differences were sometimes rather superficial, both groups harshly attacked and accused 
one another over the political decisions taken when the other was in power. In 1913, with 
the coup against the Sublime Porte and the CUP’s taking control over the empire, the 
opposition was either silenced by force or left the empire. The positions, taken by the 
CUP and Liberal Entente members in the post-WWI era were based on the pre-war 
division between the CUP and the Liberal Entente. This also affected the political 
atmosphere within the empire. When civil war broke out during the post-WWI period 
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between the Istanbul and Ankara governments in 1920 and 1921, those supporting the 
nationalist cause were close to the CUP, and those who supported the Ottoman Porte and 
the palace were former supporters of the Liberal Entente. The CUP did not have mass 
support behind it, since it was seen by the common people as responsible for the 
disastrous results of the wars fought in the last decade between 1911 and 1919. Its image 
in public was already very poor, and it was subject to growing dissent against it.  
Like other groups within the empire, the Circassians participated in the civil war 
on both sides, with some individuals playing significant roles. Anzavur Ahmed and the 
Adapazarı-Düzce incidents were the first threats that were believed to represent a 
challenge to the nationalist cause, with the potential to spread anti-nationalist sentiment 
to Ankara, the nationalist stronghold. The South Marmara and Adapazarı-Düzce 
Circassians opposed the nationalists, due to their ties with the Ottoman Porte and their 
reaction to the wartime policies of the CUP. Ankara was protected by Çerkes Ethem in 
the Anzavur, Adapazarı-Düzce, and Çapanoğlu incidents, and he became a nationalist 
figure as a result. However, the growing power of Ethem caused problems between him 
and his brothers on one side and the executives of the nationalist cause, Mustafa Kemal, 
İsmet (İnönü) and Refet (Bele), on the other. Ethem was a useful guerrilla fighter from 
the perspective of Ankara, as his forces had preserved Ankara three times from palpable 
threats. However, the regular army in Ankara was slowly becoming stronger as soldiers 
and military equipment were transferred from the Eastern front, and Bolshevik military 
and financial support poured in to strengthen the regular army. Following disagreement, 
however, Ethem was excluded from the nationalist circle at the end of December 1920.  
Ever since the Anzavur and Adapazarı-Düzce incidents, a group of Circassians in 
Western Anatolia opposed the nationalists. With the exclusion of Ethem and the 
expansion of the nationalists into the İzmit region in 1921, a group of Circassians altered 
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their pro-Istanbul policy to collaborate with Greek forces. Under Çule İbrahim Hakkı’s 
leadership, they aimed to create a form of Circassian nationalism that would distinguish 
them, from both the Istanbul and Ankara governments. They declared autonomy in the 
Greek occupied city of İzmir via a congress. However, their call for autonomy was 
supported by only a very small group of Circassians, certainly not the majority. This act 
created a very small, third group of Circassians in Anatolia, positioned ideologically 
alongside the nationalist (pro-Ankara) and loyalist (pro-Istanbul) camps.  
In the post-Turkish-Greek war period (1922-1923), the Ankara government was 
unable to gain control over the South Marmara region. Armed Circassian groups were the 
main security threat to the Ankara government at this time. Some of those close to Çerkes 
Ethem, such as Takığ Şevket, and some other opponents of Ankara such as Kuşçubaşı 
Eşref, aimed to create chaos and insurgency in the region to achieve their ultimate aim of 
overthrowing the Ankara government and Mustafa Kemal. During 1923, the group 
continued its opposition from the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Chaos was widespread 
in Western Anatolia because of the activities of the Circassians and other groups. 
Considering the significant Circassian population in the region, proportionally a very 
limited number joined them. However, Ankara took the radical decision to deport the 
Circassians in the region to eastern and central parts of Anatolia. A decision that took the 
form of a collective punishment for thousands. Although they were allowed to come back 
to their homes a few years later, the catastrophic impact of the deportation is still felt.  
Furthermore, Ankara took its revenge not only by deporting entire villages, but 
also by preparing a list of ‘traitors’, i.e. its wartime opponents. They were also deported 
from Turkey, and their citizenship revoked. Some members of this group, such as Çerkes 
Ethem, Sami and Eşref, planned and attempted to assassinate Mustafa Kemal, overthrow 
the government, and then return to Turkey. Their distrust of Mustafa Kemal was more 
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personal than ideological, since Mustafa Kemal had excluded them from the Nationalist 
cause in order to seize control of the national movement, and had not allow their respected 
leader, Enver Pasha, to return to Anatolia. On the other hand, the opposition in the post-
1923 period provided an opportunity for the republican regime to solidify its power over 
the people. The protests against those who attempted assassinations became a nationalist 
ritual, whereby citizens of the young republic came together in the squares around statues 
of Atatürk to ‘curse the traitors’.  
Before the single party regime was established, Turkey missed the huge 
opportunity to create a state for everyone. While there was a pluralistic structure to the 
first assembly (1920),819 it MPs were from a variety of backgrounds, from ulema to 
notables, bureaucrats and high-ranking military personnel. Although the government 
encountered difficulties making decisions, due to the frequent and lengthy discussions 
between the different groups in the assembly, the pluralistic structure had to be 
maintained, since the government required the support of the masses. During the Turkish-
Greek War, Mustafa Kemal gradually assumed a dominant, authoritarian position, as an 
extension of the rights extended to him as Commander-in- Chief, Head of the Assembly 
and the government (which gave him the right to choose who was going to be a MP).820 
With the defeat of the Greeks (1922), the Kemalists, and especially Mustafa Kemal, did 
not wish to sustain a pluralistic structure, since opposition was seen as an obstacle 
preventing them from modernising the country. The Kemalist modernist project was not 
built on pluralism, but rather applied top-down policies to create a nation state. Therefore, 
the opposition groups were gradually purged from political life, and the basis of an 
authoritarian political system was set down, creating the cult of a powerful leader in the 
early republican period that has endured in Turkish political life ever since. Although 
                                                          
819 Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclisʼte Muhalefet : İkinci Grup /, 5. baskı., Araştırma-Inceleme Dizisi ; 
(İstanbul : İletişim, 2009).  
820 Ibid. 231.  
230 
 
there were developments in the early republican era in social and cultural areas, this type 
of rule strengthened anti-democratic political culture in Turkish political life.821 The 
apparatus of the state was employed as a tool to shape the citizens of the republic. Through 
bureaucracy, the military and education, the state not only aimed to transform itself, but 
also to transform its citizens by interrupting daily life and making decisions for them in 
terms of the clothes they wore, what books they read, how they should look and what they 
should think. These things could only be decided by the state. 
The republican elites used state mechanisms to create a single typical citizen, 
rather than to create a multicultural state and society protecting the diverse natures of all 
its citizens. This approach led to the exclusion of some people from the centre by the 
elites, who held the state apparatus in their hands. Although society had always been 
diverse, the new state was based on the Kemalist ideology, which, as we have seen in this 
thesis, prohibited its citizens from expressing different identities in public, such as their 
mother tongues. Due to the oppressive policies in the early republican period, many 
people were not considered ‘true citizens’ of the republic. The state was not based on the 
values of the people; rather, it imposed its own values on the people by force.  
Similar to the other citizens of Turkey, the Circassians were restricted by the 
regime in terms of using their mother tongue and expressing their identities in public. 
Indeed, it must be underlined that these topics were not openly discussed until the 2000s, 
either in the Circassian community or in academic circles. The elder Circassians who 
lived through this catastrophic period preferred to forget what they had experienced, 
                                                          
821 Ibid. 608.  
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choosing not to mention it to the younger generations. When they spoke about these topics 
with their friends, any children present were ordered out of the room by the elders.822  
Another reason for the forgetting of the past was the reconciliation that took place 
between the Circassians and the state. The Circassians did not suffer from the single party 
regime as much as other groups within the country; i.e. the Kurds and other religious 
groups. With multiparty elections in 1950, for example, and the coming to power of the 
Democrat Party a reconciliation process began between the state and Circassians. The 
negative image the state had towards the Circassians in the 1920s and 1930s gradually 
disappeared. Cold War-politics also helped to change this image. Turkey and the Soviet 
Union were on opposite sides and the latter was now both the ‘enemy’ of the Turkish state 
and the Circassians.  
The Turkish state and many Circassians also had mutual interests against Soviet 
Russia. Turkey developed a good relationship with the North Caucasian emigrants who 
entered Turkey after the collapse of the North Caucasian Republic, from the early 1920s 
up until the 1970s as part of its foreign policy against Soviet Russia. Due to this 
relationship between the North Caucasian emigrants and the Turkish state, the latter 
extended privileged status to the North Caucasian political emigrants.823 Although the 
single party regime oppressed the Circassians of Turkey, it did not affect the foreign 
policy agenda, which was supported by the North Caucasian Emigrants. This was a win-
win situation for both the Turkish state and the North Caucasian Emigrants. While Turkey 
used the emigrants for its foreign policy, it was used by them as a safe haven in their 
struggle against Soviet Russia. The emigrants were supported by Turkey in terms of their 
                                                          
822 I met with two people who were sons of two personae non gratae (Yüzellilik) in Düzce and 
Gümülcine (Greece) Çule Baki Özcan and Sedat Reşat. I heard same story from both of them. They told 
me that they were not allowed by their fathers to listen to their conversations on these topics.  
823Arsen Avagyan, Türk Dış Siyasetinde Kuzey Kafkasya Siyasi Muhacereti (1920-1971) (İstanbul: Belge 
Yayınları, 2013), 14, 15. 
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publications, political mobilisation, and of establishing political networks with others of 
Circassian origin in European associations.824  
In terms of using the emigrants effectively, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the military, police, and intelligence services worked in coordination.825 From the 1920s 
until the end of the 1930s, Turkey was much more independent in terms of creating policy 
and using emigrants. In 1925, Istanbul was seen as a centre for emigrants by Russia, and 
thus represented an opportunity to strengthen its own network via intelligence agents.826 
From late 1930 to the mid-1940s onwards, Turkey worked with Great Britain, France, 
Poland and later Germany against Russia.827 Although the Circassians had difficulties 
with the Turkish nation state in the first two decades of the regime, aside from a few 
minority groups of Circassians, even the anti-Kemalist Circassians had never aimed to 
establish an independent state. They fought against Mustafa Kemal and his single party 
regime and tried to overthrow it, with the aim of replacing it with a more pluralistic one. 
They never had fundamental problems with the other peoples living in Anatolia. One can 
argue that despite some problems in the early republican period, the Circassians did not 
have an especially negative impact on either the state or society. Therefore, one might 
also claim that with the arrival of these latest emigrants, the Circassians were given a little 
bit more freedom, being allowed officially by the state to open the first non-Turkish 
community association in modern republican history with the Azerbaijanis of Turkey, 
namely the ‘Dost Eli Yardımlaşma Derneği’ in 1946.828 Furthermore, from the 
intelligence service to the military, the Circassians were not restricted in Turkey post-
1950.  
                                                          
824 Ibid. 14, 15.  
825 Ibid. 16, 17.  
826 Ibid. 128.  
827 Ibid. 16, 17.  
828 Ibid. 18. 
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Another important topic covered in this thesis in relation to Circassians in the 
republican era, was the Çerkes Ethem incident. Although a limited reconciliation 
occurred between the Circassians and the Turkish State in the post 1950s era, the issue of 
Çerkes Ethem was an ambiguous topic for Circassians. On the one hand, while Çerkes 
Ethem did not represent all the Circassians in Turkey, and not the all Circassians 
supported him, he nevertheless became a symbol for the Circassians. He was introduced 
to pupils in schools as a traitor, something that persists in the official curriculum until 
today. Although there are plenty of interpretations of his life, school texts still rely on 
Atatürk’s Nutuk, in which Atatürk accuses Ethem of being an agent who worked for 
himself and the interests of the other states.  
On the other hand, elsewhere Ethem came to have a very positive meaning for 
some Circassians, especially those who felt themselves close to republican Turkey and 
were proud of Ethem for having supressed three very significant incidents, which had 
saved Ankara from defeat at the hands of anti-nationalists. Indeed, this became part of a 
newly imagined Circassian identity, which glorified having one of its own responsible for 
founding modern Turkey, along with an emphasis on the significant numbers of high-
ranking soldiers and bureaucrats who participated in the nationalist struggle to fight 
against the occupation. Ethem’s suppression of the incidents strengthened this narrative 
and became a founding element of Turkey. They used Ethem to prove their ‘loyalty’ to 
the Turkish state and its values, but only focused on his early activities from 1919 to 
December 1920, ignoring his later exclusion from the nationalist circle. The activities 
post-December 1920 were not considered, since they were seen as too complex and 
damaging to Ethem’s image as a saviour of Turkey, rather than as an assassin or 
insurgency leader aiming to overthrow Mustafa Kemal (as had actually happened in the 
post-1921 period). 
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However, what is interesting here is that the Circasssians prefer not to recall that 
the majority of Circassians were loyal to the Sultan/Caliph, as were the majority of 
Anatolia’s peoples. This group rose against the nationalists since they did not want to be 
engaged in war any longer; indeed, they were very war-weary by this time. Furthermore, 
a group of Circassians, the majority of whom were former Ottoman soldiers and agents, 
aimed to create an insurgency in Turkey in opposition to the Kemalists. One of the reasons 
for the problems noted is that Ethem’s life was not evaluated from beginning to end. Some 
groups and people used part of his life to support their own arguments, either claiming 
that he was a ‘hero’, or the reverse, that he was a ‘traitor.’ This approach also dominates 
Turkish academia, and there is not yet a well-documented and balanced book or thesis 
relating to him written in Turkish.  
Undoubtedly, the Circassians suffered from state oppression in the early 
republican period, but their suffering was in fact much less when compared to that of the 
Kurds and other minority groups. However, they did suffer from oppression by the state 
in ideological terms, as a response to their closeness to the Ottoman State, especially the 
Harem and the military and intelligence services, and because of the Çerkes Ethem 
incident. For high-ranking Kemalists, politicians and statesman in the early republican 
period, Circassian identity was associated with either ‘backwardness’, the Ottoman State 
or the ‘traitor’ Çerkes Ethem. They were seen by the republican elites as a reminder of 
the bad old days of the Ottoman Empire, and the civil war between the Ankara and 
Istanbul governments. On the other hand, because the Circassian population lived in rural 
areas and villages, their oppression by the state did not result in full assimilation or 
adoption of the new Turkish identity being promoted in the republican era. Indeed, the 
Turkish State was not sufficiently well organised to interrupt the daily life of the rural 
population, and so the Circassians continued to live very close to their own ethnic kin, 
practicing inter-Circassian marriage widely.  
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It can be argued that the urbanisation of the Circassian population after the 1950s 
had a huge impact on the assimilation of Circassian identity; even more so than the 
policies of the Kemalists in the early republican period. Prior to this, the Circassians lived 
in villages where they were isolated from the centre and their identity was protected from 
the assimilationist policies of the Kemalism. However, with the higher rates of 
urbanisation, the influence of the Kemalist nation state ideology increased on the 
Circassians. Thus, when the Kemalist regime was most oppressive, between the 1920s, 
1930s, and 1940s, the Circassian identity was less affected by its policies, since the 
Turkish state could no longer control the rural areas as effectively as the urban ones. 
However, although the Turkish state had begun to be less oppressive from the 1950s 
onwards, preventing the Circassian identity from assimilation was much more difficult 
than it had been in the previous period, since the Circassians moved to the cities and were 
educated en masse under the Kemalist education system.  
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